Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1973

THE SOVIET MILITARY

Foreign Policy Role
Malcolm Mackintosh

Party Ties
William E. Odom

MOLDING COMMUNIST YOUTH

The USSR
Joel J. Schwartz

China
Ronald N. Montaperto

CASTRO'S COURSE
Carmelo Mesa-Lago

Book Reviews
John A. Armstrong
Wayne S. Smith
Harold J. Noah
Jeffrey W. Hahn
Victor C. Falkenheim

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SEPT-OCT 1973 VOL. XXII

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SUBSCRIPTIONS: Within the United States, annual subscriptions or single copies of *Problems of Communism* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Price per copy: $1.00. Subscription price: $5.50. Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may in most cases be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. The journal can also be ordered directly from the US Government Printing Office at the prices listed above, plus 25 percent for foreign mailing.

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INDEXING: Articles in *Problems of Communism* are indexed, *inter alia*, in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, the *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), and *ABC POL SCI*.

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Cover: Party and military leaders view samples of Soviet military might in Red Square, Moscow, on November 7, 1972. Photo by V. Mastiukov for TASS, via Sovfoto.

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The Soviet Military

EDITORS' NOTE: Throughout history military power has been one of the vital sinews of the foreign, and sometimes the domestic, policy of national states. This aspect of the nexus between power and policy is clear and indisputable. More complex is the matter of the influence of military men as such upon the process of formulating and determining policies which they will be called upon to support, and with which they may or may not be in agreement. Here, questions of constitutional structure and practice, of national traditions and cultural norms, as well as the interplay of individual convictions and interest-group politics, inevitably come to the fore. And, in the nuclear age, the impact of dramatically increased military might on the status of the military within the political system of a state raises additional complex questions affecting internal as well as foreign policy. The following two articles explore some of these many questions within the context of contemporary Soviet policy and practice. Mr. Mackintosh addresses himself to the role of the Soviet military establishment in foreign policy decision-making, while Mr. Odom examines the relationship of the military to the main locus of Soviet political power, the Communist Party.

Influence on Foreign Policy

By Malcolm Mackintosh

No one would deny that the Soviet Union is at present engaged in a series of active and sophisticated foreign policy initiatives on a worldwide basis. In these circumstances, the identification of the power structures in the Soviet Union which have real potential influence over decision-making in this crucial area has rarely been more intriguing or more important. Of those power structures, the large military establishment is certainly one of the most vital. It is the purpose of this article to explore the nature and extent of the influence of the military on foreign policy decision-making. There is, of course, some evidence that the military is not necessarily united in its views on foreign and defense policy; however, this is a separate study in its own right. In the present article "the military" is intended to mean the likely majority grouping within the High Command.

Before embarking on our inquiry, mention should be made of some basic background factors and issues that are important in any analysis of this complex subject. It should be noted, for example, that there is a difference between the roles of the military in influencing defense policy on the one hand and foreign policy on the other. Defense is, of course, part of the military's business, and military

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influence in that sphere is, on the whole, easier to trace. Foreign policy, however, is the military's business only if the Communist Party invites the soldiers to participate in decision-making on foreign issues—and here the recent promotion of Marshal Andrei A. Grechko to full membership on the Politburo is naturally significant. We shall be looking at the role of the military in both fields, but to separate them arbitrarily into two subjects would probably not correspond to Soviet reality.

Secondly, the physical power, sophistication, and diversification of the Soviet armed forces' capabilities have grown steadily since the war. Apart from the postwar demobilization of the 1945–47 period and some cuts in manpower in 1955 and 1958, the trend has been for the Soviet forces to increase in size and in capabilities, especially during the 1960's and 1970's. Two new branches of the armed forces were added to the traditionally large land army and its air force and the navy: *i.e.,* the Air Defense Command in 1954 and the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959. The navy has greatly expanded and modernized its fleets, and effective marine, air transport, and airborne forces have been developed in support of the traditional concepts of Soviet military power. It is very largely because of the great buildup of the Soviet armed forces, together with Soviet economic and technological development, that the Soviet Union has been able to pull itself up into the superpower class alongside the United States, and the Soviet military establishment is entitled to claim both credit for achieving this power and an interest in how it is used in support of the country's foreign policy.

The third point, which is more of an issue than a factor, relates to the problem of military access to the decision-makers. At least since the death of Stalin, the military seems on the whole to have had reasonable access to the political leaders in the sense that its members have been heard as professional experts called in to give an authoritative view on military matters. For example, the Minister of Defense, even when not a member of the Politburo, may well have been able to attend Politburo meetings on invitation, although there is no evidence to support this. It is possible that most senior members of the military establishment have been content with this usually limited role. But it also seems likely that in a system in which the political leadership relies so much on its military power to achieve its goals in foreign policy and to back up the USSR's claim to be the other superpower, there must be an urge within the armed forces to have a greater say in decision-making. In other words, there must be strong pressure within the Ministry of Defense in Moscow to ensure that the degree of formalistic access the military has already gained to the party decision-makers should mean both influence over and participation in decisions on foreign and defense policy. Thus, the central issue in the problem of the role of the leaders of the armed forces in this field appears to be: Does access necessarily mean influence?

Military Access to Decision-making

In order to study more closely the nature and results of the access to the political decision-makers accorded to the military, let us look first at the present institutional structure (as far as we know it) of the relationship between the party leaders and the Ministry of Defense. Clearly, the Politburo is the decision-making body with respect to both defense and foreign affairs in the Soviet Union, and traditionally the General or First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has assumed top responsibility for directing Soviet foreign and defense policies. This is as true of Brezhnev today as it was of Khrushchev and Stalin. Moreover, we know from Soviet sources that the Politburo can deal with the details of weaponry as well as with the broader issues of force structure and employment.[1] We may assume from what we know of the Soviet system that only the Politburo can make a decision to go to war, to send troops into another country (as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968), to deploy combat units abroad (as to Egypt in 1970), or to use nuclear weapons. The Politburo also probably decides on the size, nature, balance and organization of the armed forces, as well as on their armament and deployment. In addition, it decides the type of political indoctrination the military forces receive through the army's Main Political Administration.[2] Apart from a few turbulent months in 1957 when Khrushchev

[1] In 1935, for example, the matter of what caliber the Red Army's standard anti-aircraft gun should be was referred to the Politburo for a decision: see N. F. Kuzmin, *Na strazhe mirnovo truda, 1921-1940* (On Guard over Peaceful Labor, 1921-1940), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1941, p. 153.

[2] The Main Political Administration of the armed forces is both part of the Ministry of Defense and a Department of the Party's Central Committee.

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admitted Marshal Georgii Zhukov to full membership on the Politburo, the party leadership has normally excluded professional soldiers from that body. Hence, Marshal Grechko's promotion to the Politburo in May 1973 may mark a new departure in army-party relations and in the system of checks and balances hitherto maintained by the Soviet political leadership.

Since the Politburo makes the final decisions on virtually every aspect of Soviet life, it is to be expected that some of its work on military affairs is delegated to, or handled in, a more specialized forum. This appears to be the Defense Council (*sovet oborony*) whose predecessor, the Higher Military Council (*vysshii voennyi sovet*) was mentioned in the case against Marshal Zhukov in 1957.[3] At that time the Higher Military Council, whose work Zhukov was apparently trying to disrupt, included both party and military leaders and was thus the highest-level organization in which the two leaderships could meet in formal session. It presumably had consultative rather than decision-making functions, but it is also possible that, as a joint military-political body, it might have been intended to form the nucleus of a supreme military-political leadership to direct the overall Soviet war effort in the event of hostilities with the West or with China. At some point after 1957 (perhaps after the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964), the Higher Military Council seems to have been renamed the Defense Council, possibly for presentational reasons. Western experts have recently referred to it as "the Defense Council" or as "the Defense Committee (or the Supreme Military Council)." [4] No information is available from Soviet sources on the responsibilities or the membership of the Defense Council today, but until the Minister of Defense was admitted to the Politburo in 1973, the Council was probably the military leaders' nearest point of access to the party chiefs on a constitutional basis.

Next in the hierarchy comes the Council of Ministers, of which the Minister of Defense is of course a member. In this capacity, he is in contact with and subordinate to the Council's chairman, Premier Kosygin, and the various First Deputy Chairmen of



Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, pictured in December 1966.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is empowered to appoint specialist commissions on various subjects, including military-industrial problems, on which the armed forces are to be represented. But the Council's main military element is the Ministry of Defense, which has so far been headed by an active professional soldier.[5]

The Ministry of Defense is a unified ministry administering and controlling the General Staff, the five "branches" of the Soviet armed forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Homeland Air Defense Command, the Ground Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy—and the logistic and support directorates which maintain the armed forces in peacetime and prepare it for war. The Minister, through his commanders-in-chief, can issue direct orders to the Strategic Rocket, Strategic Air, and Air Defense Forces and the Navy; and, on the evidence of the Czechoslovak operation of 1968, he can likewise issue orders through the General Staff to the Ground and Tactical Air Forces. Thus, his powers of force employment are considerable. However, authorization to exercise them can come only from the Politburo, perhaps through the Defense Council. The Ministry of Defense, moreover, has its own "Main

[3] Yu. P. Petrov, *Partiinoe stroitelstvo v sovetskoi armii i flote* (Party Structure in the Soviet Army and Navy), 1st Ed., Moscow, 1964, p. 462.

[4] John Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, 1971, p. 29; and Lt. C. David Miller, "Soviet Armed Forces and Political Pressure," *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), December 1969, p. 65.

[5] In April 1967, when Marshal Malinovsky died, there was some press speculation in Moscow that he might be succeeded as Minister of Defense by a civilian, the experienced armaments expert, D. F. Ustinov. See *Morning Star* (London), April 5, 1967. As it turned out, Marshal Grechko was appointed to the post April 14, 1967, but the issue could reappear.

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Military Council," which issues directives to the armed forces on matters such as the need to improve discipline and party political work.[6]

Members of the armed forces also come into contact with political leaders through the CPSU Central Committee, on which 36 military officers at present serve as full or candidate members. Central Committee plenums discuss foreign (as well as domestic) affairs, and military members of the Committee are known to have spoken on these occasions.[7] On a routine basis, military affairs at the Central Committee level are dealt with by two departments: the Main Political Administration (already mentioned), which is responsible for the quality and direction of the political work in the armed forces; and the Administrative Organs Department. The former is headed by Army General A. A. Yepishev (who incidentally served under Brezhnev as an Army political officer in 1945), and the latter by a career political officer, N. I. Savinkin, whose war service was mostly in the Far East. To judge from Soviet military press comment, the Administrative Organs Department is primarily concerned with personnel and similar matters.[8]

From this brief survey of the formal points of contact between the military and the political decision-makers, it seems clear that the Ministry of Defense receives its directives from the Politburo, probably by way of the Defense Council, and is then responsible for the formulation and implementation of the party's military doctrine and for the preparation of the armed forces to put it into practice if required. Disputed points which reach the highest military level can presumably be debated in the Defense Council, or perhaps in a commission set up by the Central Committee or the Council of Ministers. Two vital responsibilities are reserved to the Politburo: the final acceptance of current military doctrine, and orders to deploy forces abroad or to go to war.

Finally, in this consideration of military access to the political leadership, we should not forget the probable influence of personal relationships. A great deal of Soviet business is probably done, as in other countries, behind the scenes and through personal and social contacts. Stalin terrified his military commanders, and they had minimum personal contact with him. Khrushchev in the 1950's built up his own "group" of army leaders who had served with him at the battle of Stalingrad and in the Ukraine; but he then antagonized them by slighting their advice and treating them in some instances with contempt. All the evidence suggests that Brezhnev has cultivated the military leaders both professionally and personally. While maintaining his authority over them, he has stabilized army-party relations and cemented a close personal relationship with Grechko which seems to have created, among other things, a new and less formal channel of communication between the Minister of Defense and the General Secretary of the party.

The Riddle of Military Influence

When we turn to consider the effectiveness of these formal and informal channels of communication and means of access for the military to approach the party leadership, we have to admit that we have no direct evidence as to what advice may have been given by the military to the political leaders on any significant aspect of foreign policy, whether that advice was unanimous among the military leaders,

Leonid Brezhnev as a political commissar in World War II, pictured addressing troops of the 18th Army prior to the campaign in the Carpathians.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

[6] See Petrov, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., 1968, p. 507, for a reference to a decree of the Main Military Council on party-political work, issued in April 1962.

[7] For example, Marshal Grechko, then Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, spoke at a Central Committee Plenum on December 12-13, 1966, on "the international policy of the USSR and the struggle of the CPSU for the solidarity of the Communist movement."

[8] See the Soviet Army's daily paper *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), July 15, 1972, for an indication of the type of work done by this department.

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and whether or not it was accepted by the Politburo. Looking back over the last seven years, we cannot *prove* that the military was in favor of, or opposed, military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the deployment of combat units to Egypt in 1970 and their enforced withdrawal in 1972. Nor have we any direct evidence on the true attitude of the Soviet armed forces with respect to the political and military confrontation with China, although we are probably justified in assuming that the military favors a tough line against so obvious a national enemy. We also know very little about recent reaction among the military to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the agreement of 1972.

It is, of course, true that the Soviet military press has discussed many of these issues, generally in terms that support the line taken by the Soviet government. While it is possible to detect changes of emphasis by one or another of the well-known military writers on foreign and defense affairs—such as Lt. General I. G. Zavialov and Major-Generals V. Zemskov and E. Sulimov [9]—we should remember that articles published in the central military press or in the journals of the various branches of the armed forces are prepared under the supervision of the Main Political Administration acting in its capacity as a department of the party Central Committee. In many cases, therefore, it would be misleading to assume that an article appearing in these papers or journals under the signature of a general or an admiral necessarily expresses the views of the military establishment or the author of the article. There are exceptions, of course—as, for example, when an officer of the seniority of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, who has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy since 1956, publicizes his concept of the role of the Navy in support of Soviet foreign policy.[10] In general, however, it is difficult to rely upon published articles in the Soviet military press for the purpose of ascertaining individual military views on defense or foreign policy issues or learning what part the military establishment played in crises abroad involving the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, it is very important to distinguish between the growth and diversification of Soviet military capabilities that make it possible for the Soviet Union to intervene, effect a presence, or have a say in a certain part of the world, on the one hand, and evidence that the military leaders (who clearly welcome such heightened capabilities in general terms) do or do not advocate the policies that are then followed by the Soviet government, on the other.

Thus, the buildup of strategic nuclear forces in the late 1960's enabled the Soviet government to take part in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as the equal of the United States, but we cannot *prove* that military opinion advocated the kind of agreement that was reached in 1972, or would have preferred a continuation of the strategic arms race. Similarly, expansion of the Soviet air and air defense forces enabled the Soviet government to deploy combat units to Egypt in 1970, but we do not know from *direct* evidence whether there was any military opposition to the potential risks involved in the development of the Soviet Union's first overseas military base in Egypt, a non-Communist country. The worldwide capabilities now possessed by the Soviet Navy have allowed the Soviet government to deploy a submarine nuclear strike force off the east coast of the United States, to maintain a "Guinea patrol" off the west coast of Africa, and to move a task force into the Bay of Bengal during the war between India and Pakistan in December 1971; but we cannot say with any certainty whether any of these actions resulted from a Navy initiative or aroused any doubts within the Ministry of Defense concerning the risks involved.

Some Case Studies

In spite of these rather discouraging reservations, let us look at a few specific cases in recent years in which Soviet foreign policy has involved the use of military forces or has had military implications. Somewhat arbitrarily, we have chosen one case involving a non-Communist country, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967; one concerned with Eastern Europe, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and one connected with the USSR's strategic relationship with the United States, the SALT negotiations, the first stage of which was completed in 1972. There are, of course, other cases of equal or greater importance—such as Soviet foreign policies with respect to China and to the Vietnam War—but an examination of the three cases selected may enable us to arrive at some general guidelines with respect

[9] *E.g.*, see General Zavialov's article in *Krasnaia zvezda* of April 19, 1973, on Soviet military and political doctrine in relation to modern war and the objectives of the armed forces.

[10] He did this in an interesting series of articles published in *Morskoi sbornik* (Moscow), Nos. 2-12, 1972, and No. 2, 1973.

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to Soviet military attitudes and their influence on foreign policy decisions.

Let us take the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 first. The Soviet Union had been arming Egypt for a number of years in the period following the Suez crisis of 1956 and had also been supplying arms to Syria and Iraq, while the United States and France had kept Israel supplied with weapons and equipment. No Soviet forces were stationed on Egyptian soil in 1967, but there were considerable numbers of Soviet advisers and technicians attached to the Egyptian armed forces, and many Arabs clearly were under the impression that the Soviet Union had committed itself to their defense in the event of another war with Israel. As the 1967 crisis moved toward its climax in May and June and President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran and ordered the United Nations force out of the Sinai, Soviet diplomacy appeared until the last minute to encourage the Egyptians to act belligerently. There were also reports that Soviet military intelligence was spreading allegations of Israeli troop concentrations against Syria and of Israeli plans to attack Syria in a matter of days.[11]

When war erupted on June 5, 1967, the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies suffered total defeat, and the Sinai, the west bank of the Jordan, and the Golan heights were occupied by Israeli forces. Hundreds of Soviet-made guns, tanks, aircraft, small arms and ammunition were destroyed or captured, and Soviet policy as well as the Soviet Union's reputation as a reliable ally suffered a catastrophic setback among the Arabs. There must certainly have been serious recriminations in Moscow as a consequence of the defeat of the Soviet Union's Arab clients. Moreover, although no evidence is available on the prior attitude of the military toward the government's Middle East policy as it developed, there are grounds for believing that at least one aspect of the crisis worried the military establishment.

Two weeks after the outbreak of the war, a Central Committee Plenum was held in Moscow on June 20–21, 1967. The first item on the agenda was "the policy of the Soviet Union toward Israeli aggression in the Middle East," and the sole announced speaker was Brezhnev. We do not know how Brezhnev defended Soviet policy in the Middle East crisis, but some criticism of the Soviet course appears to have been voiced at the Plenum by N. G. Yegorychev, First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Yegorychev was dismissed and demoted after the Plenum,[12] and he never recovered his party position.

The interesting point here is that Yegorychev, as First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, was also a member of the Military Councils of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Air Defense District, the latter commanded by V. V. Okunev. (These political-military councils direct the activities of all high-level Soviet force headquarters.) In July the Moscow Air Defense District Military Council held a special meeting attended by Yegorychev's successor, V. Grishin,[13] and the District then launched a lengthy air defense exercise. All this suggests that if Yegorychev did criticize Brezhnev's handling of the Middle East crisis at the June Plenum, he may have done so in his capacity as a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Air Defense District, for he would probably have had no grounds for intervening in a debate on foreign affairs in his normal capacity as the party leader of Moscow City.

While there is no evidence that Yegorychev had any military background, one can reasonably surmise that he may have been put up to his intervention in the Plenum debate by members of the military establishment. One can further surmise that what the military may have been saying, through Yegorychev, was in effect that the Soviet air defense systems were unready for war, and that if the Arab-Israeli conflict had escalated into a Soviet-American confrontation, the military establishment would not have been able to guarantee the air defense of the Soviet Union. If this interpretation is correct, the implication would be that in 1967 at least some members of the military considered the policy pursued by the Soviet government in the Middle East crisis too risky. This interpretation also suggests that members of the military establishment have tried to press their views on the Politburo through individual party leaders.

Before moving on to the other two cases, it may be useful to add some observations with regard to the probable attitude of the Soviet military toward the later evolution of Soviet policy in the Middle

[11] The evidence of such Soviet activities is reviewed in A. S. Becker and A. L. Horelick, *Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, Rand Corporation, September 1970, pp. 46-49. Specific mention is made of Soviet approval of the deployment of Egyptian forces into the Sinai in mid-May 1967.

[12] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 28, 1967.

[13] Petrov, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., p. 506.

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East conflict. We do not know for certain how the Soviet military viewed Moscow's decision to deploy combat units to Egypt after the Israelis' deep penetration air raids during 1970–1971, or to the decision to use Egyptian airfields for the purpose of Soviet reconnaissance patrols against NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean. So far as the latter is concerned, there presumably would have been a good deal of professional military support since reconnaissance from Egyptian bases would augment the Soviet armed forces' overall capabilities against NATO. With regard to the former, one can speculate that the military probably regarded the close involvement of Soviet military power in the defense of Egypt from 1970 to 1972 and the establishment of a large Soviet military mission in Cairo (interestingly enough, under the same General V. V. Okunev who had been in command of the Moscow Air Defense District in June 1967) as at least assuring the Soviet government of the kind of political control over Egyptian actions that had been lacking in 1967. It is therefore likely that the military leaders were less worried about the risks inherent in the 1970–72 involvement than they had been about those in 1967. Such an attitude would be consistent with the feeling among observers in Moscow since the expulsion of Soviet military personnel from Egypt in July 1972 that the USSR does not consider itself bound to help Egypt militarily in the event of another Arab-Israeli war.



General V.V. Okunev, chief Soviet military adviser in Egypt, is presented a medal by Egyptian War Minister Mohamed Sadek (right) at a farewell reception.

—UPI photo.

The Invasion of Czechoslovakia

The second case study is that of the Soviet Army's invasion of Czechoslovakia, along with forces from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and the GDR, in August 1968. Here again we have to admit that we have no direct evidence of the views of the military on the decision to invade an ally's territory and overthrow its legal government by force. All we can say definitely is that the Soviet armed forces, in virtually ideal circumstances and without the urgency of an international crisis, built up a large invasion force around Czechoslovakia's frontiers between April and August of 1968 and then, upon the Politburo's order to invade, carried out a swift, overwhelming, and effective operation which successfully achieved the political objectives of the Soviet leadership.

The natural assumption in these circumstances is that the Soviet military welcomed the opportunity to display the country's military might, to prevent a member of the Warsaw Pact from defecting into neutrality, and to put the armed forces to a practical test in a realistic politico-military situation. One Soviet general, who commanded the Trans-Caucasus Military District, did in fact write that the invasion of Czechoslovakia provided an excellent testing ground for Soviet military training.[14] Another Soviet statement declared that "the counterrevolutionaries wanted to drive a wedge into the heart of the Warsaw Pact area, and through the Czechoslovak corridor, so to speak, West German soldiers could have marched straight to the Soviet border, and with them would be American troops." [15]

There is also no doubt that the Soviet military took the occasion very seriously as a test of their command and control procedures at the highest level. A very large forward headquarters of the Soviet General Staff was set up at Lignica in Poland in early August, and Stalin's wartime Chief of Operations, General S. M. Shtemenko, was recalled from

[14] Colonel-General S. K. Kurkotkin, in *Zaria vostoka* (Tbilisi), Feb. 23, 1969. General Kurkotkin was subsequently appointed to command the Soviet Group of Forces in East Germany in September 1971.

[15] Radio Moscow, Sept. 4, 1968.

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Soviet Army General A.A. Yepishev, Head of the Main Political Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, arrives in Prague on May 18, 1968, as the Czechoslovak crisis builds toward the August intervention by troops of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armies.

—Photo by CTK (Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency) via Eastfoto.

an administrative post to take charge of the invasion under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, General I. G. Pavlovsky.[16]

One of the most interesting military lessons of the invasion was in fact the transfer of command from the regular Warsaw Pact headquarters to the Soviet High Command at the beginning of August. The Warsaw Pact, under Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, supervised the buildup of forces around the Czechoslovak territory during the exercise known as "Sumava," which was staged in Czechoslovakia in June. As soon as the deployment was complete, however, the Warsaw Pact handed over command to the Soviet General Staff—a procedure which might well be followed in the event of war in Europe.

Perhaps the only hint of Soviet military views was contained in a report published in *Le Monde* early in the crisis. On May 6, 1968, the Paris newspaper reported that the head of the Soviet Army's Main Political Administration, General Yepishev, had broached the possibility that "faithful Communists" in Czechoslovakia might appeal to the Soviet Union for military intervention, and had intimated that, if this happened, the Soviet Army would be ready to do its duty. Although the report was denied on May 19 by the Czechoslovak News Agency (General Yepishev was in Prague on this date), it may well have been basically accurate. Further, Yepishev could have been speaking either in his party or in his military capacity inasmuch as it seems likely that the advice of the military establishment would have favored the invasion of Czechoslovakia—assuming that NATO intervention could be ruled out—in order to preserve the "buffer zone" west of the Soviet frontier intact.

As for the role of the Soviet military in the final decision to invade, this is hard to assess. A study of Marshal Grechko's movements during August 1968, as reported in the press, shows that he inspected the invasion forces in East Germany and Poland with General Yepishev from August 15 to 18 and was not in Moscow to greet the Finnish Defense Minister, who arrived there on August 17.[17] This does not prove, however, that he did not attend the critical meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow on August 18-19, which reportedly took the final decision to occupy Czechoslovakia.[18] The most likely conclusion is that, if Grechko did attend the meeting, he reported on the readiness of his troops to move and was not called upon at this late stage to press the case for invasion on an already convinced party leadership.

The SALT Negotiations

This brings us to the third case study, *i.e.*, the SALT negotiations between the US and the USSR—a matter of vital concern to the Soviet military leaders since it affects the essential element of Soviet national security and defense policy more directly than even the preservation of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, and certainly more than support for a Middle Eastern ally. Soviet agreement to Strategic Arms

[16] See the author's "The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact," International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphia Paper No. 58, 1969, pp. 14-15.

[17] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Aug. 18, 1968.

[18] Radio Free Europe Research Memorandum, "Czechoslavakia in 1968—A Chronology," Munich, Jan. 22, 1969, p. 12.

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Limitation Talks with the United States was initially announced on June 27, 1968, and was reiterated after the occupation of Czechoslavakia, on January 20, 1969. The talks began in November of the latter year and were concluded at the Moscow summit of May 1972, in the form of the agreement limiting the construction of anti-ballistic missile defenses in the Soviet Union and the United States and the interim agreement on offensive strategic missiles. The second round of the talks opened in November 1972.

From the point of view of the Soviet political leadership, the SALT negotiations have everything to recommend them. Through them the Soviet Union once again confirms its position as the other superpower alongside the United States; the Soviet Union is enabled to save a considerable amount of money and resources by eliminating the risk of a new round in the strategic arms race (which the Soviet Union could not win); and the interim agreement, though not without its advantages for the United States, secures the latter's assent to Soviet totals of nuclear delivery vehicles that assure to the Soviet Union the capacity to destroy vital American targets. Moreover, research and development are allowed to continue unhindered on both sides.

It would appear that the 1972 SALT agreements should also satisfy Soviet military planners on several counts. First, the agreed totals allow the Soviet Union to retain numerical superiority in land-based missiles and to continue expanding its arsenal of submarine-launched missiles up to a total yet to be decided but probably in the area which the Soviet military would have wished to reach anyway. Second, the Soviet defense industry can still produce MIRVs for the strategic nuclear forces. Third, the anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) agreement prevents the US from moving ahead with the kind of "thick" anti-missile defense which only the US could afford, while averting the vast expenditures on both sides which ABM defense demands. Finally, the leaders of the theater forces, which are not covered by the agreement, may well hope that they can absorb some of the resources that will be saved on strategic weapons.

Civilian and military members of the Soviet negotiating team arrive at the US Embassy in Vienna in April 1970 for the second round of SALT. From the left, V.S. Semionov, Chief of the Soviet delegation, John P. Humes, US Ambassador to Austria, Raymond Garthoff (back to camera), secretary of the American team, and Col. Gen. N.V. Ogarkov, Nikolai Kishilov, Col. Gen. N.N. Alekseev, and Oleg Grinevsky of the Soviet SALT team.

—Photo by USIS Vienna.

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Published statements by Marshal Grechko and his colleagues have unequivocally supported the official line on SALT, and there have been no recent indications of military disagreement with the negotiations or the agreements concluded.[19] But this was not so when the concept of strategic arms limitation was first raised. In December 1968, a Soviet military writer subordinate to the Main Political Administration of the armed forces underlined the importance of adequate strategic nuclear weapons by saying that to overemphasize the importance of conventional weapons was a "more serious error" than the mistake of relying too completely on nuclear arms.[20] In April 1969, still another officer commented that the American decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM system proved that the United States was not interested in limiting the strategic arms race.[21]

These quotations suggest that both the professional military and the political officers of the armed forces were apprehensive of the SALT negotiations in their early stages. As the talks went on, however, public expressions of military concern faded—partly, no doubt, because the issue of Soviet participation in the negotiations entered the field of the highest-level political decision-making, but partly also, perhaps, because the party was able to show the military, as the outline of the ultimate agreement emerged, that their interests would not suffer.

As for military representation at the talks themselves, the Soviet delegation included the First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Colonel-General N. V. Ogarkov, representing the armed services with respect to operational and intelligence aspects of the subjects under discussion, and Colonel-General N. N. Alexeev, a General Staff officer with a technical background in missiles and electronic equipment. A third senior officer who was sometimes present, Colonel-General A. A. Gryzlov, was also a career General Staff officer. (While the talks were in progress General Alexeev was promoted to a Deputy Minister of Defense, and his place was taken by another representative of the General Staff, General K. A. Trusov.) The course of the talks provided some indications that the military representatives were not overly eager to pass on military information to the civilian members of the Soviet delegation, who found themselves deferring to the generals and postponing the discussion of certain items until the Ministry of Defense was ready to contribute.

To sum up the evidence in this particular case, it seems probable that some influential Soviet military figures were initially skeptical about the strategic arms limitation concept and the desirability of negotiating with the United States, but that this attitude changed as the talks developed. Clearly, the conduct of the negotiations depended a great deal on the military contribution, and the promotion of one of the senior military delegates while the talks were under way may have been significant in this context, although there is no proof that the importance of the SALT negotiations was responsible for the move. In any case, the evidence suggests that as the talks proceeded and the outline of the eventual agreement took shape, the military realized that its requirements were going to be met and therefore modified or abandoned its early reservations. Although the party had the ability to force the military into line by "administrative measures" (to use the Soviet phrase) or by removing opponents of its policy from their positions, it clearly proved unnecessary to resort to such measures in the case of SALT.

Some Conclusions

The lessons to be drawn from these case studies are admittedly fragmentary and inconclusive. Nevertheless, they tend to support the view that the military establishment favors hardline or at least firm foreign policies when issues concerning the defense of the Soviet homeland or Soviet hegemony in the "buffer zone" in Eastern Europe are at stake. On the other hand, they suggest that when a proposed foreign policy may involve the commitment of Soviet armed forces beyond just naval forces to areas far away from Soviet frontiers, the military still tends to react on the side of caution and a full evaluation of all the risks involved. As for the ability of the military to translate its attitude on foreign issues into actual influence on top-level foreign policy decision-making, the case studies suggest that when the particular policy concerned requires military support, the influence of military advisers is significant. They also demonstrate the fact that when a foreign policy adopted by the leadership coincides with military views, it is difficult to distinguish whether the policy was initiated by the party or by the military. Finally, there is nothing in any of the case studies to suggest any diminution of the party's

[19] See, *e.g.*, an article by Army General S. L. Sokolov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, in *Izvestia* (Moscow), Feb. 23, 1973.

[20] Lt.-Colonel V. Bondarenko, in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), No. 24, 1968.

[21] Lt.-Colonel T. Kondratkov, *ibid.*, No. 8, 1969.

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Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei Grechko, recently promoted to membership in the CPSU Politburo, attends a meeting of Soviet and North Vietnamese party leaders on July 10, 1973. On the extreme left is Le Duan, North Vietnamese party leader. On the Soviet side, starting at third from the left, are Konstantin Katushev, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, President Nikolai Podgorny, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin, and Marshal Grechko.

—TASS via UPI.

ultimate primacy in foreign policy decision-making in cases where the views of the armed forces might differ from those of the party leaders. The current presence of one military representative on the Politburo seems unlikely to affect this situation.

This brings us back to the matter of Marshal Grechko's promotion to the Politburo, the probable reasons for it, and its significance from the standpoint of military influence on foreign policy. Many explanations have been put forward for his elevation, along with the head of the KGB, to full membership in the Politburo. These include reward for past services (perhaps especially in the SALT negotiations), the need to bring the armed forces more closely into the decision-making process, and the personal preferences of Brezhnev. It seems likely that Brezhnev wanted to rally all his supporters round him in the final forum of Soviet decision-making at a time when he was facing some of his most critical decisions in foreign and domestic policy—and Grechko has certainly been one of Brezhnev's most cooperative and valued colleagues. After a cool start in 1967, the Brezhnev-Grechko relationship warmed, both professionally and on the personal level, in the difficult years of the Czechoslovak crisis and the establishment of the Soviet naval-air base in Egypt, and Grechko found himself frequently used on diplomatic tours which might normally have been expected to be entrusted to an official of the party or of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Grechko was the dominant figure in the delegation whose mission to Prague in the spring of 1969 effected the dismissal of Alexander Dubcek and the appointment of Gustav Husak. He was in India before the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty; in Egypt several times during the setting-up of the Soviet base; in Somalia before the appearance of facilities in that country probably designed for the use of the Soviet Navy. Thus, his role and value to Brezhnev in foreign as well as military affairs have grown in recent years. But does his political promotion mean that the influence of the military in the formulation of foreign policy has also grown commensurately?

The evidence seems to suggest that no startling change in the present position is likely. For several years, ever since Admiral Gorshkov's Navy undertook

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the overseas support of Soviet foreign policy (as mentioned earlier), the military has had to be consulted at an earlier stage and in greater depth than ever before, and this has given representatives of the armed forces more frequent and more secure access to the party leadership than they used to enjoy. Senior officers have apparently been able to present their points of view to members of the Politburo in person at the Defense Council, and as has already been mentioned, the Minister of Defense, even when not on the Politburo, has probably been summoned to attend meetings of that body when military matters were to be decided. Grechko's own close relationship with Brezhnev in recent years has given him access to the party's top leader on the personal as well as the professional plane. His appearance among the full members of the Politburo now gives him a vote on the full range of Soviet decision-making, but it does not necessarily increase his power position in practical terms. He will in any case be 70 years old in October 1973 and may not retain his ministerial post very much longer.

Finally, we must remember that even a rejuvenated Soviet High Command is still a force for stability and maintenance of the *status quo* in Soviet affairs. The military establishment is against dissent and innovation in Soviet society at home and in favor of an active—though not an "adventurist"—foreign policy abroad with military support. It probably favors a "special relationship" with the United States, bitterly opposes China, and hopes for a more advantageous position (in relative terms) in Europe as a result of Brezhnev's *Westpolitik* in this traditional area of Russian foreign policy. It is likely to be wary of new commitments in the Middle East, though it would like to be able to resume reconnaissance flights against NATO forces in the Mediterranean from a base in the area. Basically, the present Soviet military leaders want to serve—as well as have some influence over—a strong and nationalistic party and government with some sense of political mission. They do not want, either directly or by proxy, to have the responsibility of formulating Soviet foreign policy itself.

The Party Connection

By William E. Odom

Two questionable assumptions form the cornerstone of most Western analysis of Soviet party-military relations. First, it is taken for granted that the civil-military boundary in the Soviet polity marks a potential cleavage—a cleavage that has thus far been forestalled by the party's unique organizational control over the military, but one which is of increasing importance as a factor for eventual change in the political system. This assumption rests on the belief that men who become competent officers grow to see the party apparatus as an adversary because its activities undercut military competency; and that these officers also develop a sense of identity as soldiers that transcends the confines of a single state to form part of a general professional awareness common to officer corps in many states. On the other side of the boundary, the party is said to abet the adversary relationship because its ideological precepts are inherently "anti-military." Second, it is assumed to be self-evident that autonomy in "military professionalism" is the source of military efficiency and a state's readiness for war; and that if party controls deny professional autonomy to the

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officer corps, there is *ipso facto* a loss of military efficiency. Presumably, then, by insisting upon rigid party controls over the military, the Soviet leadership pays the price of reduced military efficiency.

These assumptions have long pervaded most of the literature on Soviet party-military relations, but perhaps the most unambiguous statement of them has come from Roman Kolkowicz:

On the one hand, they [*the party leaders*] *pursue an ambitious foreign policy, predicated to a large extent on the continued availability of a powerful military capability. . . . On the other hand, the party antagonizes the military leadership and burdens a modern war machine with the archaic impediment of a political control system.*[1]

Furthermore,

the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviet military is essentially conflict-prone and thus presents a perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state.[2]

This assertion leads Kolkowicz to argue that the party

must reconcile its obvious need for an effective military organization, which demands broad professional autonomy, with constant concern that such an organization could someday reject party controls and make its own political claims.[3]

Of the military political administration, he goes on to write:

The result of these attempts to graft onto a military establishment certain traits peculiar to Communist political organizations is the anomaly of an up-to-date military machine that is forced to wear a horse collar of ideological and political controls.[4]

Nonetheless, Kolkowicz concludes by expressing the view that "in recent years . . . the military has been advancing toward greater professional and institutional freedom."[5]

It is not the purpose of this article to take issue with most of Kolkowicz's lengthy and impressive study, or to challenge the view that Soviet military leaders are frequently unhappy about particular policies implemented through the Main Political Administration in the armed forces. Conflict undoubtedly infests the Ministry of Defense and all its subunits. It does seem appropriate, however, to raise doubts about Kolkowicz's particular way of conceptualizing the adversary relationship between the Soviet party and military establishments—doubts that also extend to his conclusion affirming a recent trend toward increased institutional freedom for the military.

By implication Kolkowicz is arguing that if the Soviet military could rid itself of the party apparatus, it would be a more efficient military, providing more war power per unit of resource inputs. Professional autonomy, in this view, is the *sine qua non* of military effectiveness, and both are inversely related to political control.

In contending that military professionalism constitutes a guarantee of efficiency and has a zero-sum relationship with political control, Kolkowicz embraces an assumption that already has wide support. For example, Thomas Wolfe suggests that "in a sense . . . the history of Soviet political-military relations can be described as the search for a formula to reconcile political control with professional military efficiency. . . ."[6] Raymond Garthoff is a bit more cautious in observing that "despite many very unpopular commissars, the institution [*i.e.,* the military-political administration] retains something of a positive role,"[7] but he, too, finds professionalism impaired by political controls and implicitly equates professionalism with military efficiency. Even Merle Fainsod has casually referred to "the familiar problem of balancing the competing demands of professionalism and party control."[8]

If one accepts this conceptualization, one is more easily persuaded by claims that the military may be waging a domestic political struggle leading to some sort of incipient institutional pluralism in the Soviet system.[9] There are grounds, however, for

[1] *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 12.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 11.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 12.
[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 341-42.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 345.
[6] *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 91.
[7] *Soviet Military Doctrine,* Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1954, p. 242.
[8] *How Russia is Ruled,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 406.
[9] Kolkowicz, *op. cit.,* pp. 347-48; and "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: "The Case of the Military," *Comparative Politics* (New York), April 1970, pp. 445-72. In the latter, Kolkowicz seems to retreat from some of the analysis in his earlier-cited work.

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challenging it. First, let us consider the adversary relationship and then go on to examine what is understood by military professionalism.

The Theory of Antithetical Traits

Kolkowicz bases his assumptions about the adversary relationship on somewhat metaphysical grounds. He identifies five traits which he claims to be "natural" to any military establishment, and he juxtaposes them to five antithetical traits said to be "desired" by the party.[10] Thus he is able to insist that an inherent value-conflict shapes the whole character of party-military relations. This is fair enough if his attributions of "natural" and "desired" traits are valid, but these attributions give rise to both empirical and definitional problems, as a detailed consideration of the five antithetical pairs will show.

First, the military is described as *"elitist"* as opposed to the party's desire that it be *"egalitarian."* It is, of course, accurate to attribute some degree of elitism to almost any hierarchical organization, and one can readily accept this as a valid characteristic of the professional military. On the other hand, it is far from clear just how genuine is the party's supposed desire for an egalitarian military. Kolkowicz himself seems to sense that egalitarianism has not been altogether congenial to Bolshevism when he observes that Lenin, as early as 1905, affirmed the party's need for a hierarchical military organization.[11] Indeed, fondness for control and aversion to spontaneity among unstructured masses are distinctive traits of the Bolshevik ideological spirit. It is conceivable that the Mensheviks may have seriously believed in the doctrine of an egalitarian military or, more specifically, in the old Social Democratic program calling for a workers' militia to replace the bourgeois state army, but for the Bolsheviks the doctrine would appear to have been a tactic rather than an inflexible commitment. They advocated egalitarianism for organizations they did not yet control, as evidenced by their policy toward the Imperial Army in 1917; but once in control, they preferred hierarchy and elitism—witness their command policies in the Red Army during the civil war.

The party's supposed desire for egalitarianism in the military thus seems to belong to the same category as its aspiration for a withering away of the state in an ultimate society of full communism—still an official goal perhaps, certainly not one that is expected to materialize in the proximate future. In today's world (however Soviet ideologues may now define it), where potentially hostile forces are not merely alive but still formidable, egalitarianism in the Soviet military would—in the party's estimation—no doubt be recognized as an ideological error, a mistake in policy. Thus, the assumed contradictoriness of the first pair of traits may be more scholastic than real.

Second, the military is said to value *"professional autonomy,"* whereas the party is assumed to desire military *"subordination to ideology."* The problem here is what is meant by professional autonomy. Does it mean the authority to introduce into military organization new technology that has as its theoretical basis scientific principles that are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism? There is little evidence to indicate that this has been an issue between the party and the military. The party's ideological objections to the Heisenberg principle in nuclear physics have not stood in the way of Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons; nor have computers been spurned for military use because of some initial ideological perplexity over cybernetics. Or does professional autonomy mean the authority to determine budget levels and to set down explicitly what military leaders are fond of calling the "requirements" of defense? Surely it is clear from what we know of both Soviet and American internal policy debates concerning military expenditures that there is no way to ascertain unambiguous requirements for defense;[12] moreover, any budget question is at root a political issue. Does professional autonomy therefore mean, in reality, "political" autonomy? Can operational substance be given to the idea of an apolitical professional military judgment? We shall return to this problem, but for the moment it is enough to show that the presumed contradictoriness between these two traits rests on uncertain definitional grounds.

Third, a strong sense of *"nationalism"* is said to be a characteristic military trait in contrast to the party's preference for *"proletarian internationalism."* This assertion is far from self-evident in the Russian context. Invoking the principle of nationalism in

[10] *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, p. 21.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[12] In the Soviet case, this conclusion is supported by the early debate on the "military question," but our knowledge of the substance of similar debates in more recent decades is admittedly more limited.

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Russia has always carried the danger of inviting the dissolution of Muscovite political hegemony over ethnic and religious "national minorities." Muscovite rulers, both civil and military (if that distinction has relevance in Russian history), have consistently asserted a legitimacy principle of universalist character, be it the 15th-century doctrine of "Moscow the Third Rome," the 19th-century ideology of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (*narodnost*),"[13] or the Soviet principle of "proletarian internationalism." Moreover, there is evidence that some Russian military leaders believed the military might help to integrate the national minorities. P.A. Zaionchkovsky, the Soviet historian of the military reforms of 1870, quotes from the archives instances of military officials advocating that officer recruitment include national-minority persons (Jews in particular) as a tactic for combating separatist sentiments.[14] In 1927, a Soviet officer took up the same theme at the level of troop recruitment, citing historical experience and claiming a special role for the Red Army in helping overcome the nationality problem.[15] The integrative role of the armed forces is still a recurring theme in the Soviet military press today.

Perhaps Kolkowicz merely means that military officers have more deeply visceral feelings of national patriotism than party leaders. But if this is his point, can he be sure that a young technician in the Soviet rocket forces reacts any more viscerally to the call of patriotism than an older, less educated party *apparatchik*?[16] A much more compelling argument would be that the privileged military elite and the party elite both have an equal stake in the Soviet state and the present political order. Once again, value congruence rather than conflict in party-military relations would seem closer to the mark.

The fourth pair of supposedly antithetical traits, namely, a military preference for *"detachment"* from society as opposed to the party's emphasis on *"social involvement,"* may at first glance seem more valid. An analysis of the record, however, reveals

Members of the Alexander Matrosov Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment attend their weekly political lesson with Major V. Vasilenko. At the rear is a political-administrative map of the USSR.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

that disputes between Red Army commanders and their party critics in the 1920's centered not so much on alleged detachment of the military from society as on how their integration was to be achieved. M.V. Frunze, Trotsky's successor as head of Soviet military forces, called for "militarization of the entire population," arguing that modern weapons made total involvement of the populace in war unavoidable.[17] Significantly enough, Frunze's concepts and rhetoric have recently reappeared in the Soviet military press, albeit in the more complex milieu of the technological revolution.[18] Present linkages between the military and industry, as well as the organizational requirements of mass mobilization, make notions of military "detachment" or "apartness" from society appear as irrelevant to Soviet military leaders today as they appeared to Frunze in the early years of the Soviet regime.[19]

[13] It should be remembered that *narodnost* does not mean "nationality" in the modern sense, but literally "peopleness," an ambiguous term even in Russian.

[14] *Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii* (The Military Reforms of 1860-1870 in Russia), Moscow, Nauka, 1952, pp. 307-14.

[15] Sidev, "The Appeal of Nationality," *Voina i revoliutsiia* (Moscow), May and June 1927.

[16] That such an assumption is open to question is supported by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's reported remark, based on personal observation, that Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev enjoys retelling his war experiences (as did his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev). See R. F. Seehan, "Why Sadat Packed Off the Russians," *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 6, 1972.

[17] *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Selected Works), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1934, pp. 22, 180, and 375.

[18] See I. Zavialov's article in *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), Aug. 3, 1972, for a recent reference to Soviet theoretical work on military affairs during the 1920's and 1930's and its relevance today.

[19] There is an interesting parallel in the lack of enthusiasm shown by US military leaders for an all-volunteer professional army, notwithstanding the increased institutional detachment that might result.

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It is probably closer to the truth in the Soviet case to describe both the party and the military leaders as vitally interested in how to integrate industrial, state administrative, educational, and military organizations in a fashion that permits swift mobilization of the society for war, yet does not unacceptably retard growth rates in nonmilitary sectors of the economy.

The fifth and last pair of incompatible traits is seen in a claimed military leaning toward *"heroic symbolism,"* in contrast to the party's assumed preference for *"anonymity."* Here again, the claim seems to flout reality. If we are looking for universally held values among military professionals, it is worth recalling that the Imperial German Army valued anonymity for its General Staff—a tradition that was reaffirmed by the chief of the Reichswehr in the Weimar period, Hans von Seeckt, when he stated unequivocally that "General Staff Officers are anonymous."[20] To be sure, actual behavior among officers is quite often at odds with such traditional military values, but the assertion of these values nevertheless contradicts the presumption of an inherent military dedication to "heroic symbolism." On the other hand, the party's commitment to the principle of "anonymity" has not always guided members' behavior. The CPSU, after all, has had serious problems with the "cult of personality," a rather grave deviation from official party norms.

Thus, even a cursory review of these pairs of antithetical traits ascribed to the military and the party creates doubt as to their validity. A more accurate assessment of the institutional values of the two entities suggests congruence, not conflict on *a priori* grounds.

Conflict or Consensus?

To be sure, those who see the Soviet party-military relationship as having an inherently adversary character do not base their argument purely on deductions from general propositions. They cite substantial published evidence of differences of opinion between party leaders and military spokesmen on current issues. No doubt such differences are numerous and at times even severe, but in judging their significance for the military-party relationship, it is extremely important to view them in fuller perspective. On reflection, the differences seem to exist against a background of broad pragmatic consensus. To demonstrate this point, let us review a list of perennial issues that confront the Soviet leadership. In every case it is possible to conclude that the military probably stands closer to the party than does any other public institution.

Consider first the question of economic reform, especially the issue of decentralization. Reformist voices notwithstanding, the party leaders have permitted no erosion of the central planners' power to set prices. The military likewise has a consistent record of attachment to this cornerstone of the command economy. The Red Commanders disliked the resort to market pricing during the NEP (New Economic Policy) of the 1920's and showed no sympathy for free peasant farming.[21] Today both military and party leaders seem to share a certain ambivalence toward economic reform. On the one hand they both value highly the control afforded by central planning, while on the other they are both unhappy about the retarding effect of the command system on economic growth. There may of course be some minor differences within the general consensus. While the party appears to harbor at least some genuine enthusiasts for reform of the pricing system, it is doubtful that there are many such in the military ranks.

A second issue on which the party and the military appear to be in general agreement is intellectual dissent. Criticism of the regime from the literary community or the intelligentsia at large has encountered fierce criticism from the military as well as from the party. The military press hews to a conservative line on literary affairs and often reflects concern that the views of some liberal writers may corrupt youth by undercutting patriotic fervor.[22] With the striking exception of retired Major-General Piotr Grigorenko, a well-known and outspoken critic of the regime, the party has been able to count on the military generally to voice approval of positive action against dissenters, or at least to give silent acquiescence to a hardline policy.

[20] *Thoughts of a Soldier*, Translated by G. Waterhouse, London, Ernst Benn, 1930, p. 111.

[21] See A. Volpe, "Military Industry in the Civil War," in A. S. Bubnov *et al.*, Eds., *Grazhdanskaia voina (1918-1921)*, (The Civil War, 1918-1921), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1928, p. 377; P. Dybenko, "The Tasks on Industry for National Defense," *Voina i tekhnika* (Moscow), No. 8-9, 1928, pp. 20-21; Frunze, *op. cit.*, p. 474. On military difficulties in food procurement, see M. Promakhin, "A General Agreement is Needed," *Voina i tekhnika*, No. 2-3, 1928, pp. 177-79.

[22] *E.g.*, see an editorial accusing writers and artists of neglecting to provide inspiring patriotic literature and works of art, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 22, 1972.

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The nationality question is another issue that appears to unite rather than divide the military and party elites. As much as anything else perhaps, this highly sensitive issue has made senior officers acutely aware that an apolitical military establishment is not a practical option in Soviet affairs. Neither the party nor the military has been able to escape the reality that the Bolsheviks seized power not in a nation-state but in an empire where military government in the outlying provinces had a long history.

Again, the crises arising from movements toward political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe have found the party and military joined in a conservative union. Although no less an authority than Thomas Wolfe expressed the view in the mid-1960's that renewed Soviet emphasis on the Warsaw Pact primarily reflected concern over the USSR's military position vis-à-vis Western Europe, and only secondarily concern over political stability within the Soviet-East European bloc,[23] this order of priority —if it ever did prevail—has certainly been open to question since the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, and the Soviet military, through the Warsaw Pact, has in recent years played a growing role in the political stabilization of the bloc. The effect of this development has been to associate the Soviet military more closely with the party's political concerns in Eastern Europe rather than to create for the military a new level of apolitical institutional autonomy.

Finally, destalinization is an issue that cuts across the party-military boundary. Like many of the party *apparatchiki,* senior Soviet military officers value the insurance against blood purges that destalinization provides. At the same time, the denigration of the Soviet system that has to some extent been implicit in destalinization has evoked ambivalent and cautious reactions in both party and military circles.[24]

To be sure, none of these five points is new. However, grouping them together serves to demonstrate that there are firm grounds for arguing that a party-military consensus on a variety of issues does exist, and that this fact should be kept in mind in interpreting evidence of the marshals' displeasure with party policy. This thesis is further supported by behavioral evidence adduced by Milton Lodge in his study of elite "participatory attitudes."[25] Lodge's findings, based on content analysis of the leading publications of the party, economic, legal, military, and literary elites over the period 1952-65, indicate that the military was the least critical of the party's leading role. There were occasions when military criticism of party policies was relatively sharp, but on the whole the military remained the least vociferous among the institutional elites in challenging the party.

To sum up the first argument of this paper, then, neither an incompatibility of institutional ethos nor disagreement over fundamental issues seems to justify the assumption that the party-military boundary marks a real or potential cleavage in the Soviet political system. Let us now turn to the second major assumption that has colored Western analysis —namely the belief that there is an inverse relationship between military professionalism or efficiency and party control.

Military Professionalism

To place such an assumption on credible grounds, one must first have an operational definition of military professionalism, but finding a satisfactory empirical referent for this vague term is difficult. Upon reflection it strikes one as somewhat analogous to "phlogiston," the mythical substance that was supposed to explain fire before man understood oxidation. If confusion is to be cleared up, therefore, one must try to establish what scholars mean when they speak of "military professionalism." What specific notions are comprehended by the term? At least two such notions come to mind—notions which have sometimes been advanced separately but have also been frequently propounded as a pair.

The first of these notions seems to equate professionalism with technical rationality in the sense that Barrington Moore uses the term in his triad of implicit Soviet decision-making criteria: *i.e.,* power, technical rationality, and tradition.[26] Professional military behavior in this sense means doing things according to more or less value-free analyti-

[23] "The Warsaw Pact in Evolution," in Kurt London, Ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, pp. 210-20. See also Wolfe's *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 386-425, 477.

[24] For examples from military circles, see reviews of Marshal K. S. Moskalenko's memoirs (in *Pravda,* June 21, 1972, and *Krasnaia zvezda,* July 5, 1972), in which Stalin is treated respectfully.

[25] "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), September 1968, pp. 827-39.

[26] *Terror and Progress USSR,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 185 ff.

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cal principles rather than according to arbitrary ideological doctrine or the political preferences of senior party leaders. Thus, in this understanding, party control and military professionalism stand in opposition much of the time, just as considerations of power are often incompatible with considerations of technical rationality in Moore's decision model. There is cogency in the analogy. The application of modern technology to military affairs has indeed brought about significant changes in the Soviet armed forces. But to see military professionalism primarily as a concern for technical rationality is to see professional soldiers as primarily scientists and technicians.

There is something incomplete about such a definition. Professional officers also concern themselves with controlling human behavior, and for control techniques they tend to turn to habit, tradition, and historical precedent—that is, considerations that can be included in Moore's third criterion, tradition. Not surprisingly, therefore, what passes as professional military opinion has not always remained in step with the revolution in military technology. Nor are military leaders inclined to think of themselves as primarily scientists or technicians. Indeed, such a narrow definition of the modern professional soldier would tend to erode the military's claim to a unique expertise that has no civilian counterpart.

A broader interpretation of military professionalism, which includes a nontechnical dimension, is provided by Samuel Huntington.[27] Briefly, Huntington says that a profession of any kind must be characterized by a sense of corporateness among its practitioners, a particular expertise that can be gained only through years of training and experience, and a set of ethical standards by which its practitioners can judge their social responsibility. To consider the last criterion first, the flaw is that one seldom finds a military establishment that is effectively bound by a comprehensive professional ethic. Even when a military elite strongly desires to adhere to a certain ethic, the task of making the desired rules of conduct operational with respect to policy choices is one of overwhelming difficulty. The ethic of the US Military Academy at West Point, summed up in the slogan "Duty, Honor, Country," is noble in spirit, but it is hardly an unambiguous guide for deciding between categories of military spending or between military and nonmilitary spending. In truth, almost any decision within the military has domestic political implications; and deep commitment to the most admirable social ethic may at times soften or alter those implications, but it will not remove them. Thus, Huntington's concept of a military professional ethic tends to obscure the fact that an apolitical military establishment is a mythical convention concocted in the parochial minds of Europeans and later embraced in the United States.

What of the first two criteria? Corporateness, obviously, is an operational standard and one that most military establishments meet. But what about a unique body of expertise learned through years of training? It is increasingly difficult to identify a specific set of skills or type of rigorous intellectual activity that characterizes the military profession as a whole. This is not to say that officers do not possess high levels of skill. Rather it is to observe that they possess such a diverse variety of skills that their common professional ground is difficult to find. Furthermore, skills that are unique to the military form a diminishing proportion of the total skills utilized in the military. In 1955 about 71 percent of all occupational specialities in the US military had civilian counterpart specialities.[28] A century earlier that proportion was less than 10 percent, and today it may well be close to 80 percent. The Soviet military is experiencing a similar trend. Today 45 percent of all officer duty posts in the Soviet military require engineers or technicians; in the rocket forces the proportion is 75 percent.[29]

One is forced to ask, therefore, how officers distinguish their skills from those of managers and specialists in industry, in the public bureaucracy, or in educational institutions. One is forced to wonder if the martial attributes of a rifle company commander are truly representative of the officer corps as a whole. One is forced to recognize that even the traditions of personal bravery and tactical acumen in battle are carried on not only by professional officers but also by reserve junior officers and draftee soldiers, the so-called non-professionals. They hear the bullets fly and know the fear of the battlefield. The professional officer holds no monopoly of these experiences, nor even the larger share.

This is hardly the last word on professionalism, but it is enough to show that formal definitions, such

[27] *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959, especially pp. 7-10.

[28] See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960, p. 9.

[29] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Feb. 23, 1972.

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as Huntington's, offer little analytical assistance and may introduce intellectual confusion.

Again, if one turns for an understanding of professionalism to policy studies of military institutions, one finds little encouragement for accepting Kolkowicz's assumption about a uniform relationship between professional autonomy and efficiency. This is true of studies both of modern defense establishments[30] and of armies in the new states.[31] One finds that these establishments are highly politicized institutions as diverse as the polities to which they belong and no easier to fit into a global model than the polities themselves.

The Military as a Bureaucracy

If professionalism is a dubious way to explain the source of military efficiency, can we be sure that political controls such as exist in the Soviet military impair efficiency? Does the political apparatus within the armed forces actually play the "horse collar" role ascribed to it? To answer these questions, a new analytical perspective is necessary. Instead of looking at the Soviet military establishment under the universal category of "military," as Kolkowicz does, let us view it rather as a large public bureaucracy, a hierarchical organization that operates in peacetime not altogether differently from other public agencies.

What does it mean for a public bureaucracy to be efficient? Obviously, if efficiency in this context is taken to signify effectiveness in advancing something as broad and nebulous as the "public interest," or the "general welfare," or the common defense," it gives rise to a host of thorny questions. Such definitional hazards can be avoided, however, if organizational efficiency is measured in terms of the degree to which the top leader's preferences with respect to goal-seeking activity are implemented by the institution's subordinates. After all, the top leadership defines organizational goals and programs, and it presumably does so with certain larger ends in mind. It follows that from the leadership's point of view efficiency has meaning primarily in terms of those ends. Moreover, it is this top-level point of view that is implicity taken for analysis by Kolkowicz and most other students of Soviet military affairs. Individuals below the top of the hierarchy, of course, may find their own preferences in conflict with the preferences held by those above.

In short, from the new perspective just outlined, behavior in the Soviet military is viewed as at root a bureaucratic political matter; and politics within bureaucracies is essentially a struggle by the top leadership to impose its value preferences on the lower bureaucratic levels.[32] Now, there are various ways in which subordinates may be able to defeat the gambits of the leadership, but control of information about activities and outputs is a vital element of power at any level, and one that is crucial to the success of any leadership maneuver. Subordinates want to conceal information about inadequate performance; superiors want to have that information in order to take corrective action.

This game is nowhere more exaggerated than in a military hierarchy. And it is the unmeasurable and ambiguous quality of the final product, *i.e.*, national security or state defense, that complicates the leadership's control of information about output and makes bargaining, deceit, waste, and general inefficiency so prevalent. To put it another way, the difficulty in observing military outputs and relating outputs to inputs is the source of the high degree of politics and the low degree of analysis in organizational decision-making affecting the military.[33] If the top learns more about activities and outputs at the lower levels, and if it can make the lower-level personnel uncertain about being able to deceive the top, then the power of the top is enhanced, and the efficiency of the organization can be improved. The party's control apparatus within the military provides an alternative information channel to the top, and it thus serves to raise the uncertainty level of sub-

[30] See, *e.g.*, S. P. Huntington, *The Common Defense*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1961; Morris Janowitz, Ed., *The New Military*, New York, Russell Sage, 1964; Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army*, New York, Praeger, 1966.

[31] See, *e.g.*, Henry Bienen, Ed., *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development*, New York, Russell Sage, 1968; and J. J. Johnson, Ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962. For a critique of the growing literature on the subject, see Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Non-Western States," *The American Political Science Review*, December 1970, pp. 1135-48.

[32] See Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964, for a full development of this view of bureaucracy as a political arena in which individuals play their own games for their own ends. Crozier also introduces an interesting way of applying this analytical perspective to the Russian cultural context.

[33] See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, New York, John Wiley, 1958, p. 145, for a discussion of these variables as they affect program content in organizations.

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ordinates and make collusion among them risky. It follows quite logically that the system of party control may well enhance rather than reduce Soviet military power by comparison with what it might be without them.

On the other side of the coin, it is the principle of *edinonachalie* ("unity of command" in Western military parlance) applied to organization that allows military subordinates to feed the high command selective information that distorts the top's perception and thwarts rational corrective action. At least this is the conclusion one would reach by reasoning in *a priori* fashion about Soviet military behavior from middle-range generalizations about organizational behavior.[34]

Admittedly, intervening variables from the cultural and political milieu might invalidate this reasoning. For example, in a society where every citizen is highly committed to the same social values and ideological principles, subordinates might be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of realizing organizational goals and thereby create an environment where social trust would permit unity of command to be an effective management technique. But that is hardly descriptive of Soviet society, where internalization of the official ideological precepts is not complete. It would seem, moreover, that where preferences about social ends and values are diverse and do not rest on some fundamental ideological consensus, the existence of dual and triple information channels would enhance the control and power exercised by the top. Furthermore, a change from a peacetime to a wartime environment might alter the effectivenss of the alternative command technique. This is apt to be true because fear of personal destruction and a changed perception of the "we" and "they" groups are likely to alter the value hierarchy of most individuals.

Horizontal Alignments

In turning to a bureaucratic-political frame of reference for analyzing the Soviet military's behavior in the sphere of domestic politics, we have shifted the emphasis from vertical institutional alignments to intra-institutional horizontal alignments. This shift has not been accidental or simply the logical consequence of taking a different set of analytical concepts. Historical perspective makes it compelling. One needs only to reflect on the exigencies of military power from the position of a general staff in Moscow.

No less than the elite of the Bolshevik party, the leaders of the Red Army in the civil war found themselves threatened as much by "localism" in the lower strata and subunits of their infant institution as by quarrels among the elite factions. The Red Army's procurement system of forced requisitioning provoked widespread hostility not only because grain was scarce but also because the system's executants abused their authority. The anarchist Makhno's antics in the Ukraine, the Kronstadt sailors' revolt, and the uprising in Tambov left the senior Red Commanders with the correct impression that they occupied jointly with the Bolshevik party the position of a besieged elite, notwithstanding their victory over the White armies. The so-called "scissors crisis" during NEP reinforced this assessment by revealing to both military and party elites the peasants' power to stifle the economy,[35] and the military elite—whether or not it was disposed to back Stalin's later move toward collectivization—again found itself threatened by rank-and-file disaffection in its own ranks. During World War II, defections by individual soldiers, units, and entire ethnic groups reasserted once again the primacy of horizontal political alignments over vertical ones, even if the Great Purges of the 1930's had given the officer corps cause for doubt about the wisdom of party unity above all. And as it has been argued above, perennial issues facing the contemporary Soviet political and military elites continue to create a consensus of concern not only for the stability and legitimacy of the regime on the domestic front but also for the stability of the Soviet political-military position in Eastern Europe.

In the process of forging this party-military amalgam, the party elite has not gone unaffected. It is often forgotten that the Red Army was the first major institution of government built after the

[34] Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is not entirely lacking. See A. K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corps," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, N.C.), Vol. 27 (1948), pp. 143-53, for a study that is relevant to this writer's views of the potentially perverse effects of unity of command in peacetime, as well as to the preceding discussion of professionalism.

[35] The "scissors crisis" occurred in 1922-23 when the ratio of the prices of agricultural products to those of industrial goods swung sharply in favor of the latter. The peasantry reacted by reducing their purchases of industrial goods and holding back agricultural produce from urban markets, leaving the industrial trusts with rising inventories of unsold goods and the urban populace in desperate need of food.

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Bolshevik seizure of power. Whatever the party's original intentions, it soon found itself immersed in the task of mobilizing the Red Army. Thus, most of the party cadres in the early years of the regime had military experience. Trotsky displayed mastery and brilliance in military affairs; Stalin skillfully adopted military categories and rhetoric in his style of political analysis. Nor were military staff procedures novel to the generation that subsequently consolidated Soviet power. In 1941 the party leaders once again donned uniforms to experience four years of intensive military socialization. One of the most interesting aspects of Kolkowicz's study of this period is the abundant evidence it provides that the personal cliques formed among the elites in World War II cut across the party-military boundary. Furthermore, those cliques proved more durable than professional and institutional loyalties when it came to the removal of Marshal Zhukov from his post as Minister of Defense in 1957.

Such political experiences are not new in Muscovite history. The civil-military boundary has always been blurred in Russia. Imperial officers frequently played roles and indulged in bureaucratic intrigue within the government as well as in dissident movements. Tsars sometimes thought of themselves foremost as military leaders. The civil service system contained many military officers in its ranks.[36] The enduring political reality that confronted the top elites was the danger of sedition and insurrection in the lower social strata. Small wonder that the technique of setting colleagues to watch and inform on one another has deep roots in Russia.

The intent here is not to provide a definitive explanation of the role of the military-political apparatus in Soviet party-military relations. Rather it is to encourage a critical reexamination of the common assumption that party controls are a brake on Soviet military efficiency. In fact, for the reasons set forth in the preceeding pages, the very autonomy presumed to be essential for this efficiency could have precisely the opposite effect.

The Effects of Misconceptions

What have been the consequences of these long-standing misconceptions for the analysis of Soviet party-military relations? Certainly they have not seriously damaged much of the literature on Soviet military policy; nor, for that matter, have they destroyed the value of several of the central chapters in Kolkowicz's prodigious study. For a variety of reasons, however, they cannot be brushed aside as minor matters of semantics.



Army General V.G. Kulikov, promoted to Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR in 1972.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

In the first place, these misconceptions have underpinned the prognosis that the Soviet military would gain increasing autonomy vis-à-vis the party—a prognosis for which corroborative evidence has not been forthcoming. Proportionate military membership in the Central Committee has remained fairly stable. The promotion of the relatively youthful Army General V.G. Kulikov—ahead of several hundreds of officers senior to him—to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces is not likely the work of a senior marshals' club; rather it probably reflects the powerful hand of the party Secretariat reaching deep into the ranks to make a selection of its own choosing. It might be argued that Marshal Andrei Grechko's elevation to Politburo membershp in April 1973 is at last the awaited turn toward greater military autonomy. But is it? Grechko is 70 years old. Not only is he separated in age by nearly 20 years from the group of young generals now emerging in the Soviet high command (Kulikov being merely the most illustrious of them), but he and his military peers are also separated

[36] John A. Armstrong, "Tsarist and Soviet Elite Administrators," *Slavic Review* (Seattle, Wash.) March 1972, pp. 14-15.

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Soviet Marshal Andrei Grechko (left) on the rostrum for the 1973 May Day Parade in Moscow's Red Square, four days after his promotion to the CPSU Politburo. With him are other key Politburo members: they are (proceeding from the left) Nikolai Podgorny, Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Mikhail Suslov.

—UPI photo.

from the younger generation by a gap in education. The turbulent 1930's and the war years advanced these older men rapidly but did not provide the technical education and sophistication characteristic of the younger group. The new generation rose in rank because of the imperatives of the technical modernization of Soviet armed forces and because of the personnel policies originated in Stalin's last years and during Zhukov's stewardship of the military in the 1950's—policies that have since been basically adhered to by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It is unconvincing to argue that the younger generals attribute their rise to Grechko's lobbyist endeavors; on the contrary, there is strong reason to doubt that Grechko has a reliable constituency in the military. And if he does not, it is all the more likely that he owes his Politburo seat to Brezhnev rather than to the group pressure of "military interests."

Nor would this be an unusual situation in Soviet military-political affairs. Marshal Klimenti Ye. Voroshilov became Commissar of War in late 1925, a few weeks before he entered the Politburo. That he was considered utterly incompetent by his military subordinates was no secret—and likely a key reason why Stalin retained him in his defense post until 1940. He was not expelled from the Politburo until 1960, although he had actively assisted in Stalin's 1937 decimation of the Soviet officer corps. Zhukov, by reputation as impressively competent as Voroshilov was incompetent, nonetheless shared with Voroshilov the inability to turn the military department into his own reliable constituency. In sum, marshals in the Politburo have yet to act successfully as lobbyists for military institutional autonomy.[37]

Secondly, the misconceptions we have examined earlier in this discussion have encouraged proponents of "group theory" (as applied to the Soviet system) to treat the Soviet military as an incipient interest group. Even if the conceptual appropriateness of group theory is granted, however, this approach raises questions about the proper identification of both the "interest" and the "group" in the case of military policy. It may well be that groupings among the Soviet elite act in concert to win approval for certain military policies, but it is not at all certain how military officers are related to such groupings. Moreover, intra-military interest conflict may be more significant for policy-making than interests uniting the military as a whole.

Thirdly, these same misconceptions have generally been associated with a dubious interpretation of the role of political controls over the military. Certainly the military-political apparatus needs to be restudied. Such study should not be confined to the questions raised earlier about the impact of political controls on military efficiency. It should also examine efforts to adapt the controls to the changing social and educational structure of the Soviet armed forces. It may be too early to treat this latter subject with confidence, but Kolkowicz cites considerable relevant evidence and cogently observes that ". . . the rise of technocrats in the military has introduced far-reaching problems. . . ." [38]

Finally, the traditional assumptions have kept the comparative study of the Soviet military's role in domestic politics where the study of the military in developing countries languished when it first

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[37] It is worth noting in this connection that Marshal Grechko has made no major statement on either defense policy or military science since his pamphlet based on the 24th Party Congress, *Na strazhe mira i stroitelstvo kommunizma* (For the Preservation of Peace and the Construction of Communism), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971. In contrast, Kulikov has become conspicuously articulate on both topics. See his articles in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1973; *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), No. 6, 1973; and *Krasnaia zvezda,* Feb. 23, 1973. Grechko's greatest domestic military visibility of late has been at the Fifth All-Army Conference of Party Secretaries, where he and Yepishev, head of the military political administration, spoke on the 1973-74 exchange of party documents and organizational measures aimed at invigorating the military's political apparatus. This is hardly the behavior of a "professional" officer striving to throw off a "horse collar" of ideological controls; rather, it is the behavior of a senior member of the Soviet political elite endeavoring to make the present system more effective for the purposes of that elite.

[38] *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party,* p. 310.

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became popular in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Because all officers wear uniforms, there has been a tendency to consider the officer corps a firm empirical referent for comparative analysis.[39] As more recent study has shown, however, uniforms do not insure analogous values or behavior from state to state.[40] The lesson seems to be that generalizations are risky unless unique cultural and political contexts are well understood.

An Alternative Conceptualization

If, then, the conventional way of conceptualizing Soviet party-military relations appears open to question on many counts, is there a better alternative? Implicit in the foregoing critique, of course, is the conclusion that more monographic research is needed before a succinct understanding can be cogently formulated. What follows, therefore, is at best an adumbration of an alternative conceptualization. It consists of five assumptions, selected to define the contemporary nature of Soviet party-military relations, and a brief excursion into the history of Imperial Russian civil-military relations designed to place those assumptions in cultural perspective.

First, *the military is an administrative arm of the party, not something separate from and competing with it.* When there are cleavages in the leadership over military policy, they are intraparty factional divisions, not division of party *vs.* military. This is true not just because members of the military elite are also party members. More importantly, it is because the variety of military institutions in Soviet society is so great that most policy issues are bound to find the military leadership divided on them rather than united as a bloc. Our ignorance of institutional structure tends to nurture misconceptions not only of the size of the military establishment but also of the diversity of military attitudes.

Moreover, there has been a tendency to overlook the extent to which Soviet military and civil activities are interlocked. Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei D. Sakharov recently chided both Soviet and Western scholars for failing to study the Soviet military-industrial complex, for example, which he believes consumes about 40 percent of national income.[41] Other examples of military-civil linkage are easy to cite. One is the little-explored relation of the military to the civil educational system: not only does the military operate a vast network of middle and higher educational institutions, but since the promulgation of the new military service law in 1967, the Ministry of Education has become deeply involved in basic military training. The military also has links with the Academy of Sciences, the universities, and most other institutions of higher learning, and most *tekhnikums* and institutes now have military chairs in their faculties.

There are still other linkages. The relation of the regional military administrations—*i.e.*, the system of military districts and commissariats—to regional and local-level civil government—is one that certainly should not be overlooked in view of its potential political ramifications. There is also significant military participation in republican and local soviets. Furthermore, the military is actively and extensively involved in civil defense activities. A Deputy Minister of Defense, whose post was only recently created, now heads a new civil defense system encompassing all civil defense activities in the USSR,[42] and the military press makes frequent references to civil defense troops and training. Thus, when Brezhnev states that "to strengthen the Soviet government . . . also means to strengthen the Soviet armed forces,[43] he is not uttering just an empty slogan, although the full import of his remark may be clear only to those aware of the plethora of Soviet civil-military ties.

Second, *the party-military relationship has symbiotic aspects in domestic politics.* Much attention has been paid by political scientists to the modernizing role that armies sometimes play in developing states, and certainly the part that the Soviet military has played in this respect as well as in the socialization of Soviet youth has been historically an important one. Ethnic representation in the Soviet high command suggests that members of some of the national minorities have found the military a route of upward social mobility. At the lower levels,

[39] On this point, see D. A. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory," *Comparative Politics*, October 1968, p. 43.

[40] See Nordlinger, *loc. cit.*, and Bienen, *op. cit.*

[41] Radio Liberty, *Research Bulletin*, CRD 178/72. Sakharov made his remarks in a statement concerning the US-Soviet SALT agreement signed in May 1972.

[42] See remarks by General-Colonel A. T. Altunin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, Oct. 4, 1972.

[43] *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1973, p. 77.

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it must also be noted that millions of peasants have passed through the army on their way to the urban-industrial sector of society. The military's role in breaking the peasant away from his agrarian milieu and socializing him for industrial life is a recurring theme in Soviet military policy from the 1920's on.

These first two assumptions may seem to direct attention away from high policy to organizational trivia, but this is not necessarily the case. Admittedly, the secretive propensities of the Soviet elite make it likely that military policy analysis will remain something akin to Kremlinology. By contrast, information about institutional structure, activity, and problems is relatively abundant, since the requirements of organizational management make such information difficult to conceal. The possibilities for learning about organizational structure and bureaucratic politics are consequently greater, and the better these things are understood, the greater will be our appreciation of their constraining effect on the highest military policy-makers. One of the consequences of institutional analysis, therefore, should be to improve both the scope and the realism of the assumptions that serve as a basis for the study of high policy. Western study of the Soviet economy offers an instructive analogy for students of the military. Our appreciation of the way GOSPLAN conceives its problems, dilemmas, and options would be severely limited without the wealth of insights generated by careful monographic analysis of Soviet economic institutions, beginning at the firm level.

Third, *the military is first and foremost a political institution.* Sophistic definitions of apolitical professionalism simply cannot depoliticize the activity of military officers, be they technical experts or heroic leaders. The argument for this assumption is presumably clear from the earlier discussion of military professionalism and need not be expanded here.

Fourth, *the military's political life is bureaucratic in character, not parliamentarian and not lobbyist.* This point, too, has been dealt with in the earlier discussion of the military-political apparatus and military efficiency. Concepts from organization theory and limited generalizations about bureaucratic politics, it was argued, can lead to new insights into the party-military relationship. At the risk of repetition, however, it is important to make explicit a significant difference between bureaucratic politics and interest-group politics.

Personal cliques and coalitions of cliques take shape in bureaucracies, but they differ generically from interest groups. They cannot formalize themselves and thereby institutionalize the pursuit of an interest. In the Soviet bureaucracy, informal cliques and coalitions are established only at great risk; they probably do not extend beyond small face-to-

An important event in the lives of these youths from Kalinin District of Moscow: their first line-up after induction into the Soviet Army.

—Photo by Novosti via Sovfoto.

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face groups; and they tend to float upward through the bureaucracy as age and promotions advance the charter members to higher levels. They cannot openly pronounce their views and recruit new and younger members in order to perpetuate and strengthen their group; rather they are succeeded by new cliques rising from below and doomed to a similar life-cycle. What remains more or less constant—the key factor in social cohesion and the source of roles and norms—is the bureaucratic structure in both its formal and informal aspects. The ambitious and effective individual player soon learns that the bureaucracy is enduring, the clique ephemeral. His participation in cliques and factions may be imperative for self-advancement and protection, but if he succeeds to the leadership of a subunit of the bureaucratic structure, he knows that he must fight and stifle opposing factions, particularly those within his subordinate hierarchy. Factions among his subordinates, even if they can bargain with him because they monopolize a service or expertise that he cannot do without, will find him defending bureaucratic norms as a means of constraining their behavior.[44]

The fifth and last assumption is that a *mechanistic factor is at work to make top-level military policy-making distinct from decision-making at the lower levels.* Technology in military weaponry thrusts military policy-making at the top into the realms of theoretical science, education, economic organization, and resource allocation. Marshals and generals simply cannot claim a monopoly of knowledge in all these areas, nor can they anticipate, most of the time, the implications of technical innovations for changes in military force structure. If anything, one would expect military elites to resist technical innovations, for as bureaucrats with fiefdoms they have reason to fear the changes that innovations frequently bring. Had there been a relaxed international setting, bureaucratic blocking tactics by the Soviet military in resistance to change might well have prevailed over the past two decades. The political leadership, however, has been acutely aware of international dangers and Soviet military inferiority, and this awareness has led the Politburo to assume an aggressive role in military policy-making. As a result, there has been a remarkably responsive and steady process of change in the Soviet military which has brought significant modifications of military technology and organization. Moreover, the broad economic and scientific ramifications of these changes meant that policy resolution at a lower level has been impossible.

The Marshals as Executants

In this environment, the marshals and generals are left to act as executants—executants of only a few aspects of the vast and complex process required by the Soviet military posture. They are not in a position to frame the issues; they can only respond to the way issues are framed above them. They have no functional equivalent to the US Congress where dissenting military views can be championed as a tactic in legislative struggle with the executive branch of government. Thus, the Soviet system is dominated by military policy-making but not by marshals.

These characteristics of Soviet civil-military relations are not without precedent in Imperial Russian experience. The Empire, like the Soviet system, was dominated by military policy; yet generals did not rule Russia, notwithstanding their conspicuous presence at the Tsars' court. Military exigencies, it has been argued, provided the major impetus for Peter the Great's reforms.[45] Money was for Peter "the artery of war," to use his phrase, but it could only be secured by vast social and economic development. The same predicament confronted his heirs, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. Military requirements, as they were perceived and created by the Imperial rulers, consistently outstripped Russian social and economic development. Certainly that has been the situation facing the Soviet leadership. Stalin's "socialism in one country" was, in effect, a truce with the encircling world forced upon the USSR by economic backwardness. Khrushchev's "peaceful co-existence," a similar kind of truce, persists in present Soviet policy.

A second rather curious Russian tradition has its roots in the Petrine age. From Peter's death in 1725 until the Decembrist Revolt in 1825, the Guards regiments, which were created and raised to prominence by Peter, played a key role in succession struggles. Their influence was such that they often

[44] The case studies of cliques in Robert Conquest's *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1961, provide excellent empirical examples of this bureaucratic political style.

[45] See Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, New York, Macmillan, 1960, pp. 355-96.

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virtually dictated the succession. At the same time, they neither permitted others to encroach upon the tradition of autocracy nor usurped power for themselves. When the Guards met their political demise in the Decembrists' Revolt of 1825, it was because they had for the first time broken the traditional alliance between themselves and the throne in favor of programs for transforming, perhaps even ending, the monarchy. After defeating the Decembrists, Nicholas I restored the traditional alliance of crown and military in a somewhat altered form marked by intensified military discipline and police controls. The ensuing bureaucratic rigidity and lack of rapid industrial development led to stunning military defeats in the Crimean War and again in the Russo-Japanese War. Each defeat prompted military reform, the first in the 1870's and the second on the eve of World War I. During the last century of the Empire, however, the military elite played no role in imperial succession.

An ironic throwback to the political tradition of the Guards regiments seems to have occurred with the Bolshevik seizure of power. A number of Lettish rifle regiments, which retained exceptionally high standards of cohesion and discipline through the tumultuous year of 1917, went over to the Bolsheviks to become the party's mainstay of police and military force at crucial junctures in the early months of Soviet rule. Lettish riflemen dispersed the Constituent Assembly, and Lettish riflemen reportedly executed Nicholas II and his family in 1918. The Cheka leaned heavily on them for assistance.

Evidence suggesting survival of the Guards tradition in more recent times is more tenuous. Stalin apparently succeeded Lenin without special assistance from elite military units. The defeat of Beria's efforts to succeed Stalin, on the contrary, seems to have involved military units and key military figures. The events of 1957 and 1964 in connection with changes in the Politburo are murky, leaving great uncertainty as to the military's role in those events. There is, nevertheless, an institutional condition that seems to make possible a reemergence of the Guards tradition. The Ministry of Defense does not control all military units in the USSR, the Internal and Border Troops answering to other lines of command. This creates a situation in which the military—somewhat like the Guards of former times —might involve itself in a political struggle, but not as a united military. That is to say, military participation in a political crisis, even to the point of ordering troops out into the streets of Moscow, could conceivably take place without the military itself being a serious contender for power. Were it to occur, it would probably be part of an intra-party struggle in which military cliques would choose sides.

To trace out these traditions in Russian civil-military relations is not to explain them; on the contrary, it raises disturbing questions. Why did the Guards repeatedly choose not to usurp power? Why, in 1825, on the single occasion when they opposed the monarchy were they defeated? Answers to these questions are needed, but they are not essential to this discussion. The questions themselves and the traditions they identify are sufficient to show that it is quite ordinary in Russia for the military to assume an executant's role in an authoritarian political system and to refrain from usurping political power even when that power falls temporarily within its reach during a succession struggle. The past, of course, is never a certain guide to the future, but it can help us understand why some of our past predictions have not proven accurate. And it can sharpen our perception of persisting and changing realities in contemporary Soviet internal military affairs.

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Castro's Domestic Course

By Carmelo Mesa-Lago

In the autumn of 1970, Prime Minister Fidel Castro declared that Cuba's revolution was entering "a new phase"—one which was described both in Havana and abroad as a step forward in the democratization of Cuban socialism. Yet by mid-1973 the promise of Fidel's "Havana Autumn" had faded to little more than a forlorn hope. The events of the intervening years appear to have increased rather than decreased the degree of centralization and regimentation of Cuban life. In the following discussion we shall review the promises made by Cuba's leaders in 1970 and contrast them with the actual developments that have taken place in the ruling Cuban Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de Cuba* —PPC), in the central administration, the management of enterprises, the trade unions, the private agricultural sector, and among students and intellectuals in the ensuing three years.

The apparent shift in Castro's revolutionary policies in autumn 1970 seemed to be a response to various factors, in particular a marked decline in the evaluation of the Castro regime by once sympathetic and internationally respected Marxist scholars and specialists, and—more concretely—the failure to achieve the goal of 10 million tons in the sugar harvest in the spring of 1970. The decline in Castro's international reputation came as a result of return visits to the island in the late 1960's—often at Fidel's own invitation—by a number of individuals who had previously observed (or even served as consultants to) the Castro government and had then published favorable commentaries on his revolution. A second round of articles and books by those individuals, published in 1969-70, proved less laudatory. While continuing to praise the Cuban revolution in general, these authorities sharply criticized autocratic and personalist tendencies in Cuba, the accumulation of power in the hands of Fidel and his close inner circle of loyal followers, the militarization of the regime, and the erosion of the influence of trade unions and other mass organizations. These observers—all committed to a humanistic, democratic, participatory form of socialism—called on Castro to delegate more power to local organizations and more freedom to trade unions, to submit vital policy issues to public debate, and generally to permit greater popular participation in decision-making.[1]

A second probable factor in Castro's decision to announce a "new phase" in the revolution was the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest to reach its target. Despite massive mobilization of the population—both rural and urban—the government was able to achieve a harvest of only 8.5 million tons. The intense effort dragged down output in other sectors and resulted in increased popular disenchantment and labor absenteeism. Coming on the heels of the criticism by once-enthusiastic foreign observers, this failure may have dramatized the need for change.

Whatever his reasons, Castro in the period from May to December 1970 delivered a series of

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[1] See, for example, L. Huberman and P. Sweezy, *Socialism in Cuba*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969, pp. 201-18; M. Zeitlin, "Inside Cuba: Workers and Revolutions," *Ramparts* (Berkeley, Calif.), No. 8, March 1970, pp. 20, 70-78; and particularly, R. Dumont, *Cuba: est-il socialiste?* (Cuba: Is It Socialist?), Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1970, pp. 134-223; and K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution*, New York, Hill & Wang, 1970, pp. 329-30, 410, 457-58.

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speeches in which he not only acknowledged but himself criticized the exaggerated role of the state in all aspects of Cuban life, the excessive centralization and bureaucratization of administrative functions and their usurpation by the PCC, the lack of democracy within economic enterprises, and the weak non-democratic state of the island's various mass organizations.[2] He proposed a number of measures aimed at clarifying and simplifying lines of command at the national level, decentralizing administrative functions, promoting worker participation in enterprise management, and democratizing and strengthening mass organizations and establishing channels for their more active participation in national affairs.

The Proposals

In a move to separate political and administrative functions within the PCC, Castro proposed the creation within the PCC Central Committee of a new Bureau of Production alongside the already existing Political Bureau. He also proclaimed that the party's role in governmental administration would henceforth be strictly coordinative and supervisory. To streamline the direction of national production under the Council of Ministers, he announced that central ministries and agencies with related functions would be clustered into several functional groupings for purposes of more efficient planning and coordination. At the same time, the Prime Minister criticized excessive state involvement in direct administration because it led to the creation of "super-agencies" and to public indifference. Instead, he declared,

we must begin to substitute democratic methods for administrative methods that run the risk of becoming bureaucratic.[3]

[2] F. Castro, "Comparecencia . . . sobre la zafra azucarera de 1970" (Appearance . . . on the 1970 Sugar Harvest), *Granma Resumen Semanal* (Havana), May 31, 1970; "Discurso en conmemoración del XVII aniversario del asalto al Cuartel Moncada" (Speech on the 17th Anniversary of the Taking of the Moncada Barracks), *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1970; "Discurso en el X aniversario de la constitución de la FMC" (Speech on the 10th anniversary of the Cuban Women's Federation), *ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1970; "Discurso en la plenaria provincial de la CTC" (Speech at the Provincial Plenary Meeting of the CTC), *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1970; "Discurso en la concentración para celebrar el décimo aniversario de los CDR" (Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1970; and "Speech at the Closing Session of the National Plenary Meeting of Basic Industry," *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Dec. 20, 1970.

Fidel Castro leads the mobilization effort in 1970 as Cuba attempts to harvest a record 10 million tons of raw sugar.

—Photo by Kaeding for ADN (East German News Agency) via Eastfoto.

To this end, Castro, said that all mass organizations would go through a democratization process and ultimately be entrusted with close supervision and control of all administrative and political activities. Moreover, governmental control of activities of insufficient national importance to warrant central administration would revert to organizations at city-district level with representation of the workers and of various organizations of youth, women and students.

Castro further indicated that within enterprises management would cease to be the exclusive prerogative of the manager and instead would be vested in a "collective body" presided over by the manager but including representatives of the workers, the party, and youth and women's organizations. Elaborating on the latter point, Minister of Labor Jorge Risquet noted that workers had hitherto been considered only producers incapable of making decisions or correcting administrative mistakes and had consequently not developed a sense of involvement in the success of their enterprise. He stated that the party was considering means of consulting the workers in drafting and adopting production plans and long-term decisions of enterprises.[4]

[3] F. Castro, "Discurso en el X aniversario de la constitución de la FMC" (Speech on the 10th Anniversary of the Cuban Women's Federation), *loc. cit.*

[4] J. Risquet, "Comparecencia sobre problemas de fuerza de trabajo y productividad" (Appearance on Problems of the Efficiency of Labor and Productivity), *Granma* (Havana), Aug. 1, 1970.

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Throughout these speeches and discussions, however, there ran some important notes of caution. For example, in discussing the issue of collective management, Labor Minister Risquet warned:

The fact that Fidel and I have suggested that the workers should be consulted does not mean that we are going to negate the vanguard role that the party must play.[5]

In his own speeches, moreover, Castro stressed that the various reforms outlined would be submitted to "careful study."

As it turned out, one would have done well to heed these warning signals, for of the promised measures only the clustering of ministries and an allegedly "democratic" reorganization of the labor unions have thus far been implemented. Instead of coming under "collective management," enterprises have remained under the sole authority of the managers.[6] There have also been no further references to community-district bodies taking over state functions or of mass organizations supervising the party and administration.

This was not the first time that the Cuban regime had raised false expectations of greater mass participation in decision-making. In 1960-62, technical advisory councils had been set up in enterprises, candidates from among the workers selected, and the functions of the councils spelled out, but the matter was then abruptly shelved. Similarly, in 1967 some 22,000 delegates were elected to municipal governing councils (*poder local*), but these bodies were suspended indefinitely in the following year.

Castro's 1970 proposals to initiate collective management in enterprises and increase local governing autonomy did not even get as far as the abortive moves of the 1960's. In fact, the concrete measures taken by the Castro regime in the aftermath of Fidel's flurry of promises to democratize and decentralize Cuban society have actually constituted moves toward rather than away from centralized authority.

One evidence of this trend emerged in connection with the work of the PCC's Commission on Juridical Studies headed by Blas Roca, which had been charged in 1970 with drafting a comprehensive revision of the Cuban judicial system and legal codes. In summarizing the draft "bases" of the revision drawn up by the Commission, an article published in late 1971 stated that the revision would make the entire judicial system "hierarchically subordinate" to the Council of Ministries—a plain indication that there was to be no ultimate separation of judicial and executive powers.[7]

Further evidence of increased centralization was the creation in late 1972 of an Executive Committee within the Council of Ministers, comprising the Prime Minister (as chairman) and nine deputy prime ministers, each in charge of several ministries and state agencies. The division of responsibilities along functional lines was as follows:

Basic industry and energy
Consumer-goods industry and domestic trade
Sugar industry
Non-sugar agriculture
Construction
Transportation and communications
Labor, foreign trade and planning
Foreign relations
Education and culture

While the clustering of ministries by sector did follow the proposals of 1970 and may well have provided a more rational and efficient structuring of the central governmental administration, the upshot was

The Cuban people listen to Fidel's July 26, 1970, speech announcing failure to reach the goal of a 10-million-ton sugar harvest and acknowledging shortcomings of the Cuban revolution.

—Photo by Stephen Shames for Black Star.

[5] "Palabras en la plenaria provincial de la CTC" (Words at the Provincial Plenary Session of the CTC), *ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1970.

[6] Despite his earlier comments on labor participation in management, Labor Minister Risquet made it quite clear in mid-1971 that the managers continued to exercise total production authority within the enterprises (see his "Speech at the Closing Session of the 6th National Council of the Central Organization of Trade Unions," *Granma Weekly Review*, Oct. 24, 1971).

[7] "Nuevo sistema judicial" ("The New Judicial System"), *Cuba International* (Havana), November-December 1971, pp. 72-75.

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a shrinkage of the size of the top administrative body in Cuba, for the new Executive Committee was half the size of the Council of Ministries. Castro, still in charge (now as chairman of the Executive Committee), directly controls the strategic areas of the armed forces, security, and agrarian matters. All the deputy prime ministers, with the exception of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (from the prerevolutionary PSP) are from Castro's inner circle.[8]

On the Labor Front

Although the Castro regime seems to have concentrated its efforts on reorganizing the central administrative apparatus and to have eschewed the promised introduction of collective management on the local level, it did attempt to breathe some life into the virtually moribund trade union movement. As an official Cuban publication noted, the practice of assuming "a total identity between the interests of the government and of the workers" during the 1960's had resulted in nearly "total dissolution" of the unions. Under orders "to win the workers for the revolution, to fight the counterrevolution and push production forward," the unions had become mere "ancillary instruments" of the government, and trade union democracy was "limited and formal," with meetings held irregularly. The same account noted that the launching of the "movement of vanguard workers" in 1967 had further undermined the unions. Consisting of the most productive and revolutionary workers, the "vanguard" groups (a selected minority) had began to usurp the few remaining functions of the unions (whose membership comprised the majority of workers). The situation was described as such that

Many thought that the unions could be eliminated without the nation losing anything, because the government, the administration and the party were ap-

[8] "Executive Committee of Council of Ministers Established," *Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 3, 1972.

Fidel Castro (fourth from left) and his fellow officials lead the way as Cuban workers march to the theme of "Productivity" (Productividad) on May Day 1972 in Havana.

—Photo from *Cuba Internacional* (Havana), August 1972, p. 12.

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parently capable of doing whatever the unions could do.[9]

The alienation of the Cuban worker under these circumstances had been admitted in a remarkable display of self-criticism by Labor Minister Risquet in his August 1970 speech:

Theoretically, the administrator represents the interests of the worker and peasant state, the interests of all the people. Theory is one thing and practice another. . . . The worker may have a right established by the Revolution, [but] there is no one to defend him. He does not know where to turn. He turns to the party, and it does not know or it is busy mobilizing the people for production . . . the party is so involved with management that in many instances it has ceased to play its proper role, has become somewhat insensitive to the problems of the masses. . . . The trade union either does not exist or it has become the vanguard workers' bureau. . . .[10]

To correct this situation, Risquet recommended that open and democratic elections for the directorates of all local unions be held and that the labor movement be allowed to perform its natural role—*i.e.*, to see that labor laws are observed and the workers' rights protected. In September 1970, Castro himself confirmed that trade union elections would be held shortly and would be "absolutely free," although he intimated that elected union officials would be expected to "go all out to defend and fight for" the revolutionary line of the party.[11]

The elections did indeed take place between November 9 and December 9, 1970, and were acclaimed by the Cuban news media as free and democratic. There were, however, some indications of governmental manipulation of the electoral process. When, prior to the elections, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba*—CTC) discussed the electoral procedures, some union members were openly critical of the traditional methods being followed. These criticisms led one veteran union official to complain:

We turned the rabbit loose before the hunter had his rifle ready.[12]

Labor Minister Risquet finally intervened to silence the critics, branding them as "counterrevolutionaries" and "demagogues" who were creating a "negative situation [which had] to be changed radically."[13]

Rank-and-file complaints about the electoral procedures were, in fact, well-founded. These procedures prohibited candidates from publicizing their own candidacy and qualifications in any way, this function being exclusively reserved to a CTC Electoral Commission. Although the CTC did not spell out the precise "merits" expected of candidates, one may assume that the Commission was disposed to favor those candidates who displayed to the greatest degree the attributes of revolutionary loyalty and militancy stressed by Castro. In most enterprises, particularly small ones, there was one candidate. Not surprisingly, worker participation in the elections was poor: although the government predicted 100-percent participation, only half the labor force actually bothered to vote.[14]

As it turned out, approximately one-third of the officials elected to union office in the 1970 elections were incumbents. Most of those who were newly elected apparently satisfied the official criteria, although there were evidently some who did not. As Minister Risquet observed,

In the great majority of work centers, the masses elected their best representatives. . . . There were some cases, however—very few of them, we must say—where the workers elected did not have sufficient merits or the merits which would entitle them to act as leaders. . . . These are "warning lights," . . . a danger signal to the trade union movement and to the party, pointing out the location or the manifestation of failures in our political work. . . .[15]

Meanwhile, even before the election results were complete, the government took a number of precautionary steps clearly designed to tighten its control

[9] Lionel Martin, "Reestructuracion sindical en Cuba" (Restructuring of Trade Unions in Cuba), *Cuba Internacional*, April 1971, pp. 28-30.

[10] "Comparacencia sobre problemas de fuerza de trabajo y productividad" (Appearance on Problems of the Efficiency of Labor and Productivity), *loc. cit.*

[11] "Discurso en la concentración para celebrar el decimo aniversario de los CDR" (Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the CDR), *loc. cit.*

[12] J. Risquet, "Palabras en la Plenaria Provincial de la CTC" (Words at the Provincial Plenary Session of the CTC), *loc. cit.*

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Electoral predictions and preliminary results were published in *Granma* on Oct. 30 and Dec. 3, 1970. Final results were given by Fidel Castro in his May Day 1972 speech (see *Granma Weekly Review*, May 7, 1972).

[15] J. Risquet, "Speech at the Closing Session of the 6th National Council of the Central Organization of Trade Unions," *loc. cit.*

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over labor. One such measure was a reorganization of the national trade union structure so as to parallel the administrative hierarchies headed by the central government ministries. There are now 21 national unions, each with a pyramidal structure spreading out from an organization in the corresponding ministry at the top, through regional branches, to units in consolidated enterprises and plants at the bottom. A second action was the launching of a campaign to make managers more demanding of their employees, and workers more demanding of their own fellow workers. Finally, the government introduced a series of measures the combined effect of which was to create a complex system for recording the "labor-political" performance of each worker, measuring individual output, and curbing absenteeism. Because of space limitations, only this last set of measures will be examined in detail here.[16]

A key element in the new system was the requirement that a so-called "worker biography," including a complete record of "merits" and "demerits," be maintained for every individual worker, and that any worker must have such a record on file, as well as an identification card, in order to be eligible for state employment (a category encompassing as much as 90 percent of the total labor force). "Merits" are recorded for such things as voluntary (unpaid) labor in sugar harvesting, overfulfillment of work quotas (see below), overtime work without pay, postponement of retirement to continue working, defense of socialist (state) property, and a high level of political consciousness. "Demerits" are recorded for any "activities that negatively affect production, disturb labor discipline, and show a low level of consciousness," *e.g.*, absenteeism; negligence in handling equipment, raw materials and fuel; nonfulfillment of work quotas; quitting work at an enterprise without previous authorization; and desertion from labor camps before completing the terms to which the worker has committed himself. The "biography" also records any penalty imposed on the worker by civil, military, revolutionary, and people's courts.[17]

In a related step, the Soviet-style system of work quotas—first introduced and applied in Cuba in the years 1963-65—has been reinstated. The quota system had been neglected during the years from 1966 to 1970, when the country had been under the sway of Sino-Guevarism, characterized—as Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado observed—by "an excessive confidence in spontaneity, in the belief that without work quotas everybody would work willingly in an efficient manner."[18] By May 1972, however, quotas had been reinstituted at 3,000 enterprises employing some 700,000 workers (about one-third of state employment), and all state enterprises and workers are supposed to be covered by the end of 1973.[19] Under the revived system each worker is assigned a specific output quota to be produced on a given work schedule. Managers are to press for fulfillment or overfulfillment of these quotas, and failure by a worker to meet his quota makes him subject to penalties (including, as stated above, the entry of demerits in his labor file).

Already as early as the spring of 1971, the Cuban government had sought to maximize the productive utilization of available manpower by enacting a law against loafing that required all men aged 17-60 and physically and mentally capable to be productively employed. Even before the measure went into effect, the government had reportedly recruited some 100,000 idle men into the labor force. The legislation was also aimed at the problem of absenteeism, which had reached a rate of nearly 20 percent toward the end of 1970. Absence of more than 15 days was deemed a "precriminal stage of loafing," and recurrent absenteeism amounted to the "crime of loafing," punishable by penalties ranging from house arrest to imprisonment in a rehabilitation center at forced labor for 1-2 years.[20]

Issues vital to the workers were involved in all these matters, but there is no evidence that the trade unions—despite the rhetoric of Castro and Risquet in 1970—have been particularly active in defending worker interests. Instead they concentrate on such innocuous functions as organizing vacations and providing education and recreation for their memberships.[21] In May 1971 Castro announced that the 13th

[16] For details on the first two points, see Fidel Castro, "Speech at the Closing Session of the National Plenary Meeting of Basic Industry," *loc. cit.*; J. Risquet, "Speech at the Closing Session of the 6th National Council of the Central Organization of Trade Unions," *loc. cit.*; and "A Battle Already Under Way," *Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 5, 1971.

[17] See, for example, "Projecto de evaluación laboral" (Plan for Labor Evaluation), *Granma*, July 8, 1970; "Projecto sobre méritos y deméritos laborales" (Plan for Labor Merits and Demerits), *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1970; and Resolution No. 425, in *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1970.

[18] Quoted in "Organización y normación del trabajo en 500 grandes centros industriales" (The Organization and Setting of Work Quotas at 500 Large Industrial Centers), *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1970.

[19] See Fidel Castro's 1972 May Day speech in *Granma Weekly Review*, May 7, 1972.

[20] See Law No. 1231 of March 16, 1971, in *ibid.*, March 28, 1971, p. 2.

[21] See Martín, *loc. cit.*; and "Cuba: Trade Unions," in *Latin America* (London), July 28, 1972, pp. 234, 236.

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Congress of the CTC (the last such congress was in mid-1966) would be held toward the end of 1972, and it was generally expected to deal with such basic issues as collective management, worker participation in national decisions, and trade union defense of worker rights and interests. However, Castro apparently found the climate at the end of 1972 unpropitious for such a gathering and postponed the congress for a year.[22]

Small Farmers

While tightening its controls over the industrial and urban labor force, the Havana government has also proceeded with efforts to mobilize and politicize rural manpower—a process which had continued throughout the 1960's, beginning with land redistribution and moving on to the formation of cooperative and then state farms. By 1964 virtually all cooperatives and large or middle-sized private farms had been transformed into state farms controlling more than 70 percent of the total arable land. The remaining 30 percent of the land continued in the hands of some 200,000 small farmers, organized in the National Association of Small Farmers (*Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños*—ANAP). These farmers have been required to sell an ever-increasing share (*acopio*) of their crops to the state at prices below official market prices.

In the years 1967-69, the government purchased some 10,000 of these private farms and acquired others when the owners retired or died (land cannot

[22] See Castro's 1971 May Day speech (*Granma Weekly Review*, May 16, 1971), his speech on the 18th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada (*ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1971), and Radio Havana broadcast of Feb. 23, 1973.

A private farmer with his family outside their home.

—A 1970 photo by Stephen Shames for Black Star.

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be inherited under current Cuban law). In certain areas, particularly the "Green Belt" around Havana, the *acopio* has come to include the farmer's total crop, in which case the government has paid him a "rent" and allowed him to use a small portion of his land to produce food for personal consumption. The private farmers had been permitted to sell any surplus products to urban dwellers, who in turn consumed, bartered, or sold such products (illegally) on the black market; however, such sales by small farmers were sharply curtailed during the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968-69.

Another problem that troubled the regime was the private farmers' practice of hiring rural workers who had not joined the state farms during the campaigns of 1962-64. There remained as many as 30,000 to 60,000 such workers in 1966. The Castro government moved on this front in 1971 (after passage of the law against loafing) when it pressured the ANAP to launch a campaign to detect and transfer to the state sector thousands of workers employed part-time on private farms or working there full-time but at "low productivity."[23]

The increased pressure of the state administration on the small farmers was even more evident in late 1971 at the Second Congress of the ANAP— advertised as a landmark event in the "new phase" of the Revolution. The Congress turned out to be the occasion of heated controversy between spokesmen for the private farmers and the government. Prime Minister Castro expressed shock at the "incredible" demands of the farmers and observed: "Sometimes one must resort to rawness if one is to put a message across."[24] The main points of friction were evidenced in four main resolutions approved by the Congress, which imposed the government's will with respect to the issues in contention.[25]

The first measure called for the progressive incorporation of private farms and their owners and employees into the state sector in order to eradicate "every remaining vestige of class and private ownership of the means of production." Although the resolution eschewed the use of force or coercion in the process, the ANAP was committed to use political education to convince the farmers and workers to join the state sector voluntarily.

A second resolution sought to limit further the private sale of agricultural surpluses and pledged a war on black-market sales of food. Some small farmers had argued against such a policy and had even appealed for annulment of the law punishing illegal traffic in agricultural products, but the Congress rejected this appeal. Castro minced no words about how to treat those who rejected the decision:

Those individuals who engage in black-market operations should be made the object of political work. And the incorrigible ones should be deprived of all their rights [*and*] *be treated as class enemies.*[26]

The last two major resolutions of ANAP were aimed at further restricting the activity of those private farmers totally integrated into the *acopio* system and drawing "rent" from the government. The Congress resolved to set such rent payments below the level needed to cover basic necessities of the small farmers (a measure designed to force them to

One of Cuba's rural workers.

—A 1970 photo by Phyllis Stoffman for Black Star.

[23] Radio Havana broadcast of March 4, 1971.
[24] The speech was published in *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan. 9, 1972.
[25] Radio Havana broadcast of Jan. 13, 1972.
[26] *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan. 9, 1972.

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work part-time on state land) and also envisaged the ultimate abolition of private plots, with the farmers to be required to devote all their working time to the cultivation of state land.

In its efforts to mobilize rural manpower, the regime found a large number of rural workers (estimated at 6 to 10 percent of the total labor force) resistant to union organization and unreceptive to official political views. To remedy this situation the CTC launched a campaign in 1972 to recruit some 150,000 of these rural workers into its member unions and attempt to change these individuals' conservative political attitudes.[27]

The Problem of Youth

The Castro government has also moved to "rejuvenate" and "strengthen" its major mass organization for youth—the Young Communist League (*Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas*—UJC). As elsewhere, the motive seems to have been to increase the capability of the organization to impose official views and enforce official policy. As noted in a March 1971 commentary, there were serious problems with the island's youth: some 12 percent of the students population were neither working nor studying (up to 60 percent of those in the 16-year-old age group); the dropout rate was high (79 percent of those who entered elementary school in 1965 did not complete the 6-year course, and 86 percent of those who went on to high school also quit school before graduating); students preferred to enroll in "language" schools rather than in the vocational and technical schools favored by the government; and youth showed a general lack of concern and responsibility for the protection of state property. The commentary also criticized Cuban youth for wearing "extravagant foreign fashions," listening to American music, and reading "decadent literature." In some cases youths were said to have been used by "counterrevolutionaries" to protest against the revolution. Minors reportedly participated in half of all crimes (and the proportion was allegedly rising), and there were "residual manifestations" of prostitution and homosexuality among the younger generation.[28]

Jaime Crombet, Secretary General of the Young Communist League (UJC) addresses the 2nd UJC Congress, held in Havana in April 1972.

—Photo from *Cuba Internacional*, June 1972, p. 6.

At the Second Congress of the UJC, held in Havana in April 1972, League Secretary General Jaime Crombet admitted that the 10-year-old organization had a "poor, rickety membership" (it has on its rolls some 120,000 youths out of a potential 2 million).[29] The Congress called for the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of youngsters and for an intensification of political work aimed at making every young person "a self-sacrificing fighter" for increased production and productivity, for lower production costs, and for careful use of material resources, and at encouraging youth to donate overtime work without pay when necessary. The UJC called for "strict, revolutionary measures in the

[27] "Cuba: Trade Unions," *loc. cit.*, pp. 234, 236.

[28] This assessment can be garnered from the speech of Belarmino Castilla at the opening of the National Congress on Education and Culture in April 1971 and the Congress' declaration (in *Granma Weekly Review*, May 9, 1971); see also the speeches of Fidel Castro on the 10th anniversary of the creation of the Ministry of the Interior (*ibid.*, June 13, 1971) and at the final session of the April 1972 Congress of the Young Communist League (*ibid.*, April 16, 1972).

[29] "Summary of the Report of the National Committee of the Young Communist League," in *Granma Weekly Review*, April 9, 1972, and Radio Havana broadcast of March 1, 1972.

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shortest possible time" against "antisocial" youngsters, especially those who neither worked nor went to school and who were careless and irresponsible in handling socialist property.[30]

In his closing address to the Congress, Castro was more explicit. He proposed attacking the dropout problem by recruiting youths into compulsory military service or the militarized Youth Centennial Column, both of which engage in considerable agricultural and construction work. For other children, compulsory education would extend beyond the sixth grade to cover the age bracket with the highest incidence of dropping out (ages 13 through 17). Those who refused to continue schooling would be subject to special internment combining work and study.[31]

Castro has placed some of the blame for the high rate of juvenile delinquency on leniency of the existing (prerevolutionary) Cuban criminal codes with respect to offenses committed by youths under 18 years of age.[32] In a move to rectify this situation, the government published two draft laws in early 1973 which, if adopted, would establish adult criminal responsibility at age 16 (to include liability to the death penalty for certain crimes) and would punish crimes against "the normal development of sexual relations."[33]

The Intellectuals

While youth problems had also been an important item on the agenda of the First National Congress on Education and Culture, held in April 1971 in Havana, that gathering appeared to be even more concerned with "deviations" in the attitude of Cuba's intellectual and cultural leaders. The deliberations occurred against an ominous background. Just prior to the Congress, the regime had imprisoned on espionage charges a government technician who had been assigned as a research assistant to René Dumont during the latter's visit to Cuba in 1969, and it also jailed the internationally known Cuban poet Heberto Padilla. A large group of European and Latin American leftist intellectuals addressed a letter to Castro expressing indignation over Padilla's imprisonment and "the use of repressive methods against intellectuals and writers who exercise the right of criticism.[34] Castro, in turn accused the signers of the letter of "intellectual tutelage and cultural imperialism" and warned Cubans against the influence of "decadent culture." He renewed the attack while the Congress was in session, assailing "neocolonializing elements in the Cuban cultural movement" who had accepted "foreign cultural impositions" and had developed a "snobbish, servile copy of decadent art."[35] Shortly before the Congress ended, Padilla was released from jail after submitting a "confession" to the Ministry of Interior, and he proceeded to read a letter of self-criticism to a hundred of his colleagues at the headquarters of the Union of Writers and Artists. In the letter, he admitted his "errors against the Revolution," accused Dumont and K. S. Karol of being agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency, disclosed his links with several signers of the earlier letter to Castro, and denounced the "errors" of four Cuban writers present at the meeting (including his wife and three of his close friends).[36]

In this climate of spiraling tension, the Congress announced a toughened line on cultural affairs. No longer would it suffice for writers and artists to proclaim themselves revolutionaries and to abstain from criticizing the regime; they would have to prove their militancy by producing works with political content because, in the words of the final declaration,

. . . culture, like education, is not and cannot be apolitical or impartial. . . . Art is a weapon of the Revolution.[37]

Control of the mass media was to be centralized under a "single political-cultural leadership" which would combat the "infiltration of imperialist cinema, television and art." Staffing of the media, universities and artistic institutions was to take into account "political and ideological qualifications . . ." Regulations for literary contests were to be revised in order to assure the designation of juries with proper revolu-

[30] "Final Declaration of the Second Congress of the Young Communist League," *Granma Weekly Review*, April 23, 1972.

[31] *Ibid.*, April 16, 1972. The 1971 Congress on Education and Culture also had called for internment in school workshops of "maladjusted minors" who commit offenses or display "antisocial behavior" (see the Congress Declaration in *ibid.*, May 9, 1971).

[32] See *ibid.*, June 13, 1971.

[33] *Latin America*, Feb. 2, 1973, p. 40.

[34] *Le Monde* (Paris), April 9, 1971.

[35] See his speeches in commemoration of the Bay of Pigs victory and inaugurating a junior high school in Jagüey (*Granma Weekly Review*, May 2, 1971).

[36] Padilla's statement of self-criticism was published in *Casa de las Américas* (Havana), March-June 1971, pp. 191-203.

[37] *Granma Weekly Review*, May 9, 1971.

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tionary credentials and the selection of the most revolutionary works. The Congress also called for stricter rules governing the invitation of foreign writers and intellectuals to Cuba, and it condemned both the signers of the letter to Castro and the foreign Marxists who had earlier criticized flaws in Cuba's revolution as "agents of imperialist culture" and "pseudorevolutionaries [who] masquerade as leftists but in reality uphold positions against socialism."

In his speech closing the Congress, Castro further announced that new controls would be placed on the selection of books for publication by the Book Institute (the nation's publishing house), and that Cuban magazines would henceforth be open only to revolutionary writers. The Prime Minister reiterated the charge that the foreign Marxists who had criticized Castro were agents of the CIA and stated that they would not be allowed to enter Cuba again.[38]

Sixty European and Latin American writers, filmmakers and artists responded with a second letter to Castro stating that Padilla's confession could only have been obtained through torture, and that this and other events in Cuba recalled "the most sordid moments of Stalinism" with its "dogmatic obscurantism," "cultural xenophobia" and "repressive system."[39] Castro promptly rejected these attacks on the revolution from "Communist, socialist, Marxist and leftist positions."[40] In the summer of 1971, several American scholars of Marxist or leftist leanings, many of whom had visited Cuba before and had expected to return, found their visas cancelled or never issued.[41] At the end of the year, Frank McDonald, an American specialist on Caribbean affairs who had published sympathic reports on the Cuban revolution and was then a guest lecturer at the University of Havana, was suddenly arrested, accused of being a spy, held incommunicado and subjected to interrogation by state-security officials. He was released three months later because of "lack of evidence" but was deported and his notes confiscated on the basis of alleged violation of "a ban on socio-political studies."[42] This same theme surfaced again in the spring of 1973 when the Cuban press leveled charges of espionage against "sociological research" conducted by US scholars in Latin America under sponsorship of such groups as the Ford Foundation and denounced what was termed US "cultural penetration" of Latin America.[43]

Shortly thereafter Cuban radio stations were ordered to stop playing records by US and British pop and folk singers because they "alienated" Cuban youth.[44]

Democratization *vs.* Central Control

This xenophobic campaign on the cultural front and the numerous other concrete measures undertaken by the Castro government in the last two years to mobilize and control the population make it abundantly clear that the promises of democratization and decentralization made in late 1970 have not been carried out. No traces of this liberalizing trend remain in mid-1973, and instead central control has become stronger and more articulated. One is prompted to ask what occasioned the promises in the first place and the contradictory direction of Cuban policy since.

It might be argued that Castro in 1970 had actually been convinced of his mistakes and had decided to follow the advice of his foreign Marxist critics. Most of the critical books and articles appeared prior to Castro's own exercise in "self-criticism," and many of the measures he proposed echoed suggestions of his critics. On the other hand, the whole affair might have been a fake, a temporizing device to compensate for grave mistakes, the erosion of Castro's charisma, and the disenchantment that followed the 1970 economic disaster. As noted earlier, it would not mark the first occasion in the brief "socialist" history of the island that a "participatory" movement had been launched only to be abruptly terminated.

Another possible factor in the peregrinations of Castro's policies might be the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in Cuban affairs—a trend which gained momentum in 1970. In this context, one might view the democratization movement as a case either of Castro yielding to this influence or of his initially resisting it. There is mounting evidence that

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Le Monde*, May 20, 1971.

[40] *Granma Weekly Review*, June 13, 1971.

[41] Personal information made available to the author during the period of June to December 1971.

[42] Frank McDonald, "Report from a Cuban Prison," in *Newsletter of the Institute of Current World Affairs* (New York), various issues from September 1972 to May 1973.

[43] See, for example, Augusto E. Benítez, "Marginality: A Case of Sociological Espionage," *Granma Weekly Review*, March 4, 1973, p. 10.

[44] "All Cuban Stations Ban US Music," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1973.

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since 1968 Cuba has revised a number of her cherished foreign policy principles in order to adapt to Soviet doctrine. Similarly, Cuba has appeared since 1970 to be moving away from Sino-Guevarism toward a more orthodox, Soviet-style policy in economic matters, and Castro's proposal to separate party and administrative functions might be interpreted as a response to Soviet advice and pressure on matters of political organization. Conversely, the democratization movement could have been a desperate final effort to mobilize the Cuban masses behind their charismatic leader in order to maintain independence of the Soviet Union, at least insofar as domestic policy was concerned. Indeed, most of Castro's proposed measures—e.g., community organizations, collective management, supervision of the party by mass organizations—were "unorthodox" by Soviet standards.

Of the possible explanations just outlined, the first two seem less persuasive than the third. If Castro was genuinely convinced in 1970 that his Marxist critics were right, why did he subsequently end up by denouncing them as CIA agents? The cynical interpretation that the whole affair was a fake—that the 1970 promises of liberalization were made simply to restore Castro's damaged prestige and that, once he felt secure again, he promptly switched back to his previous policies of centralized authoritarianism—seems somewhat more plausible, but it, too, does not by itself appear wholly adequate. By and large, Soviet influence would seem to have been the most critical factor behind the 1971-73 reversal of direction. Whether Castro yielded to Soviet pressures from the outset or initially resisted them, the end result was a reversion to and strengthening of Soviet-type bureaucratic-administrative features.

Whatever, the causes of this paradoxical series of events, the concrete result is a Cuba in which the administration is more centralized, the labor force more regimented, the small farmers and rural workers more controlled, and the student body and intellectual milieu more closely supervised than they were at the inauguration of Cuba's Autumn three years ago.

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Political Socialization: Two Paths

EDITORS' NOTE: All societies have processes whereby their young people learn the traditions and working of the specific political system in which they live. In some cases, the process is highly unstructured and informal, the product of a myriad of influences; in others, there is at least an attempt to define and direct it centrally. The Communist states clearly fall into the latter category. Moreover, the ruling parties in these states originally came to power with the intention of reshaping socialization processes in order to bring about a transformation in the type of political participants that these processes turn out. The following two articles explore what the regimes of the two major Communist powers have tried to accomplish, and seek to evaluate the regimes' successes and failures in their endeavors. Mr. Schwartz looks at the situation in the USSR, concentrating on the political socialization efforts of the Soviet Young Communist League; Mr. Montaperto delineates the Maoist approach to political socialization and assesses the degree to which the Chinese Communist Youth League has implemented it.

The Elusive "New Soviet Man"

By Joel J. Schwartz

The Bolshevik Revolution has brought many changes to Russian society. Economically, industrially, and militarily, the USSR is a far more formidable nation today than it was in 1917. Assessments of progress made under Communist leadership usually rely upon economic and military indicators of this sort. But the Communists also cite other reasons to justify their political stewardship. From the Revolution's inception, the leadership has posted as a priority goal the rearing of a "New Man"—one whose values and behavior would be free of the pernicious influences of the Tsarist past.

Experience has shown that official rhetoric is not always an accurate reflection of Soviet intent. In this connection, Communist affairs analyst Robert C. Tucker has argued that Marxist movements tend to intensify their verbal adherence to revolutionary goals at the very time they are abandoning such goals in practice.[1] However, there is reason to believe that the leadership of the Communist Party

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[1] Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 192.

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of the Soviet Union is speaking in earnest when it emphasizes the creation of a New Soviet Man as a key objective of its socialization policies. Going beyond mere lip service, the regime expends substantial social and economic resources in its efforts to mold Communist character. Much of the activity engaged in by the schools, the youth organizations, the mass media, and the party itself is directed toward this purpose.

Both pragmatic and ideological considerations underlie the regime's commitment. On the practical side, the authorities undoubtedly recognize that abandoning this revolutionary goal—if indeed, they wanted to—would entail serious costs. Even the most fervent defenders of Soviet progress admit that alcoholic abuse, corruption, juvenile delinquency, crime, slovenly work habits, and many other undesirable behavior traits are still widespread among the peoples of the USSR. Unless the regime is prepared to accept the economic and social consequences of such "deviant" behavior as inevitable and permanent, rearing a New Man must remain an active, high-priority concern.

In terms of doctrinal implications, the leadership also has little alternative but to persist in its socialization efforts. The CPSU justifies its monopolistic political role on the grounds that it alone has access to a scientific social theory. Marxism-Leninism is said both to explain and to predict the evolution of man in society. The credibility of the doctrine therefore depends upon the support of historical evidence; events must unfold in accordance with ideological assumptions.

One basic assumption of Marxist-Leninist theory is, of course, that the economic substructure of any society determines the ideological superstructure. Marx decisively rejected the absoluteness and universality of human values. What men esteemed and how they behaved depended upon what their relationship was to the means of production and the exchange of goods at a given point in historical time. Altering man's economic and social environment meant altering his personality as well. Marx ascribed all the social ills and all destructive behavior of his time to the capitalist economic system. The transition to communism, he predicted, would put an end to the division of labor, alienation, war, crime, violence, corruption, greed, and the many other unsavory conditions of man's existence.

The USSR claims to have abolished capitalism and declares that it now stands on the threshold of full communism. Nevertheless, asocial behavior continues to plague the country. Why has Marx's eschatological vision not yet been realized Because, argues the CPSU, remnants of bourgeois consciousness still infect the popular mind. Capitalism as a form of production no longer exists, but capitalism as a state of mind still takes its toll. Fifty years have not been sufficient time to resocialize the Soviet citizen. Cultural lag keeps the population in bondage to prerevolutionary habits and attitudes. By attributing deviancy to remnants of the bourgeois past, party ideologists avoid explanations which would undermine the validity of Marxist theory and the legitimacy of Bolshevik power.[2] At the same time, the "remnants" thesis requires rigorous socialization efforts to sustain its credibility.

The Komsomol: Functions and Sanctions

The purpose of the present essay is to explore one dimension of the continuing Soviet socialization program—the role of the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, in molding the New Soviet Man. Many other institutions, of course, perform important functions in the program, but space does not permit an adequate treatment of the entire Soviet socialization experience. The Komsomol has been singled out for attention because its membership ranges in age from 14 to 28, and its activities thus coincide with a critical time period in the human life-span—the years in which youths establish their independence from their families and assume their first adult roles. It is also a period of life when most Soviet youths are no longer under the influence of the public schools.[3] Hence, the Komsomol is the primary socializing agent upon which the regime must rely to influence these critical transitional years. To a certain extent, the Komsomol's success or failure determines the overall success or failure of the broader socialization effort.

[2] If asocial behavior was not attributed to "cultural lag," the CPSU would have to contend with alternative explanations—e.g., the suggestion that Marxist theory is unsound or that the Soviet system itself is responsible for at least some portion of deviant behavior. Obviously, the party prefers not to have to deal with these alternative possibilities.

[3] Soviet children, who begin school at the age of seven, must complete eight years of universal and compulsory education, usually by ages 15-16. Thereafter, youths take a full-time job, work part-time and study part-time in evening and correspondence secondary schools, enroll in various vocational or specialized secondary schools, or complete general secondary school. For the vast majority, full-time schooling thus comes to an end between the ages of 15 and 18.

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This educational responsibility is somewhat simplified because the Komsomol does not impart any new values. Rather, it supplements and reinforces the socialization lessons already taught in the schools. The content of those lessons may be summarized as follows: The New Soviet Man is an individual who subordinates his self-interests to those of the wider community. He is solicitous of other people's welfare, a vigilant guardian of state property, and diligent in his work habits. He eschews any ties with organized religion and unhesitatingly supports the party's position on all domestic and international issues. He is law-abiding and observant of conventional behavior standards as defined by authority. Pursuing an alternative life style or participating in a "counterculture" holds no attraction for him.

Through its educational program and organized activities, the Komsomol continually legitimizes these values. The primacy of communal interests, for example, is given concrete meaning through the Youth League's system of public work assignments. Every member is asked to devote a certain amount of his free time to socially useful tasks. That may include cleaning neighborhood streets of litter, helping nearby farmers bring in the harvest, assisting the local police in combatting hooliganism, or decorating public buildings in honor of a forthcoming holiday. While the tasks vary, the moral lesson behind them is always the same. The Soviet citizen's primary concern ought to be not self-indulgence but rather contribution to the collective welfare.

Members of the editorial staff of Komsomolskaia pravda *meet to map out the next issue of the newspaper geared to orient Soviet youth.*

—Sovfoto.

What if a young person does not adequately internalize these norms? What if he shirks public work assignments, violates labor discipline, destroys state property, or expresses politically unorthodox views? When these cases arise, the Komsomol has at its disposal a broad range of sanctions which it can use to encourage avoidance or modification of deviant behavior. The effectiveness of such sanctions rests upon the assumption that Soviet adolescents have developed an outer-directed personality by their teen years and are therefore sensitive to peer approval or disapproval. In other words, successful social control depends upon the Komsomol's ability to mobilize peer pressure against certain behavior patterns and upon the likelihood that the deviant will respond to such pressure.

Mobilization techniques may involve a comradely warning in private, censure and condemnation at a general meeting, or shaming and ridiculing the deviant in a public place.[4] Alternatively, the errant member may be brought before a "comrade's court." Since this quasi-judicial assembly is not bound by strict legal procedures, it may review behavior which is perfectly legal but not socially desirable from the regime's point of view. The court's proceedings are structured so as to encourage full participation of all who are present. The expectation is that those who live, work, and study with the accused will condemn his actions and demand that he mend his ways—a classic example of social opprobrium being mobilized to influence the outer-directed man. But if it deems necessary, the court can go beyond mere public disapproval: it can vote to sentence the guilty party to a corrective labor camp for short periods of time.[5]

As a final control measure, the Komsomol may expel the offender from the organization itself. Not only does exclusion carry the stigma of social ostracism; it can have quite serious consequences for the present and future life of the individual, especially in the case of students with career aspirations. Because the Komsomol is the only youth organization in the USSR, it exercises dominant control over the social, recreational, and cultural facilities available to this age group. By excluding an individual

[4] Shaming mechanisms include listing the offender's name and perhaps his picture on a dishonor roll. Caricatures of the individual may also be posted on a street billboard or at the place where he lives, works, or studies.

[5] When a comrade's court reaches such a decision, the proceedings are transferred to and reviewed by the regularly constituted court system. This provides some protection for the defendant against capricious and arbitrary actions.

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ЕГО ЖДАЛИ

Рисунок В. ЧИЖИКОВА

Cartoon strip satirizing the difficulty of getting kolkhoz youth to return to the farm after completing their studies at a big-city institute under kolkhoz scholarship. The cartoon, drawn by V. Chizhikova, is titled "They Waited for Him."

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), No. 11, April 1972, pp. 8-9.

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from its ranks, it can also, in effect, exclude him from utilizing and enjoying such facilities. Later in life, a young person may seek admission to college, the opportunity to travel abroad, or promotion to a more responsible and rewarding job. A bad character reference from the Komsomol may complicate or prevent achievement of these goals.

Exclusion, of course, carries disadvantages for the Komsomol as well. Once a member is expelled, he is put beyond the potential influence of the organization. The utility of this particular sanction requires balanced use. It cannot be exercised too often, but it must be used often enough to sustain its deterrent effect. In the latter respect, peer criticism and disapproval might become less effective as a control mechanism if the member were to assume that more costly sanctions would not be invoked.

Patterns of Resistance

The previous discussion has mentioned only a few of the many resources employed by the Komsomol in its socialization program. The critical question, however, is how well these resources work. Although measuring success is a difficult problem, it seems reasonable to argue that the behavior of Soviet youth often falls considerably short of the New Man ideal. The following section will identify several behavior patterns which deviate from officially-prescribed standards. While it is impossible to ascertain the precise extent of such behavior because the Soviet Union does not publish the type of statistical data that would permit exact assessment, the extensive coverage that has been given such behavior problems in the official press makes it clear that they are profoundly disturbing to the Soviet leadership.

At all levels of the social hierarchy, Soviet youth have increasingly demonstrated their unwillingness to subordinate personal gratification to the collective welfare. Among college graduates this attitude frequently manifests itself in the avoidance of state labor assignments. Upon graduation, every student is required by law to work for three years in a job and in a place selected by the State Labor Commission. Normally, this means employment in an underdeveloped part of the country which cannot attract or maintain a stable labor force on a voluntary basis. A willingness to work under primitive and harsh conditions represents a repayment to society for the free education it has bestowed upon the student. Yet when confronted with this social obligation, many students either have failed to appear at their designated jobs or have deserted their work assignments before the three-year term expired.[6]

A different sort of refusal involves high school graduates who are rejected for higher schooling but who remain out of the industrial work force. In the world's first proletarian state, manual labor is viewed by children of the middle class as both dishonorable and degrading.[7] Such attitudes cause real problems for the regime. In the first place, they are a source of ideological embarrassment. A nation advertising itself as classless and governed in the interests of the proletariat cannot tolerate an elitist and contemptuous attitude toward manual labor. In the second place, the behavior of middle-class youth exacerbates an already critical labor shortage problem. Recent economic and demographic changes have created a demand for semi-skilled workers which far exceeds the available supply. High growth rates will be difficult to sustain unless the supply-demand imbalance narrows. Therefore, the regime must find a way to prevent large numbers of high school graduates from remaining idle, neither attending higher educational institutions nor joining in the labor force.

Another behavior pattern, common to working-class youth and bothersome to the party, is the high turnover rate in industry and agriculture. For many years, Soviet leaders, through the Komsomol, have encouraged young people to remain and work in the countryside. But the flight from rural areas has in no way diminished. A 1966 survey in the Smolensk region showed, for example, that the number of Komsomol members working on state farms had halved in five years. The drop had been even more precipitous on collective farms, declining from 21,043 to 8,778.[8] Among urban youth, the problem has been not so much abandonment of factory life as constant movement between jobs. According to a report of 1967,[9] in Moscow—a major industrial center as well as the capital city—nearly 65 percent of those categorized as job transients were under 30

[6] In some instances, reported refusal and desertion rates have run very high. For example, 30 percent of the 1962 graduating class of Yerevan State University and 60 percent of the graduates of the Yerevan Institute of Foreign Languages did not accept their assigned jobs. *Moskovskii komsomolets* (Moscow), July 10, 1963. For reports of similar mass refusals and desertions, see *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1957, and Feb. 15, 1962; and *Izvestia* (Moscow), April 23, 1972.

[7] For reports on these attitudes, see *Komsomolskaia pravda*, March 2, 1956, and Feb. 10, 1957; *Kommunist* (Moscow), Vol. 36, No. 4, 1960, p. 63; *Izvestia*, March 14, 1971.

[8] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), July 23 and 26, 1966.

[9] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Feb. 2, 1967.

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years of age. Campaigns to stabilize youthful labor mobility have been no more successful than attempts to keep young people "down on the farm."

To cite another problem area, the CPSU's unremitting assault on organized religion has not accomplished all that it intended. Today, many young people, particularly in rural areas, openly support and identify with the Russian Orthodox Church or with other religious denominations.

Perhaps most disconcerting of all to the regime is the growing incidence of crime, delinquency, and alcoholism in the USSR. The younger generation does not monopolize these forms of deviancy. But a recent study suggests that such behavior patterns are disproportionately concentrated in urban communities and involve a disproportionate percentage of the younger population.[10]

To argue that many young people do not behave exactly as the party and Komsomol would like is not, of course, to assert that the younger generation is massively alienated from the Soviet social and political system or that Soviet youth are generally rebellious, anti-social, or anti-Communist. What the evidence reveals is a very real gap, or slippage, between the goals and the accomplishments of the socialization program—between the New Soviet Man and the real Soviet man. What accounts for this slippage?

Some Underlying Explanations

Certainly one important factor is the Komsomol's inability to reach millions of young people. Although 23 million individuals are affiliated with the organization, its membership is not equally distributed among all youth sectors. In the countryside, where a third of the population still resides, the Komsomol is barely visible: despite quite vigorous recruiting efforts, there is evidence that the Youth League has attracted at most no more than 20 percent of the age-eligible members.[11] Representation among young industrial workers is considerably higher but does not constitute a majority.[12] Only in educational institutions can the Komsomol claim virtually universal membership.

Differential access to the younger generation imposes severe limitations on the Komsomol's effectiveness, for its organizational influence is weakest precisely where it should be strongest—among the sector of the population which is most likely to commit deviant acts. Soviet sources reveal that those youths typically involved in alcoholism, crime, and delinquency tend to be on the periphery of organized social life. They are not in school, or in the Komsomol, or in a work situation.[13]

But membership in the organization does not, in and of itself, guarantee social conformity. The previously cited Smolensk study did not document the flight of rural youth in general. It discussed the abandonment of agricultural work by Komsomol members in particular. In this specific instance, it is not difficult to explain why those individuals who belonged to the Youth League chose to repudiate one of its primary goals: the official value disseminated by the Komsomol was in fundamental conflict with the societal value adhered to by most of the population.

Movement from the countryside to the city has long been perceived as a means of occupational mobility and of raising one's standard of living. Hence, talented and ambitious rural youth have gravitated toward the urban centers. Today, the regime laments this attitude and tries to reverse the depopulation of the agricultural sector, but earlier decisions of the Soviet regime are largely responsible for young people's contempt for rural life. Industrialization and urbanization in the USSR occurred at the expense of the countryside. For decades, the CPSU depleted the

[10] Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 83-93.

[11] This figure represents an educated, if probably overly generous, guess. Komsomol First Secretary Sergei P. Pavlov claimed in 1964 that there were 20 million boys and girls of Komsomol age working in the countryside (*Moskovskii komsomolets*, March 18, 1964). Rural Komsomol membership has averaged 2-3 million (as calculated from stenographic reports of the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Komsomol Congresses, held respectively in March 1954, April 1958, April 1962 and May 1966). Thus, Komsomol membership could run as low as 10 percent of the age-eligible group in rural areas.

[12] Again, this figure represents an educated guess. In 1965 Pavlov stated that there were 70 million Soviet citizens between the ages of 14 and 30 (*Partiinaia zhizn* [Moscow], No. 5, March 1965). As noted in footnote 11, about 20 million in this age category work in the countryside, leaving a balance of 50 million. Of these, some 4.5 million are students in higher educational institutions and an equal number are enrolled in general, vocational, and technical secondary schools (see Samuel Hendel, Ed., *The Soviet Crucible*, 4th edition, North Scituate, Mass., Duxbury, 1973, pp. 362-63). Subtracting several million more for the last two years of the eight-year school, one can assume an urban young labor force of 35-38 million.

According to the stenographic report of the 15th Komsomol Congress, total membership amounted to 23 million in 1966. About one-fourth of these have been estimated to be in student units, and another 2-3 million are in rural areas. Thus the number of members among young industrial workers could not be more than 14 or 15 million, or less than one-half of the age-eligible group.

[13] See Connor, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-113.

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A mood of anticipation reigns as prospective students assemble at the Admissions Commission of the Physics Faculty of Moscow State University.

—Photo by Y. Diakonov for TASS via Sovfoto.

rural sector of human and economic resources; it allowed these areas to stagnate in their development. Consequently, an enormous gulf now separates the quality of life in urban and rural areas. Recurrent food crises ultimately forced Soviet leaders to abandon their earlier posture of malign neglect, and official policy is now more solicituous of the peasant's welfare and supportive of rural development. Still, the countryside lags woefully behind the cities. That fact is well known to the younger generation and seriously undermines the Komsomol's campaign to keep youth on the farm. Elites can easily change value pronouncements, now extolling the virtues of agricultural life and deemphasizing the importance of industrial life. But mass values do not shift so quickly, especially when the new shift in official values is not matched by an adequate shift in allocative priorities.

For roughly the same reasons, it is difficult for the Komsomol to persuade high school graduates that a college education is not "the only path to life." In earlier decades, the Communist regime firmly implanted that view in the younger generation. Underdeveloped secondary school facilities, rapid industrialization, and reconstruction of a war-shattered economy combined to keep the demand for college-trained specialists considerably higher than the available supply.[14] Hence, the party encouraged students to seek as much schooling as possible and applauded the desire for higher education as a valuable contribution to the state. Stalinist incomes policy reinforced this point of view by closely linking the Soviet citizen's share of societal rewards to the amount and type of schooling he had received. The party's strong emphasis upon advanced schooling struck a responsive chord in parents, particularly those in urban areas who were themselves entering the ever-expanding white-collar class. In short, during the 1930's, 1940's, and early 1950's official values and social values coincided.

Now the two no longer operate in tandem. A rapid expansion of high school facilities and a shift in the skill requirements of the labor force have resulted in many more high school graduates than are needed or can be accommodated in higher educational institutions.[15] In response to this changed situation, the Soviet regime asks that children of the urban middle class reorient their career and educational aspirations. At the same time, however, the Communist Party has done very little to realign differential social rewards as a function of differential educational achievement.[16] Not surprisingly, both parents and children have balked at the shift in the official line, and the prospects for change in their attitudes do not seem bright. It is patently self-defeating for the party to demand that the Komsomol alter young people's occupational and educational preferences, while simultaneously continuing distributive policies which helped generate those preferences in the first place.

Nowhere is the gap between official and popular values wider than in the area of alcoholic consumption. For years, the Soviet regime has attempted to change the drinking habits of the population. Its obsession with this matter is understandable. According to official statements, a large share of the crime, delinquency, labor absenteeism, accidents, and interpersonal conflicts in the USSR is directly or indirectly traceable to alcoholic abuse. Given the enormous individual and social costs of this problem, it is natural that the regime exerts great effort

[14] See Nicholas Dewitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 140-53.

[15] In 1966, for example, only one-fourth of all applicants were accepted for study in higher and secondary specialized institutions of the RSFSR. *Izvestia*, Nov. 20, 1966.

[16] It is true, of course, that incomes policy in the post-Stalin period has moved in a more egalitarian direction, and it is also true that some manual jobs (coal mining) are better paid than some professional jobs (teaching, medicine). But in the aggregate, a college degree still leads to those jobs which are better paid, less hazardous, more satisfying, and socially more prestigious.

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to bring it under control. But the evidence suggests that anti-drunkenness campaigns have had little success so far.[17] The official view of the evils of vodka simply is not shared by the mass population. Hard drinking is a social norm learned in the home and reinforced in friendship circles. It has deep cultural and historical roots in the USSR, and even those individuals who abstain or are moderate drinkers tend to be very permissive toward the proverbial drunkard. In the face of such ingrained attitudes, the CPSU cannot mobilize sufficient opprobrium to "resocialize" the population.

Indians and Chiefs

So far this discussion has focused on the more obvious reasons for the failure of socialization policies—the inability of the Komsomol to involve a large part of working-class youth in its program and the dissemination of official values widely discrepant from those held by the target audience. There are, in addition, more subtle factors which undermine the potential effectiveness of the Soviet Communist youth program.

As previously noted, peer criticism of deviant behavior is the linchpin of Komsomol social control. Its success, however, depends on the willingness of the rank and file to play the role of collective disciplinarian. Evidence suggests that attempts to mobilize peer criticism have sometimes produced opposite results. Periodically in the post-Stalin era, articles in the youth press have claimed that Komsomol members judged before their organization peers have been let off with mild reproofs or have even been given "protection," and that "collective intercession for victims" is a common practice which over time has tended to subvert the Youth League's authority.[18]

It is not difficult to understand why the rank and file would protect one another. When disciplinary situations arise, Komsomol members feel a natural empathy for the "deviant," particularly if the behavior they are being asked to criticize relates in its impact to the adult, as opposed to the youth, community.[19] On such occasions, a "we-they" dichotomy becomes involved in the proceedings. The rank and file have a strong motivation to insulate themselves as much as possible from the incessant demands of authority. No doubt members also hope that by being lenient and understanding of others' transgressions, they will insure reciprocal treatment, should they themselves someday be subjected to collective criticism.

More complex than the peer-group outlook is the motivation which encourages Komsomol leaders to protect deviants. Western scholars have generally argued that the leadership stratum of the Youth League dutifully manipulates the rank and file to conform to the demands and expectations of the CPSU. This subservience has been considered inevitable since individuals who hold executive positions in the Komsomol do so at the pleasure of the party, and since many of these individuals aspire to later leadership roles in the CPSU. The relationship between the leaders and the led has been depicted as essentially coercive and antagonistic, as in the following statement:

The leading members of the Komsomol look upon the rank and file of the membership as their subjects on a lower plane of Soviet society, while the ordinary Komsomol member regards the leaders of Komsomol as party henchmen.[20]

In the writer's view, this analysis is overly simplistic. Any Komsomol leader who assumes the role of "party henchman" will inevitably alienate the rank and file. To be sure, he need not worry that an enraged constituency will vote him out of office. Neither his current nor any future position directly depends upon approval from below. But indirectly, he does need popular support. Dissatisfied members can and do vote with their feet: every year millions of Soviet youth leave the organization. While part of the turnover can be attributed to members' reaching the upper age limit (28), the largest percentage of

[17] See Connor, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-58.

[18] See *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Oct. 27, 1955; March 28, 1962; *Moskovskii universitet* (Moscow), Oct. 22, 1959; *Molodoi leninets* (Stalingrad-Volgograd), Feb. 23, 1955; Dec. 19, 1959; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Nov. 24, 1957; Feb. 1, 1969.

[19] The difference here is suggested by the example of a young factory worker who arrives at work drunk and upsets the production process in his labor unit (an act which economically harms his adult co-employees), as compared to the example of a young factory worker who does not show up for his public work assignment or who expresses a politically unorthodox point of view.

[20] P. Kruzhin, "The Youth Movement in the Soviet Union," in *Youth in the Soviet Union*, Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1959, p. 7. For similar views, see Ralph T. Fisher, *Pattern for Soviet Youth*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959; Allen Kassof, *The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and Rebellion*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.

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departures represents voluntary termination because of boredom and dissatisfaction.[21]

If leaders are to keep membership loss to a minimum, they must avoid giving the impression that they represent exclusively the interests of the party, the government, and adult authority. They must also identify with the needs and interests of the rank and file. One demonstration of the latter is the intercession of leaders on behalf of members whose behavior has violated prescribed standards. Even the CPSU must tolerate a certain amount of such intercession. It must recognize that a Komsomol leader is ineffective to the extent that he does not have the confidence of the rank and file; it must also recognize that an organizational transmission belt is of little value if the client group deserts.

Whether the Komsomol leaders in fact have the ability to inspire the confidence of the membership has been a subject of debate. Some outside scholars have expressed serious doubts on this score, holding that the organization's "official status" and its suppression of any spontaneous youth culture have imposed severe handicaps on the leadership. This may indeed be true. In any event, there are more prosaic and specific handicaps which undermine the Komsomol's effectiveness as a socializing agent.

The Komsomol in Industry

On the industrial front, to cite a crucial example, the Youth League has great difficulty establishing its visibility as an independent and indispensable functional unit. Trade unions are touted as the workers' major representative organization, and union responsibilities exactly parallel those of the Komsomol. The only way the Komsomol can escape the shadow of the trade unions is by rigorously advocating the rights and interests of the younger sector of the labor force.

Ideally, what this means is that the Youth League should protest any discriminatory hiring practices on the basis of age. It should insure that workers under 18 are not assigned to overtime or evening production shifts in violation of labor law. It should demand that young men and women be given time off the job at full or half pay to continue their education on a part-time basis.[22] It should actively lobby

Komsomol members of the Amursk Cellulose and Cardboard Combine show students from Amursk No. 4 secondary school around the factory—a step in the initiation of young workers into the combine.

—Photo by V. Voloshenko for Novosti via Sovfoto.

[21] This judgment is based upon the following data (taken from stenographic reports of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Komsomol Congresses). Between 1954 and 1958, 10 million new members entered the Komsomol, but total membership dropped 800,000; thus, 10.8 million members must have left the organization in these years. Between 1958 and 1962, another 10 million new members joined, while total membership registered a net increase of 1 million; thus, 9 million must have left. Between 1962 and 1966, 15 million new members joined for a net gain of 3.5 million; thus 11.5 million must have dropped out. Between 1966 and 1970, 15 million new members joined for a net gain of 4 million; thus 11 million must have left.

These losses could not have been wholly the consequence of removal from the rolls because of age, since that would mean the overwhelming majority of Komsomol members were in the 24-28 age category. Just the opposite has been true. At the 15th Congress in May 1966 Pavlov reported that the number of members between 14 and 17 had risen sharply, whereas the proportion of members between 18 and 25 had decreased by 23 percent. In light of this evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the loss of millions of members every four years was due primarily to voluntary resignations because of disinterest or dissatisfaction with the Komsomol program.

[22] The relevant law stipulates that students at higher and secondary evening and correspondence schools are entitled to an extra day off each week at half their average wages. If they wish, they can have one or two additional days off each week without pay. They also are entitled to between 10 and 30 days off with pay each year, depending upon their level of course study, for the purpose of preparing for examinations. Besides these paid leaves, students enrolled in senior courses at higher and secondary schools can have an additional month's leave without pay in order to do practice work in their future specialties or to gather material for their graduation papers.

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for improved dormitory, recreational, and in-service training facilities for young workers. And it should bring the legitimate grievances of every younger worker before the appropriate authorities. Needless to say, any Komsomol unit which conscientiously and effectively discharged these responsibilities would have no visibility or confidence problem among the rank and file.

But the Komsomol unit would just as surely antagonize the management of the particular firm involved. The overriding concern of any plant director is production output. His salary and career are closely tied to output performance; consequently, he abhors anything which slows production. The hiring of young workers is one such factor. If they are not yet 18, restrictive conditions govern their employment. If they have little or no previous work experience, the firm will have to train them, at a cost involving not only economic resources but also the time and energy of senior plant employees. After this training period ends, there is no guarantee that the firm will recoup its investment. The military draft, acceptance into higher education, or the constant mobility of young workers may deprive the factory of the skills which it developed and paid for. Not surprisingly, many managers have avoided these risks by not hiring such young workers in the first place.[23]

Another fact of Soviet industrial life is the faulty supply system. Parts are not always available when needed, creating bottlenecks in the production process. When the parts do finally arrive, Soviet managers traditionally introduce an intensive work schedule to compensate for the earlier slack period. In time of stress, the rights of young workers have counted for little. Managers have indiscriminately assigned them to evening or overtime shifts and have refused to release them for part-time study.[24]

How should Komsomol leaders respond to any or all of these situations? Protests may serve the interests of those youths adversely affected. But observing the law may actually complicate production output, and *a fundamental task of every factory Komsomol unit is to help the firm meet its production quotas.* In other words, the fulfillment of some organizational tasks may make difficult or impossible the realization of other organizational tasks. Which tasks and which factory constituency—the young worker or management—deserve priority support?

When forced to choose between contradictory tasks and separate constituencies, the Komsomol leadership has many reasons for siding with management. Aside from a general feeling that what is good for production is good for the Komsomol, Komsomol leaders may be buttressed in that point of view by personal considerations. Very few heads of industrial primary units draw their pay from the Youth League budget. The vast majority earn their living as workers in the factory and are therefore dependent upon management for their pay and promotion. In these circumstances, an adversary posture vis-à-vis the management could prove to be very costly.[25] Even when a Komsomol leader does dare to challenge a director's actions, the contestants are not equally matched. Managers can ignore such complaints as minor irritants, especially if their own illegal behavior produces economic gains.

For the Komsomol rank and file, it makes little difference why the youth organization failed to protect their interests—whether because the leadership did not wish to jeopardize its own cozy relationship with management or because management ignored the leadership's complaints with impunity. In both instances, the ordinary member can only conclude that the Youth League does not, or cannot, service his needs and thus does not deserve his affiliation. Recurrent conflicts of this sort are no doubt responsible for the fact that so many young workers wander in and out of the Komsomol every year.

The Komsomol on Campus

In educational institutions, the problems of youth work are not quite as severe. To begin with, the Komsomol does not have to compete for visibility. Most individuals connected with schools are the students themselves who are age-eligible for membership in Komsomol: the Youth League represents *the mass organization* in such institutional settings. Secondly, educational Komsomol units, unlike their counterparts in industry and agriculture, can count on a broader and relatively more stable member-

[23] See *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Nov. 17, 1957; *Molodoi leninets*, Sept. 22, 1957, and Oct. 22, 1957; *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 25, 1957, and Dec. 1, 1967; *Izvestia*, June 26, 1965.

[24] See *Molodoi leninets*, May 13, 1959; Feb. 10, 1961; March 18, 1961; June 23, 1961; Feb. 21, 1962; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Sept. 15, 1966.

[25] One obvious cost is loss of one's job at the firm, which appears to have been a common fate for those who have played their advocacy role too well. See *Molodoi leninets*, Feb. 3, 1960; *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Feb. 27, 1960; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, March 4, 1969.

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ship. Because of acute labor shortages, no worker in agriculture or industry needs to join the youth organization, or worry about quitting it, in order to get or keep a job. While he might be deprived of certain benefits and suffer some ostracism (as pointed out earlier in this paper), the youthful worker can be reasonably sure of ample employment options, regardless of what the Komsomol has to say about him. A student, on the other hand, may find a good character reference from the Komsomol beneficial when he seeks admission to higher education or a satisfactory job placement once he earns a college degree.[26] For these reasons, students cannot as easily resist pressure to affiliate with the organization. Nor can they readily quit the organization when dissatisfied, particularly since the Komsomol disapproves of resignations for reasons other than age.

But the advantages of student Komsomol units have their own drawbacks. When virtually everyone belongs, there is little distinction or pride attached to membership. In fact, many students have viewed their affiliation as a necessary onus and have participated only marginally in Komsomol activities.[27] Their indifference has undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect upon the enthusiasm and commitment of others. Although Komsomol leaders have indicated that they are aware of widespread apathy, there has been little evidence of purge-type measures to preserve zealousness and organizational dynamism.[28] Apparently, the Youth League is prepared to tolerate marginal participation on the part of students in return for a modicum of social control over future members of the elite class.

This tolerance of low participation levels is also necessary because other groups in educational institutions oppose excessive Komsomol demands upon students' time. Much of the Komsomol-sponsored work in the schools is devoted to raising the political and social consciousness of students. That involves public work assignments, political study groups, and various other extracurricular activities. An exceptionally able student will manage to satisfy his organizational obligations without ignoring his academic work. The vast majority of students, however, cannot manage to do both well. They must order their priorities and must decide where to expend maximum effort.

Those who resolve the dilemma in favor of academic work, at the expense of Komsomol involvement, can usually count on the support of school officials. In theory, the Youth League is assured of the full cooperation of a sympathetic academic and administrative staff. But in fact, there is often sharp disagreement as to how students should distribute their time and energy. Teachers and administrators approach this question with a special point of view: as educators, their primary concern is to impart knowledge to their students. Anything which interferes excessively with that goal arouses their opposition. Since the Komsomol's activities in the school have often had just that effect, educators have challenged its authority.[29]

Youth league officials cannot openly dispute the preemptive importance of academic work. At the same time, they cannot acquiesce in the view that overinvolvement in Komsomol activities is bad because it distracts the individual from his studies. Organizational pride alone would dictate a firm repudiation of that position. But there is an additional impetus as well. Many Komsomol activists do not share the teacher's high esteem for academic knowledge. A large percentage of them have already set their sights on a full-time career in the party apparatus or the state bureaucracy.[30] For them, school is not primarily a place to learn a "specialty" but an

[26] During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a character reference from an applicant's social organization was legally mandated, and admissions committees were told to give considerable weight to such references in making their acceptance decisions. There is also some evidence that good Komsomol connections can be helpful in enabling a college graduate to avoid assignment to the hinterlands for three years. See David Burg, *Oppozitsionnye nastroenia molodezhi v gody posle "ottepeli"* (Oppositional Moods of Youth in the Year after "the Thaw"), Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1960.

[27] A 20-percent rate of participation in Komsomol activities is considered normal in most school Komsomol units. See *Moskovskii universitet,* May 25, 1957; Nov. 2, 1960; and April 17, 1962; *Komsomolskaia pravda,* April 13, 1958; N. I. Panov, "Develop Active Methods of Educational Work," *Vestnik vysshei shkoly* (Moscow), October 1961; *Kommunist,* No. 10, 1966, pp. 34-42.

[28] During an exchange of Komsomol documents in 1967, the central leadership made it very clear that passive members were not to be expelled from the organization. Activism was to be encouraged by less drastic means. *Komsomolskaia pravda,* March 7, 1967.

[29] The Moscow University Komsomol newspaper summed up the essence of the conflict in this way: "At Komsomol meetings it is often possible to observe the same characteristic phenomenon. People in the academic sections tirelessly remind us that the basic duty of a student is his studies; they state that it is unwise to engage excessively in public work because it will harm one's studies. On the other hand, Komsomol leaders criticize individual students who study very well but engage in almost no Komsomol activities." *Moskovskii universitet,* Nov. 23, 1959; see also issues of June 19, 1956; Oct. 10, 1961; Feb. 13, 1962. Also, *Kommunist,* No. 10, 1966, pp. 34-42.

[30] During the 1950's and 1960's, about 3,000 Komsomol leaders transferred annually to directive work in party and state administrative units. See *Kommunist,* No. 4, 1959, p. 66; *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), November 1962, p. 40.

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arena in which to develop and to demonstrate their organizing and political skills. Consequently, Komsomol leaders and Soviet educators are often at odds not only because of incompatible goals but also because of dichotomous value systems. Understandably, these differences undermine the potential impact of youth work in the schools.

Conclusion

This essay has highlighted some of the major factors which limit Komsomol effectiveness as a socializing agent. Soviet leaders would not deny the argument presented in these pages—that the Youth League has failed to instill adequate social motivation in a substantial portion of the younger generation. Indeed, most press articles devoted to youth affairs emphasize this very point. However, there would be disagreement with respect to the root causes of the Komsomol's failure. Most often Soviet writers blame bureaucratic formalism, poor training of youth leaders, and consequent ineptitude among the leadership cadres in directing the energies of young people in a positive and constructive manner. All these shortcomings may, in fact, contribute to the ineffectiveness of the socialization program. But the Komsomol's difficulties have much deeper roots. They result from the infrastructure of the organization itself and from basic systemic features of the USSR. Thus, it seems clear that merely reducing bureaucratic formalism and improving leadership would not decisively alter the Komsomol's performance.

In fact, there may be very little that the Youth League can do to change the outcome of socialization efforts. Empirical research done in the West suggests that the value orientations and behavior inclinations of individuals are well developed by adolescence and highly resistant to change.[31] If this is true of the socialization process in the Soviet Union as well, then the Komsomol program can do little more than confirm and reinforce the effect of earlier socialization experiences on Soviet youth.

[31] See David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1969; Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969.

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The Maoist Approach

By Ronald N. Montaperto

The role of youth (individuals between the ages of 13 and 25) in the Chinese revolution has undergone many shifts and changes over the years. Perhaps the most dramatic of these occurred in 1949 when the newly installed Communist government called on China's young people to transfer their revolutionary effort from armed struggle to the more peaceful tasks of reconstructing the economy and increasing the output of the country's farms and factories. Since 1949, the political authorities have continuously redefined the specific functions of Chinese youth in the national revolution in response to different tactical needs. Accordingly, they have had to reformulate the revolutionary orthodoxy of one period in a way designed to ensure the continuity of overarching revolutionary goals.

From the standpoint of the Chinese government, therefore, a central problem of political socialization is how to instill in youth both an adaptability to changing requirements and dedication to the goal of ongoing revolution.

This problem constitutes the major focus of attention in the present article. Specifically, we shall explore the general nature of the role that Chinese youth have been expected to play as that role has evolved since 1949, and how, in Maoist terms, the process of socialization within that framework is suppose to occur. Then we shall endeavor to look at the socialization process as it has been going on in practice in China and to assess the degree to which it corresponds to Maoist theoretical conceptions.

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In searching ideological literature of the Chinese revolution for a definitive statement of the role of youth, one finds two interesting phenomena. First, Mao tends to equate "youth" with intellectual youth of petty-bourgeois background almost to the exclusion of youthful representatives of other strata. More concretely, he seems most concerned with youth of college age or those recently graduated from colleges or universities. In discussing such young people he emphasizes their origins among

. . . those whose standard of living is falling. Many in this section, who originally belonged to better-off families, are undergoing a gradual change from a position of being barely able to manage to one of living in more and more reduced circumstances. . . . They are in great mental distress because there is such a contrast between their past and their present. Such people are quite important for the revolutionary movement; they form a mass of no small proportions and are the left wing of the petty bourgeoisie.[1]

This treatment stands in noticeable contrast to his analysis of other classes in Chinese society. Indeed, he seems not to recognize age differentials within other strata, but approaches them as homogeneous social groups. For example, his writings contain relatively little reference to young workers or young peasants.[2]

[1] "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (hereafter cited as *Selected Works*), Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1965, Vol. 1, p. 16.

[2] See especially the following items from the *Selected Works:* Vol. 1—"Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" and "Why Is It that Red Political Power Can Exist in China"; Vol. 2— "The May 4th Movement," "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," "On New Democracy"; Vol. 3—"Reform Our Study," "Serve the People," "On Coalition Government"; Vol. 4—"Methods of Work of Party Committees" and "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship."

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Secondly, and more significantly, Mao regards this particular segment of Chinese society with deeply mixed emotions. On the one hand, he recognizes that Chinese youth has rendered substantial historical contributions to the revolution and that student-intellectuals comprise an essential component of the revolutionary forces. In fact, he holds that but for China's young people, the evolution of events during the period 1911-35 would probably not have been as favorable as it proved. To him, in short, Chinese youth has in many ways been conterminous with the Chinese revolution:

What role have China's young people played since the May Fourth Movement [of 1919]? In a way they have played a vanguard role—a fact recognized by everybody except the diehards. What is a vanguard role? It means taking the lead and marching in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks. In the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ranks of the Chinese people, there is a contingent composed of the country's young intellectuals and students. It is a contingent of considerable size, and even if the many who have given their lives are not included, it now numbers several million. It is an army on one of the fronts against imperialism and feudalism, and an important army, too.[3]

However, Mao also waxes less than enthusiastic about some characteristics of China's students. He asserts that most student activists during the 1919-35 period stemmed from the middle and petty bourgeoisie, and he goes on to argue that such a class background seriously diminished their revolutionary potential because it limited not only their motivations for joining the revolutionary struggle but their ability and willingness to continue the struggle to the end as well.

[3] "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 245.

Red Guards perform a dance in front of the Cultural Palace in Peking's Forbidden City; Mao's Little Red Book is carried in each hand.

—1967 photo by Scheler of Stern via Black Star.

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This mistrust is really that of a Marxist revolutionary activist with a peasant-proletarian orientation toward the middle and petty bourgeoisie. Mao contends that as conflict begins to touch intellectuals personally, they may resolve their tensions by dropping out of the movement and ultimately turning against it. Moreover, he perceives youth as being too individualistic and unwilling to submit themselves to discipline in pursuit of larger goals. Students, that is, tend to place excessive value on abstract freedom and do not recognize the need for an integrated and disciplined approach to the solution of China's problems. Finally, Mao finds student intellectuals guilty of subjectivism and pride. He feels that young people tend to analyze China's problems without reference to the scientific laws of Marxism-Leninism and then proceed to act upon their analyses in a largely unstructured and personal way. As they do so, they tend to invest their own personal assessments of the revolution with a quality of absoluteness which makes for a lack of flexibility and decreases the capacity for concerted effort. Attachment to such subjective views renders compromise—and therefore organization and leadership—impossible; in effect, pride becomes counter-revolutionary.[4]

Thus, it seems clear that while Mao recognizes the contribution of youth to the historical development of the Chinese revolution and the necessity of their continuing participation in its consolidation, he remains intensely suspicious of certain aspects of the traditional activism of China's young people. This suspicion, as we shall see later, greatly colors his conception of the process of political socialization.

Socialization and Revolutionary Stages

Before we proceed to examine that conception, however, we should note one further influence that has affected it. The role that Chinese youth is expected to perform is shaped in part by Mao's view of the development of the revolution itself. In his eyes, the values, attitudes, and behavior patterns of China's youth must always conform to the requirements of the revolution at any given moment, but since the revolution progresses by stages, these values, attitudes, and behavior patterns must change in accordance with that progression. Lest any misunderstanding arise on this point, let us briefly review the specifics of his outlook.

In "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," first presented as a speech in December 1939, Mao defined the nature of the Chinese revolution and sketched its history, its targets, its tasks, its motive forces, its character, and its perspectives. He later amplified and explained the ideas contained in this essay in two other articles, "On New Democracy" (1940) and "The People's Democratic Dictatorship" (1945). These three works taken together provide the requisite insights for present purposes.

Even a casual perusal of the three essays reveals that Mao holds that revolution takes place in various stages and that each successive stage is essential for the transition to the next.[5] For instance, he places China's development squarely in the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. That is, he classifies the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution against feudalism and colonialism, not as a proletarian-socialist revolution.[6] However, Mao also distinguishes China's bourgeois-democratic revolution from past revolutions of this type. China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, while designed to resolve the contradiction between feudalism and imperialism on the one hand and capitalism on the other hand, will not result in the establishment of a purely capitalist system as did those in the United States, England, and elsewhere. Instead, it will bring about the creation of a social system which permits sufficient capitalist development to prepare the way for the transition to socialism, but which also prevents capitalism from developing to the point where capitalist exploitation of labor becomes the dominant characteristic of Chinese society. China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, then, will be one of a new special type—it will be a "new-democratic" revolution. The system to which it gives birth will not be a bourgeois democracy like that found in the United States and Western Europe but a "new democracy."

In "new democracy," anti-feudal and anti-imperialist social classes—*i.e.*, the proletariat, poor and middle peasants, rich peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and elements of the middle or national bourgeoisie—will dominate China's political institutions and prevent anti-democratic forces—*i.e.*,

[4] See particularly "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 321-22.

[5] "On Contradiction," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 328-30.

[6] "On New Democracy," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 341.

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the landlords, certain sections of the middle bourgeoisie, the big bourgeoisie, and bourgeois compradores—from transforming the revolution into the traditional capitalist mold. Thus, the place of China's revolutionary classes is written into the system, and their political role is thereby safeguarded.[7]

These revolutionary classes, in turn, will use their political power to guarantee the economic well-being of the Chinese masses through land reform, nationalization of basic industries, social welfare legislation, rent reduction, and provision of basic social services. While private capitalist enterprise will remain, the "abuses" of the capitalist system will be greatly reduced. As a result, the capitalist or bourgeois-democratic revolution will be completed, and the conditions for the socialist revolution will be fulfilled. Moreover, these conditions will be met in such a way that the transition to socialism can be accomplished with minimum difficulty.[8]

If China's revolution is to progress from the "new-democratic" stage, through the socialist stage, to the Communist stage, then the role of youth in the Chinese revolution will logically vary with the particular revolutionary stage that has been reached. For example, the role of youth in the "new-democratic" stage will differ from the role of youth in the socialist stage—as will the respective roles of all China's social classes.[9] Therefore, we must anticipate reflections of the notion of a multistage revolutionary process in Mao's view of the role of youth in the Chinese revolution.

The Role of Youth

What, then, does Mao deem this role to be? To begin with, Chinese young people are to serve as a revolutionary vanguard during the period of the "new-democratic" revolution. They constitute a force for confrontation with nonrevolutionary elements and an important link between social classes which affords a basis for mobilization, education, and recruitment for broadly-based revolutionary activity. Hence, they are to function as a cutting edge of the party as it seeks to implant roots at basic levels of society—as instruments through which the party disseminates, expands, and consolidates its programs and control throughout Chinese society. In short, youth as a group constitutes one of the mechanisms through which the Chinese Communist Party will establish and maintain firm control of the social system.

This instrumental role, of course, means that the specific functions of youth are what the party decrees, and these can alter considerably over time. During the period of armed struggle against Japan, and later during the period of civil war against the Kuomintang, for example, the party directed the activities of Chinese youth mainly toward the overt and obvious enemies, but its perspective changed in 1949 when the period of armed struggle of the "new-democratic" revolution ended. It then ordered Chinese youth to turn their energies to assisting in the consolidation of the gains of the "new-democratic" revolution in the countryside, the factories, and the classrooms through revolutionary nation-building.

However, there is another aspect to Mao's vision of the role of youth during the period of the "new-democratic" revolution. As we have seen, Mao regards the "new-democratic" revolution as but one stage in a continuing revolutionary process. It is the stage which permits the strengthening of China as a nation and, more important, which also prepares the ground for the transition to socialism. Youth are essential instruments in the process as they perform their vanguard role.

Yet, as noted earlier, Mao views the youth who have taken the lead in the movement since its inception with suspicion because of their petty-bourgeois class origins. To him, such young people are incapable of playing a vanguard role in the transition to socialism. Therefore, as the youth participate in armed struggle (as against the Japanese and the Kuomintang in the 1930's and 1940's), as they participate in land reform and economic reconstruction (as in the 1950's), and as they develop skills and expertise in the classroom—that is, as they fulfill their role as instruments of the "new-democratic" revolution—they are supposed to prepare themselves for continuing to play a vanguard role in the proletarian-socialist revolution. They are to overcome those shortcomings in attitudes and behavior which prevent development of the orthodox perception of the revolutionary process and which thus inhibit the development of the conditions necessary for the transition to socialism. In sum, as Chinese youth make revolution in the world around them, they are to experience a revolution in their

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 344.
[8] "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 326-29.
[9] "On New Democracy," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 378 ff.

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own minds. Revolution in the head must accompany revolution in the street.

This viewpoint finds concrete expression in Mao's commentaries on the nature of "the relationship" between the world of mind and the world of matter and on the question of epistemology. In the first place, he holds that youth must develop a unified outlook from which they can proceed to analyze the conditions of Chinese society. Once they have achieved this, it will be possible for them to undertake concerted action to further the completion of the "new-democratic" revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution. Mao, of course, wants to inculcate in China's young people a *particular* view of the world as well as a *particular* pattern of behavior rooted in that world view. Youth—indeed, all people who would serve the revolution—must develop knowledge or understanding of *the laws of development of the objective world.* It is only after this task is accomplished that the more important aspect of human endeavor, the application of knowledge to the world in order to change it, can begin.[10] Hence, an understanding of Mao's notion of the process by which Chinese youth are to achieve the desired unity of outlook requires an appreciation of his conception of the way in which human beings learn.

In line with his Marxist background and orientation, Mao maintains that the sources of knowledge lie in the objective world. Thus, the sources of knowledge about human social development lie in the social activity of man—*i.e.,* in his activity in economic production (producing the goods necessary for the maintenance of life), in scientific experimentation (trying new and different things to improve the level of physical livelihood), and in class struggle (interacting with fellow human beings in a conflictual way based on the pattern of control of the means of production).[11]

As man moves in the objective world, he comes into contact with discrete phenomena and commences to form sensory perceptions and impressions. This process of gathering impressions constitutes the first stage in the development of knowledge —the stage of perception.[12] Later, as man continues to engage in social activity, he is successively exposed to the same phenomena; that is, his perceptions are reinforced. As a result, he is able to link these discrete perceptions and to see their similarities and differences. He can see the relationships between different phenomena. In a word, he forms conceptions regarding classes of things and/or events. This process of refining and combining perceptions to form conceptions comprises the second stage in the development of knowledge.[13] Finally, man combines and analyzes his conceptions and begins to make judgments and inferences. He can generalize about social phenomena and grasp the essence of the relationship between things. When man reaches this stage, he attains rational knowledge (or logical knowledge) and so is able to generate theory.[14]

Thus, the process of developing knowledge consists of two distinct but integrated stages: perception and conception. Following from this, Mao argues that since perception is the starting point of knowledge, "whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is by living (practicing) in its environment."[15] Knowledge of the objective laws of the world can be gained only by engaging in social practice within the world:

If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena. . . . This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary.[16]

But society is in a state of constant flux. The process of developing rational knowledge regarding social change must therefore continue as long as the process of social change continues. Yet how does one know whether one's rational knowledge is correct or not? How does one know whether one's theory corresponds to objective reality?

Again, in Mao's view, there is but one method. Any theory—which represents the end product of perception and conception derived from social practice—must be applied in the objective world. If it produces the desired result, it then corresponds to the objective reality it was designed to represent. As Mao puts matters:

[10] "On Practice," *ibid.,* Vol. 1, p. 304.
[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 296-97.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 297.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 298.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 299.
[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 299-300.

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

The Communist Youth League provides the manpower in 1959 for construction of the Communist Youth League Railway in the Lesser Hsingan Mountains of China's northeast.

—Photo from *China Reconstructs* (Peking), August 1959, p. 17.

Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but—and this is more important—it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle, and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing the developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition.[17]

Furthermore, since the process of social movement does not stop, there is a constant necessity to continue the process of cognition to develop new and different theories which correspond to the ever-changing objective world. Accordingly, the need to test theory in practice becomes even more intense. This notion of knowledge and its development, in turn, places a special burden upon revolutionaries. Revolutionaries must be certain not only that their theories are correct but also that the plans and programs they propose are appropriate to changing conditions. Thus:

As far as social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans or programs when errors are discovered as the revolutionary process has already progressed and changed from one stage of development to another; they must also be good at making themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective knowledge along with it—that is to say, they must ensure that the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programs correspond to new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period, the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.[18]

To sum up, then, Mao contends that in the "new-democratic" phase of the Chinese revolution youth must play an instrumental role in the evolution of that phase and prepare themselves for the continuation of such a role in the revolution's ensuing socialist phase. These two aspects of the prescribed role for Chinese young people constitute, in effect, the goals of political socialization from the Maoist standpoint. Such goals are, moreover, inextricably intertwined. That is, the activities of youth in the "new-

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

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democratic" revolution are intended to provide an essential element of the social practice that youth must have in order to acquire the knowledge necessary for meaningful participation in the next stage of the revolution. Through constant involvement in the process of making revolution, Chinese young people are supposed to gain knowledge of the essence of the revolutionary process, and their knowledge is supposed to deepen as the revolutionary situation changes and conditions become appropriate for the implementation of the country's socialist revolution.

Problems of Socialization

In Mao's eyes, of course, the leadership of the revolution belongs to the proletariat and to the Chinese Communist Party. Hence, it is ultimately the party which bears the responsibility for structuring the socialization process in such a way as to achieve these goals, for ensuring constantly that "proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programs correspond to the new changes in the situation." [19] Broadly speaking, this task entails the creation of the kind of environment in which youth can actively participate in the style of social practice requisite to the development of the kind of knowledge that Mao considers vital.

Such an undertaking has posed several crucial problems for the party since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. First, Mao's suspicion of the petty-bourgeois background of most activist youth and his belief that the youth movement lacked proper integration with the worker and peasant classes have implied a need for a major overhaul of the traditional youth movement. Not only does this include the establishment of new structures of leadership, control, and education; it also entails a revision of policies on membership recruitment, personnel, and intra-organizational advancement designed to expand the participation of youth from class backgrounds other than the petty bourgeoisie —particularly youth of proletarian and peasant origins. This revision, of course, encompasses measures to counter any resistance from those strata of youth who previously enjoyed dominant roles in youth politics.

Second, Mao emphasizes the need for a unity of view among youth. This virtually dictates that all young people be exposed to basically similar experiences and that some form of organization on a national basis be set up; however, the needs of youth from different social classes are, in many ways, different—at least with respect to specific detail. The petty-bourgeois majority within the movement must be educated, supervised, and led in such a manner that they will cease to distinguish between themselves and representatives of other social classes. They must replace their petty-bourgeois world outlook with the more revolutionary outlook of workers and peasants. That is, they must shed the individualism, subjectivism, and pride that characterized and even prompted their initial participation in the revolution, and they must come to view the process of social development from the same perspective that workers and peasants do.[20]

The situation with respect to the proletarian and peasant minority is not quite the same. In Mao's eyes, these strata alone possess the class consciousness and dedication necessary for the successful completion of both the "new-democratic" and socialist revolutions.[21] Thus, it is incumbent upon them to take the lead in the youth movement, under the direction of the party. But in order to do so, young people of worker and peasant origins must first overcome their innate mistrust of bourgeois youth and then provide the latter with guidance and education in order to develop a unity of viewpoint. In the process, worker and peasant youth will also broaden their own viewpoint, enhance and enrich their revolutionary experience, and hence render themselves better able to head the revolutionary struggle.[22]

These divergent needs and interests confront the party with a formidable task when it undertakes to fashion a suitable environment for the sort of political socialization that it desires. It must take account of the various differences, but it must at the same time maintain a general unity of approach, organization, and content.

Third, Mao insists that there must be a voluntaristic element in the acquisition of rational knowledge. As we have seen, he regards socialization as the product of an environment structured to afford

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 245-46, and "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 302.

[21] "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 324-25.

[22] *Ibid.*, and "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 301.

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Hsiao Hsuan-fang (left), Deputy Secretary of the Chiangan Locomotive Depot's Communist Youth League Committee, is an outstanding electric-welder.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 6, 1973, p. 5.

a particular kind of social practice and thereby to permit the development of a particular viewpoint and particular style of behavior, and he deems the party to be the only proper source of leadership in the construction of this environment. However, he holds that ultimately the acquisition of rational knowledge must be accomplished without coercion and with maximum independence. From the Maoist perspective, then, the organizational linkage between the party and the youth movement must allow for an appropriate mix of individual freedom of action and centralized, unified control.

Assessing Implementation of Theory

The foregoing discussion of the goals and methods of political socialization in China has been couched in terms of Chinese Communist ideology. The author has deliberately followed such a strategy in order to avoid the trap of applying Western concepts to a context in which they may not in fact be relevant. Within this general framework, we have seen that socialization can occur only by direct and active involvement in an environment so structured as to engender a certain set of perceptions, conceptualizations, and general theories. Further, we have noted that as young people participate in the activity of revolutionizing their objective environment, there is to occur a revolution in their own minds. Thought, in other words, must come to correspond to objective reality.

If this is so, the success or failure of the socialization process depends upon the extent to which involvement in the myriad aspects of the physical environment is explicitly linked to the broader goal of revolutionizing the mind. That is, young people should become aware that all that they do is connected in a concrete way with the higher goal of achieving a thoroughgoing revolution. Working in a factory to increase production, for example, must be viewed as an integral component of a wide range of revolutionizing experiences.

One method of evaluating the degree of linkage is to examine the kinds of things for which the Communist Youth League and its members have come under criticism from the body's top leadership (and thus the party). The Youth League constitutes the official training ground for "revolutionary successors" and the vanguard of the youth movement, and if these high-level criticisms of the League's operations and the actions of its members are directed mainly toward specific aspects of nation-building performance and not integrated into the type of revolutionizing framework required by official ideology, then it should be clear that political socialization as it has taken place in practice has failed to support efforts to achieve ideological goals and may in fact actually have subverted them.

To arrive at such an assessment, the author carried out a content analysis of the daily *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (China Youth News). This publication and the periodical *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (Chinese Youth), both published by the CYL's Propaganda Department, are the chief instruments of communication and distribution of information throughout the League system. All branches subscribe to *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao;* its content constitutes the major study material for nearly one-half of the League's branch and small-group meetings. Moreover, both League members and young people who do not belong to the League are expected to read it daily, and most youth do so.

The results of the content analysis appear in the table on pp. 60-61. Before we discuss them and their meaning, however, a few words of explanation regarding the character of the analysis and the table are in order. To begin with, in carrying out the investigation, the author focused on selected years—

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1955–61 and 1965. The 1955–61 period was chosen for two reasons. It covers a reasonably lengthy time span after the Youth League had completed its national organization and emerged as a mature body, and it embraces several distinctly different phases of Chinese politics—the relatively peaceful days of 1955; the stresses and strains of the Hundred Flowers movement in 1957 and the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of the communes in 1958; and finally, the retreat from the commune concept and the adoption, after about 1959, of policies more akin to those of 1955. The year 1965 was included to gain a picture of the orientation of the youth movement on the eve of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, it should be noted, the *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* ceased to appear, for the Youth League itself suffered disbandment and did not reemerge as a formal entity until 1971.

Second, the number of specific criticisms recorded bears no relationship to the number of issues or items read. Some issues of the daily contained no items with criticisms of the League and its members; on the other hand, other issues contained items with more than one criticism. In every case, only explicit criticisms were counted. If a criticism was directed to more than one aspect of the League's performance, that was so noted. Thus, one specific criticism may show up in different components of the breakdown in the table.

Third, the criticisms, as the table indicates, were classified on two bases—general subject matter and general targets of the criticism. In the former case, the criticisms were initially broken down into two broad categories—criticisms of ideological deficiencies and criticisms of deficiencies in performance as instruments of the party and state (essentially in connection with specific tasks, usually related to physical problems of nation-building). Both categories, in turn, were subdivided further. The subcategories for "ideological criticisms," derived from the ideological perspectives already described, included motivation (service to the people), class consciousness (awareness of one's class standing and its implications for human behavior), misapprehension of the relationship between theory and practice (a misunderstanding of the process by which knowledge is gained, of the interaction between concrete activity or revolution in the street and revolution in the mind), and failure to perceive the ongoing character of the revolutionary process. The subcategories for "instrumental criticisms," derived from the data themselves, were: inadequate attention to fulfillment of assignments, quotas and plans (a) in agriculture or (b) in industry; ineffectiveness in carrying out military functions; poor leadership in technical education and propaganda; bad organizational discipline and cohesion; and inadequate service to other sectors of society.

It is true that criticisms which fall under the various headings of "instrumental criticisms" could be treated as "ideological criticisms" too. For example, chastisement for failure to fulfill production quotas in industry could well be construed as an ideological criticism. Here, however, they are viewed as such only when they are directly related to the revolutionary environment. If working to increase production in industry is talked about as an integral aspect of the realization of larger ideological goals, then the criticism has been classified as connected with ideology. If, on the other hand, there is no direct tie-in with the revolutionizing aspect of such activity —*i.e.*, if improving industrial production is spoken of as essentially an end in itself—then the criticism has been classified as "instrumental."

In the case of the general targets of criticism, an effort was made, first, to distinguish between criticisms directed at League members and those directed at the League organization and cadres. Then, within each of these categories, the criticisms were classified further in terms of the particular level at which they were aimed—local, provincial-municipal, or national.

With these points in mind, let us now turn to a consideration of the data in the table. If one lumps the entire 1955–61 period and 1965 together, instrumental criticisms of the Youth League and its members enjoy a slight edge over ideological criticisms, though a rough balance does exist. The relatively greater frequency of instrumental criticisms is more pronounced when one examines the data by year. In only three of the eight years did ideological criticisms outnumber instrumental ones, and in several of the five other years instrumental criticisms were vastly preponderant. Moreover, the only years in which ideological criticisms heavily outweighed those of an instrumental nature (1957 and 1958) were years when the very fabric of society was under dramatic assault. Nearly all organizations, including the party, experienced ideological criticisms identical to those leveled at the Youth League. While one might possibly have expected that the Youth League, in light of its position as a political organization second only to the party

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in status, might have received somewhat different treatment than other less prestigious bodies, it in fact did not. It is conceivable, then, that Youth League leaders found themselves forced to change their line of criticism and that they might have preferred to continue to define the organization's role in more instrumental terms.

In short, though the Youth League leaders have been concerned to some extent with the ideological dimension of political socialization, they have by no means continuously emphasized the body's revolutionizing mission. This conclusion is reinforced by some of the other data set forth in the table. First of all, ideological criticisms tended to cluster around problems that had to do with class consciousness and the relationship between theory and practice. The emphasis on the latter is particularly interesting. As we have already observed, criticisms of this sort rest on the Maoist notion that one can learn only by participating in concrete actions and activities and, conversely, that such participation is intended to bring about a change in the level of individual

Criticisms Aimed at Communist Youth League Members:

	KIND				DIRECTED TOWARD			
	Ideological		Instrumental		General Membership		Organization and Cadres	
Year	*Content*	*No.*	*Content*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*
1955	Motivation	3	Agriculture	5	Local	3	Local	9
	Class Consciousness	5	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	1
	Theory and Practice	6	Military	1	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	6	All	2	All	1
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	3				
			Service	0				
	Total	14	Total	15	Total	5	Total	11
1956	Motivation	1	Agriculture	5	Local	0	Local	7
	Class Consciousness	2	Industry	2	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	1
	Theory and Practice	5	Military	0	National	0	National	1
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	4	All	0	All	7
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	7				
			Service	2				
	Total	8	Total	20	Total	0	Total	16
1957	Motivation	2	Agriculture	0	Local	2	Local	1
	Class Consciousness	10	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	2
	Theory and Practice	0	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	0	All	4	All	4
	Revolution	2	Organizational Discipline	6				
			Service	1				
	Total	14	Total	7	Total	6	Total	7
1958	Motivation	0	Agriculture	0	Local	0	Local	3
	Class Consciousness	4	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	4	Military	1	National	0	National	1
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	1	All	1	All	3
	Revolution	1	Organizational Discipline	1				
			Service	1				
	Total	9	Total	4	Total	1	Total	7

SOURCES: Content analysis of *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (China Youth News).

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consciousness. Since this notion presupposes the existence of a concrete task, the criticisms themselves inevitably have an instrumental component to them; and in view of the general predominance of instrumental criticisms in the total volume of criticisms, it seems probable that the Youth League leaders have conveyed the impression to members that it is the instrumental aspects of criticisms involving the relationship between theory and practice which really count, while their ideological aspects constitute mere rhetorical flourishes.

Second, relatively few of the ideological criticisms concerned motivation. Thus, the dominant thrust of the criticisms had to do with the quality of execution of specific tasks and the fulfillment of specific roles rather than with stimulating Youth League members to think about why they did certain things. To put matters another way, Youth League members were confronted primarily with criticisms of role performance instead of role definition.

Third, instrumental criticisms tended to focus on issues connected with organizational problems and

An Analysis of the CYL Daily Organ, 1955-61 and 1965

	KIND (Cont.)				DIRECTED TOWARD (Cont.)			
	Ideological		Instrumental		General Membership		Organization and Cadres	
Year	*Content*	*No.*	*Content*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*
1959	Motivation	1	Agriculture	2	Local	1	Local	5
	Class Consciousness	3	Industry	3	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	3	Military	1	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	2	All	2	All	2
	Revolution	1	Organizational Discipline	1				
			Service	1				
	Total	8	Total	10	Total	3	Total	7
1960	Motivation	0	Agriculture	0	Local	0	Local	0
	Class Consciousness	2	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	2	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	0	All	2	All	2
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	1				
			Service	0				
	Total	4	Total	1	Total	2	Total	2
1961	Motivation	0	Agriculture	1	Local	0	Local	5
	Class Consciousness	3	Industry	1	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	1	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	1	All	3	All	4
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	5				
			Service	0				
	Total	4	Total	8	Total	3	Total	9
1965	Motivation	1	Agriculture	0	Local	3	Local	11
	Class Consciousness	2	Industry	1	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	6	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	2	All	5	All	3
	Revolution	1	Organizational Discipline	4				
			Service	4				
	Total	10	Total	11	Total	8	Total	14

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organizational discipline, while problems concerned with role performance in the realm of education and propaganda were relegated to second place. In short, although the Youth League's cutting-edge function would seem to dictate that the leadership should pay primary attention to education and propaganda efforts, it was clearly more concerned with the maintenance of discipline than with anything else. Furthermore, it appears to have treated education and propaganda undertakings as simply tasks to be accomplished instead of as integral parts of a revolutionizing process either for the members who participated in the process or for nonmembers. That is, it very seldom criticized such undertakings within the context of the revolutionizing of Chinese youth.



Young intellectuals settled in the Jenho No. 2 Brigade, Pienmen Commune, Fengcheng County, Liaoning Province, "accept reeducation by the poor and lower-middle peasants" and learn to quarry stone.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 9, 1969, p. 20.

Fourth, the preponderance of both the two broad types of criticisms was aimed at the basic levels of the Youth League rather than at the provincial-municipal or national levels. To some extent, of course, this situation no doubt reflected the fact that most problems are apt to arise at the local level, where relations between members and organizational units are closer and interactions more intense. In this connection, it is worth noting that the League leadership evidently went to some lengths to provide typical illustrations of concrete problems at the local level in published criticisms. Nonetheless, the dominance of criticisms of local units seems to go hand in hand with the stress on organization and discipline mentioned earlier.

Fifth, a great many of the criticisms in the two broad categories were directed vaguely at the organization as a whole. Frequently, for example, criticisms referred to "league branches" or to "many members" rather than to specific elements within the organizational structure. It is true that to some degree this phraseology may have been the leadership's method of addressing problems to many different units of the League—*i.e.*, a convenient code or tag intended to capture the attention of any local units to which the criticism applied. Indeed, such generalized criticisms often appeared in conjunction with more specific items and were thus probably meant to underscore the seriousness with which various units and members were supposed to consider the criticisms. However, the most important point about these criticisms is that they indicate a vital and constant concern on the part of the League leaders with maintaining the organizational discipline of the body's membership. The absence of theoretical and/or ideological justifications for this concern suggests that the leaders were preoccupied with completing tasks as opposed to expounding ideological reasons for undertaking certain tasks in the first place.

Looking Backward and Ahead

Additional confirmation of the shortcomings of the Youth League emerges from statements of the party leadership about the post-Cultural-Revolution reconstruction of the League. A series of feature articles in the national press between January 1970 and April 1971 set forth authoritative guidelines and methods for this task, and these were later

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compiled and reissued in book form for use by party bodies and revolutionary committees.[23] While the articles contain few specific criticisms of the "old" Youth League, they quite plainly lay the blame for the body's previous faults on its insufficient grasp of its ideological *raison d'être.* There are numerous references in the pieces to the "capitalist road" of Liu Shao-ch'i, with its alleged emphasis on rote memorization, the mindless reading of books, and entry into the Youth League in order to become an official, and its deemphasis of class struggle. Moreover, the reconstruction of the League is said to be possible only because the successful conclusion of the Cultural Revolution has brought an end to the negative trends and impulses that had previously characterized the organization. The League had become the preserve of persons who either failed to perceive or ignored its mission and role in the process of individual revolutionary transformation, who concerned themselves essentially with the physical aspects of nation-building and with personal advancement. Thus, the vanguard of the revolution had lost sight of its goals. It had forgotten that the act of nation-building was meaningless unless it enabled China's young people to experience a revolution in their own minds.

Similarly, the prescription for the future in these articles is crystal clear. The League must be reconstituted by a process of "open-door criticism." That is, the party and "the masses" must select as core members those who have evinced an understanding of the interrelatedness of the twin goals of nation-building and the revolutionizing of the individual, and—more important—who have demonstrated an awareness of this interrelatedness through their own behavior in concrete practical situations.

Besides suggesting that Youth League leaders had in the past regarded the body as fundamentally a bureaucratic instrument to support specific nation-building endeavors and had devoted primary attention to the accomplishment of these undertakings, the articles' guidelines and methods of reconstruction attest to the party leadership's determination to refashion the body into an organization dedicated above all to the mission of socializing China's young people so as to create in them an awareness of the continuing revolution. At present, it is still too early to judge how successful this effort has been, but the resolution of the problem will undoubtedly remain the central concern of the youth movement for the foreseeable future.

[23] *Yung Mao Tse-tung Szu-hsiang Chien-she Kung Ch'ing T'uan* (Use the Thought of Mao Tse-tung in Building the Communist Youth League), Peking, China Youth Publishing House, 1971, *passim.*

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Books

Soviet Political Economy

By John A. Armstrong

ABRAHAM KATZ: *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
WERNER G. HAHN: *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972.

ON THE BASIS of their titles, one might suppose that the simultaneous appearance of these two substantial monographs would provide a comprehensive picture of the relation between Soviet politics and major aspects of economic policy in the recent past. But the books are not really that complementary; they serve better as an illustration of two kinds of investigation into Soviet policy-making, revealing the advantages and limitations of both approaches.

Abraham Katz' slimmer volume is in many ways the more satisfying. A career diplomat with considerable academic training in Soviet affairs, Katz acquired a sure feel for Soviet policy development during his two years (1964-66) as Counselor for Economic Affairs at the American Embassy in Moscow. His basic purpose, concisely explained in his introduction, is to examine the tension between "the totalitarian imperative and the need for rational economic relationships" (p. vi). Both economists and sociologists may find his definition of rationality ("objective constraints on the extent to which the basic proportions of various elements in the economy can be stretched") slightly simplistic, as the author himself implies. But to the reviewer, it seems an adequate working definition for his treatment, which emphasizes discussion of policy rather than assessment of economic attainments. To put the matter another way, Katz takes the *persistent* Soviet assertion of the overriding need to create a superior socioeconomic system, measured in terms of material output, as a given, and he tries to determine how compatible this requirement is with the equally persistent demand for highly centralized control.

The theme is an old one in Soviet studies, and it is scarcely surprising that Katz does more to confirm previous insights (particularly Alec Nove's) than to present new ones. In the process, he provides an up-to-date analysis of the fundamental economic policy debates since World War II (prefaced by a brief but helpful review of earlier Stalinist discussions). As a concise guide to the milestones in the evolution of Soviet economic policy, the book is marred only by the publisher's omission of an index. In contrast to some gingerly treatments of Soviet debates, Katz does not hesitate to interpret materials with the benefit of hindsight and new revelations, nor does he shrink from summary judgments when the evidence is clear (Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* experiment is emphatically labeled an "administrative monstrosity" from an economic viewpoint).

Katz is willing to venture to some extent into an assessment of individual leaders' views on basic economic issues during the Khrushchev period. He identifies M. S. Suslov, for example, as an exponent of the view that the party apparatus should "leave the daily tasks of the economy to the professionals" (p. 119). In the course of economic reforms since Khrushchev (to which half of Katz' book is devoted), signs of fundamental divergences on economic policies have persisted, but there has been less evidence to pinpoint where individual leaders have stood. In this situation, Katz has opted for an approach that emphasizes positions over personalities. In particular, he concentrates on a close analysis of the arguments aired in Soviet eco-

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nomic debate and their implications for his basic thesis of the dichotomy of "rational *vs.* totalitarian" tendencies. He strives for an indisputable identification of positions. For example, he finds that "mathematical economists" were early advocates of rational planning. On the other hand, he identifies as "conservative" those (whether writers, economists, or officials) who opposed a broad resort to market principles. Similarly, Katz considers an excessive concern for centralization at the expense of economic rationalization to be "bureaucratic." By identifying positions, rather than trying to find who held them or why, Katz has deliberately set limits on his analysis.

WERNER HAHN takes up where Katz cautiously stops. In his longer work, Hahn devotes almost three times as much space to the 1960's as does Katz. Hahn needs this space, for he has attempted nothing less than "to identify individual leaders' positions on issues through careful study and comparison of their statements through the years, to identify the role of these leaders and their viewpoints in disputes and decisions, and to compare personnel shifts and career patterns with policy changes and political disputes" (p. xii). In other words, where Katz provides a close analysis of evolving economic doctrine, Hahn presents a rather elaborate exercise in Kremlinology.

There is no doubt that identification of the positions of specific leaders is a significant aspect of Soviet studies, utilizing an array of special methods basically grouped under scrutiny of esoteric language and investigation of career associations. This kind of analysis was begun decades ago in a journalistic, often polemical vein by the great émigré critics of Stalin. During the Khrushchev era, Kremlinological methods were refined and logically expounded by systematic students like Robert Conquest and Myron Rush. These writers (and others who, like myself, occasionally dabbled in the art) possessed the enormous advantage that successive overt leadership struggles, with their accompanying revelations, provided much evidence to test Kremlinological hypotheses. Post-Khrushchev analysts usually lack this advantage; only "occasionally," as Katz remarks (p. 187), "will the curtain part to document real conflict within the government." On the other hand, contemporary Kremlinologists can rely on some time-tested rules of the game—*e.g.,* consistency in associations can generally be counted upon since it is clearly dangerous for Soviet officials to switch allegiance, especially during the course of power struggles. The unsolved question is whether, in a period of oligarchical solidarity and lowered penalties for defeat, the old rules continue to hold.

In one specific respect, Hahn's analysis provides some vindication for the Kremlinological approach: he is explicit in identifying G.I. Voronov as the persistent loser in controversies over agricultural policy and P. Ye. Shelest as a sometime opponent of ascendant policies. Within months after publication of Hahn's book, these men became the first two post-Khrushchev Politburo members to be ousted. But Hahn's double-winning ticket in the Kremlin prediction sweepstakes is largely devalued by his analytical approach, which is confined to intensive examination of a single policy issue. The whole truth of Shelest's ouster is unknown, but all available evidence indicates that his major sin was laxity on the nationality question rather than deviation on agricultural policy. In general, agricultural policy is only one of a series of major issues, including—in addition to the nationality question (which the reviewer would put at the top of the list, together with the connected problem of

Reviewers in This Issue

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WAYNE S. SMITH—US Foreign Service Officer and Ph.D. candidate at George Washington University (Washington, DC); contributor of articles on Soviet Latin American policies to *Orbis* and other journals.

HAROLD J. NOAH—Professor of Economics and Education at Teachers' College, Columbia University; author of *Financing Soviet Schools,* 1966, and co-author of *Toward a Science of Comparative Education,* 1969.

JEFFREY W. HAHN—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Villanova University (Villanova, Pa.); contributor of articles to *Youth and Society* and other journals.

VICTOR C. FALKENHEIM—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto (Canada); contributor of articles to *Asian Survey* and to Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China,* 1972.

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satellite relations)—general foreign policy, defense policy, industrial development, and ideological control. All are interrelated, and no Politburo member can afford to neglect any of them. Consequently, his alignments will be heavily influenced by his perception of the effect that policy formation in any one of these areas will have upon his own specialized interests. Men farther down the bureaucratic ladder may not be able to analyze the effect of the whole range of policy disputes in this way; but *insofar as they do constitute stable personal followings,* they become entangled in the whole complex of issues. Even Katz' careful treatment of the well-documented dispute over the priority of consumer goods in 1954 suffers from failure to relate Soviet developments to Imre Nagy's "new course" in Hungary.

Hahn would certainly not deny this complexity. In fact, in the latter chapters of his work, he comes close to analyzing the broad range of issues dividing the post-Khrushchev leadership, especially in the economic field. At other points, though, his emphasis on agricultural policy is simplistic at best. For example, his treatment of Khrushchev's ouster at the November 1964 plenum could lead the less knowledgeable reader to believe that Khrushchev's apparent "opportunity to strike at his foes in agriculture" was lost because of his unpopular policies in this field. No one will question the importance of the "virgin lands" failures or of the opposition within party circles to the setting up of party committees for agriculture as contributing causes to the plenum's rejection of Khrushchev. But few dispute that the matter was vastly more complex, involving (as Katz' remarks on Suslov's position suggest) doubts about the industrial-control element of party bifurcation, repeated rebuffs in foreign policy, and concern over Khrushchev's endorsement of the anti-Stalin campaign. Except by fits and starts, Hahn cannot give adequate attention to the complexity of policy interactions, if only because explicating Kremlinological arguments requires so much space.

THERE ARE SEVERAL ways for an author who wants to pursue Kremlinology in depth to avoid this dilemma. One is to limit his analysis to a very brief chronological period in which a wide range of problems can be treated feasibly. A second solution is to accept authoritative general explanations propounded by other Kremlinologists, using his own specific policy analysis as a test of their general hypotheses for the period. A third way—notably repugnant to Kremlinologists—is division of labor in team studies.

There is a fourth way, but it represents a partial renunciation of the Kremlinological approach. One can discuss the positions of top leaders (generally Politburo members) whose broad involvement and frequent public pronouncements make it feasible to trace their positions in detail. But is it really feasible to extend this analysis, as Hahn attempts, to identification of personal followings on a single issue? When (as in the case of Zhores Medvedev's revelations on the Lysenko affair) special bodies of information are available, the author's exploration of lower levels of policy alignments is convincing. At other points, it seems to the reviewer, it would be preferable to move closer to Katz' approach—*i.e.,* to identify *policy positions* rather than personal adherence to them.

Increasingly abundant biographical data does make one additional level of analysis feasible, however. Instead of trying to identify individual positions far down the bureaucratic hierarchy, one might more prudently deal with statistical clusters of career patterns correlated to subsequent policy positions. Some of the most exciting analyses by younger scholars employ just this type of approach. Their emerging conclusions appear to suggest that the personal-alignment hypothesis is tenable only to a very limited extent. Doubtless this new wave of quantitative study can profit from Hahn's painstaking assemblage of Kremlinological data—if not always from his conclusions.

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Moscow's Latin Beat

By Wayne S. Smith

K.S. TARASOV: *SShA i Latinskaia Amerika* (The USA and Latin America). Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972.
B.I. GVOZDAREV, Ed.: *Neokolonializm SShA v Latinskoi Amerike* (Neocolonialism of the USA in Latin America). Publication of the Latin American Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970.
A.I. SIZONENKO: *Ocherki istorii Sovetsko-Latinoamerikanskikh otnoshenii* (An Outline of the History of Soviet-Latin American Relations). Publication of the Latin American Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1971.

BEFORE 1960, few Soviet scholars directed their attention to Latin America. The number of books on the area published in the Soviet Union was unimpressive and consisted mostly of drab, uninformed tracts based on such one-sided sources as newspapers of Latin American Communist parties and passages from documents of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1962, however, an institute for the study of Latin America was founded in Moscow, and since that time the number of Soviet Latin Americanists and the volume of their work have increased dramatically.

In the final analysis, the impulse behind this upsurge can be reduced to one word: Cuba. Not that Soviet scholars have been interested so much in Cuba for its own merits; on the contrary, as Leon Gouré pointed out in a book review in the November-December 1972 issue of this magazine, surprisingly few works have been published in the USSR on Cuba itself. Rather, as numerous Soviet authors have insisted since 1960, the triumph of Castro's Revolution and Cuba's subsequent association with the Soviet Union have had the broader effect of undermining the "theory of geographic determinism," *i.e.*, the view that the proximity of Latin America to the United States effectively precluded the emergence there of a whole range of economic, social and political developments—domestic and international—deemed desirable by Moscow.[1]

Soviet writings have usually spoken of the dispelling of this theory as the result of a change in the perceptions of Latin Americans, of their growing awareness that even on the Yankee doorstep it is not impossible to throw off the "yoke of imperialism." In fact, however, the realization that geographic determinism is not an iron-clad law of history probably had a more profound impact on Soviet observers than on Latin Americans—and no less so on scholars than on political leaders of the USSR. They suddenly perceived that Latin America was no longer to be viewed as the remote and impenetrable US backyard, that it was an area in which there might be increasing economic and political opportunities for the Soviet Union, and in which, therefore, Soviet academicians might profitably interest themselves.[2] As a result, the past decade has seen not only an increase in the number of Soviet works on Latin America but also a discernible improvement in their quality. Increasingly, they have drawn not only upon Communist sources but also upon the research and writings of Western scholars—especially those in the US. This has tended to mute the characteristic one-dimensional approach of earlier treatises and to introduce an element of balance

[1] Indeed, two of the books herein reviewed, the Tarasov and Gvozdarev works, emphasize the role of the Cuban Revolution in this respect.

[2] It hardly need be pointed out that, for converse reasons, the Cuban Revolution had much the same effect in the United States. It brought home to American statesmen and scholars that Latin America could not be safely ignored. It was an area we understood all too little and to which we had devoted insufficient resources and attention. The Alliance for Progress was one result. Funds for new centers of Latin American studies and grants for individual research projects were another.

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into accounts of individual developments or events—even if the ultimate outcome is still deemed by the authors to be determined by the dialectical forces of history.

The books examined here are indicative, to a greater or lesser degree, of this increase in the scholarly objectivity of Soviet studies on Latin America. The Tarasov and Gvozdarev works both draw heavily on the works of North American specialists in the field. Tarasov, for example, cites Lisa North's study of *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru,* the Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari volume, *Elites in Latin America,* and the latest writings of Arthur Whitaker, Edwin Lieuwen, Robert Burr, Norman Bailey, and David Burks, to name but a few. The writers in the Gvozdarev volume also draw upon most of these as well as upon the works of other well-known North American specialists on Latin America, *e.g.,* Lincoln Gordon, Theodore Draper, Charles Anderson, Ernst Halperin, Ronald Schneider, and Karl Schmitt. Because of its subject matter—*i.e.,* Soviet relations with Latin America—the Sizonenko work relies more heavily on Soviet and Latin American Communist sources, although it, too, cites numerous independent Latin American newspapers in addition to those associated with the local Communist parties.

The Tarasov and Gvozdarev volumes are also indicative of the growing interest among Soviet scholars in the study of the policies and activities of the United States in Latin America, just as there is a growing reciprocal interest among US scholars in Soviet policies and activities in the region.[3] This development is not surprising and, in fact, is part of a single causal nexus. As Soviet official interest in the area was stimulated by the perception of possible gains there at the expense of traditional US predominance, so North American interest was heightened by manifestations of the increased Soviet attention to Latin America. It was to be expected, then, that specialists on each side would begin to address themselves more seriously to the study of the position of the other side and of their own posture in relation to that of the other, as well as to closer examination of the Latin American area itself.

AS STUDIES of US policy and actions in Latin America, the Tarasov and Gvozdarev books usefully complement one another, the first concentrating on US military policy in the region, the second on the Alliance for Progress and the associated "new look" in US policy.

Tarasov contends that "among the varied forms of US imperialist aggrandizement in Latin America, military policy occupies first place" (p. 328). That policy, he continues, has itself been modified and reshaped over the years, particularly in response to the changing demands and conditions of modern warfare, in which the exposure of virtually every spot on the globe to the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles has rendered the terms "front" and "rear" obsolete. Hence, he suggests, the role of Latin America in the eyes of US strategists has changed from that of a "secure rear" to one of a "strategic reserve" or "inner front"—the latter having reference to the primary mission Tarasov believes the Pentagon to have assigned to Latin American armed forces, *i.e.,* that of guaranteeing stability and crushing partisan movements.

Traditional military concepts and definitions have indeed been revised radically over the past decade or more, and Tarasov is by no means the first to point out that, inexorably, Latin America's place in any strategic equation has also changed. Tarasov's interpretation of the direction, or nature, of the transformation, however, is puzzling indeed. Logically, the very conditions to which he alludes —that is, the global range of nuclear weapons—should render Latin America less rather than more significant strategically. Yet, Tarasov apparently assumes that a "strategic reserve" is a greater asset than a "secure rear," and he goes on to claim that one new US objective designed to meet the needs of the changed strategic situation is the establishment of military bases in Latin America, many of them to be used as missile launching sites. He even asserts that in 1957 the US acquired rights to construct a nuclear missile base in the Tierra del Fuego region of Argentina.

Tarasov apparently sees no inconsistency between this assertion and the changed strategic realities he emphasizes. However, a military policy emphasizing the acquisition of new bases would seem to belong more to the world of Alfred Thayer Mahan than to our own world of hardened silos and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). One wonders why Tarasov thinks that the US would want missile bases in Latin America at all, inasmuch as

[3] Three books reviewed in the May-June 1971 issue of *Problems of Communism* are illustrative of the latter trend: J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, *The Soviet Union and Latin America;* Stephen Clissold, *Soviet Relations With Latin America;* and Robert G. Carlton, *Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America.*

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launching pads there would be generally farther away from any likely targets than those in the United States itself would be. His suggestion of US interest in establishing missile launching sites in Tierra del Fuego is simply comical. What might be the target of such sites—the South Pole, the empty Pacific Ocean?

Perhaps more to the point, Tarasov interprets all US policies and programs in Latin America, including military policy, as designed to keep the region in the capitalist sphere and to strengthen US positions, and he sees indications that the US is beginning to fail in this objective. He claims in particular that military elements in Latin America are now seeking to break away from the grip of the Pentagon, and he cites the military rebellion of 1970 in Trinidad, the Dominican revolt of 1965, and recent developments among ruling military circles in Bolivia and Peru as evidence of such a trend.

But while he points to manifestations of growing nationalism in Latin American military establishments and other evidences of increasing estrangement from the United States, Tarasov is less certain when it comes to predicting where all this is likely to lead in terms of internal politics. He rejects the attempts of bourgeois reformers—*e.g.*, the Christian Democrats in Chile and the Peronists in Argentina—to devise a viable Latin American alternative to communism as a substitute for traditional forms of capitalism, but his evidence for arguing that Latin American nationalism is not leading in precisely that direction —*i.e.*, toward development of political models *sui generis* to the region or to individual countries in the region—is conspicuously thin. Apart from the obvious case of Cuba, he sees hope that the Peruvian revolution may eventually move in the right direction (*i.e.*, toward communism), although he admits that it still remains in the "bourgeois-democratic" stage. He grounds his optimism on speeches by leaders of the Peruvian Communist Party praising the anti-imperialist struggle of the present regime and on the observation of a visiting Soviet scholar that "the government of Velasco . . . is struggling to find its path to independent non-capitalist development" (pp. 168-69). Even this last statement, however, seems to suggest the development of a "third" model rather than eventual adoption of the Communist one.

TARASOV's uncertainty reflects the fact that the whole question of where Latin America stands and in what direction it is moving in its sociopolitical development is a difficult one for Soviet ideologists to handle. The Latin American countries simply do not fit the "third world" stereotype. Their independence is no recent occurrence as it is in the case of many of the countries of Asia and Africa; nor is the advent of industrialization and an entrepreneur class a very new development there. Where then does Latin America stand? Is it comprised of semi-feudal societies which might hopefully bypass capitalism on the way to socialism? Or is it an area of capitalist states in which the local Communist parties should be urging socialist revolution? Soviet ideologists have generally attempted to resolve the problem by arguing that Latin American states are a mixture of feudal and capitalist elements, and that the latter are not yet sufficiently dominant to make a direct transition to socialism ideologically feasible. For example, Viktor Volsky asserted in *Pravda* (Moscow) of June 27, 1970:

Socioeconomic backwardness in these countries, plus the domination by latifundism and the presence of strong precapitalist relations in the countryside, oppression by foreign monopolies—all this testifies to the fact that the road to socialism on the continent lies basically through a people's democratic revolution.

The approach of the Tarasov and Gvozdarev volumes to this question seems to differ somewhat from the customary Soviet formulation. The contributors to the latter, for example, complain that American ideologists tend to view Latin America's ills as the results of its feudal vestiges, and, then, to prove that this is not the case, they emphasize the extent of the area's capitalist development. This permits them to argue that most of the region's problems are produced, not by feudal vestiges, but by the internal contradictions of capitalism. Well and good. But if that is the case—*i.e.*, if the capitalist component is so clearly the dominant one in the Latin American edifice—what becomes of the other Soviet argument that direct transition to socialism would be historically premature in Latin America? One cannot, after all, have it both ways.

Leaving that question aside, one must note that the Gvozdarev study presents an interesting and at times surprisingly balanced view of the changing forms and methods of US policy in Latin America. It traces the revolution of US policy from the era of President Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" to the Alliance for Progress,

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but the main focus is on the development of the Alliance in the early 1960's. The "new look" which came to characterize American policy at that time was, the authors correctly contend, the collective creation of a number of architects, many of them from academic circles. Lincoln Gordon, Arthur Whitaker, Robert Alexander, and a number of others are discussed in this role. The general thesis that these men sought to impress on US policy, it is explained, was that peaceful social revolution had to take place in Latin America if a more violent form of revolution was to be avoided. Vested interests would have to give up some of their riches and privileges or risk losing them all. The contributors to the Gvozdarev volume contend that this "evolution or chaos" theory[4] was basically anti-Communist in its inspiration—*i.e.,* that it was designed to forestall Communist-oriented revolution. Although most Americans would argue that the Alliance for Progress was primarily based on liberal-democratic motives, few would deny that it had something of an anti-Communist underpinning. This was not altogether surprising in the period just preceding and immediately following the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

AS NOTED earlier, Sizonenko's broad survey of Soviet-Latin American relations from 1924 to 1970 is a somewhat different type of study, and one which is less indicative of the positive currents in Soviet scholarship on Latin America. The volume unfortunately adds very little to Viktor Volsky's earlier book on essentially the same subject.[5] Sizonenko avoids discussing Soviet-Cuban relations on the flimsy ground that it has been treated fully by others. He also does not delve deeply into recent Soviet-Chilean or Soviet-Peruvian relations.

In fact, the Sizonenko volume is little more than a chronicle of events and developments in state-to-state relations between the USSR and Latin American nations. If a trade agreement was signed in a given year, the author reports the fact; if a Soviet soccer team toured the area under government sponsorship, this is noted. Sizonenko chooses 1924 as the beginning of his coverage because it was the year in which formal diplomatic relations were established with Mexico, the Soviet Union's first official link with a Latin American state. He ignores earlier contacts between the Soviet and Mexican Communist Parties, the role of the Comintern in interparty affairs (including the visit of Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin to Mexico in 1919). Such an approach obviously presents an emasculated canvas of the early period of Soviet-Latin American relations.

Such an incomplete view of events can, of course, prove quite convenient. Sizonenko, for example, would have one believe that Soviet-Mexican relations developed quite normally from 1924 to 1929, and that it was only the US campaign of vilification of the USSR and pressure on Mexico by "US and British imperialism" which led to the souring of this budding relationship and the decision of the Mexican government to rupture relations with the USSR in January 1930. Even on the surface, this is an untenable thesis. The Mexican government was no less nationalistically inclined in 1929 than in 1924 and hence was no more likely to succumb to US pressure to sever relations than it had been to earlier pressures not to establish those relations. General Plutarco Elias Calles [who dominated Mexican politics from 1924-34, first as President and then as the "man behind the throne"] was not reluctant to stand up to the United States, as he demonstrated on a number of occasions. Had he believed that maintenance of relations with the Soviet Union was still in Mexico's interests, it is unlikely that the break would have been ordered, whatever the external pressures.

Why, then, did the rupture of Soviet-Mexican relations occur? One need look no further than the Sixth Comintern meeting in 1928 to find the answer. Prior to that meeting, the Comintern line had been one of working through popular fronts and cooperation with "progressive" bourgeois governments. So long as it followed that line, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) did not run afoul of the Mexican government. In 1928, however, the line shifted abruptly to one of open struggle against bourgeois governments. Dutifully, the PCM went on the offensive. In 1929 it called for open opposition to the government of Portes Gil, and Communist-led peasant leagues were ordered to launch an insurrection. The uprising was suppressed almost as soon as it began, but not before bringing the wrath of the government down on the PCM. It was also a key

[4] The Soviet author, in fact, borrowed the expression directly from the Praeger publication of that title by Karl M. Schmitt and David Burks.

[5] Viktor Volsky, Ed., *SSSR i Latinsaya Amerika, 1917-67* (The USSR and Latin America, 1917-67), Moscow, International Relations Publishing House, 1967.

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factor in the embitterment of relations between Mexico and Moscow.

All this—the shifting Comintern line and the PCM's opposition to the Mexican government—is omitted from Sizonenko's study; hence, he can simply maintain that official relations developed normally from 1924 and that there were no problems between the two governments that could have justified the 1930 break in relations. In so saying, Sizonenko is in good company. This was exactly the line taken by Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov in commenting on the rupture back in 1930, and it has not changed over the past 43 years. It is evident that the breezes of objectivity which have freshened Soviet scholarship on Latin America in recent years have yet to reach this dusty corner.

Communist Schooling

By Harold J. Noah

JOHN I. THOMAS: *Education for Communism: School and State in the People's Republic of Albania.* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1969.
NIGEL GRANT: *Society, Schools and Progress in Eastern Europe.* Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1969.
WASYL SHIMONIAK: *Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics.* Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970.
SEYMOUR M. ROSEN: *Education and Modernization in the USSR.* Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1971.

THERE IS now a substantial collection of books published outside the Communist countries discussing the origins, nature, structure and purpose of education under communism. The four volumes presently under review are valuable additions to that bibliography.

John I. Thomas' study is the narrowest in focus, dealing with educational developments in tiny Albania, with a population of only 2.1 million in 1970. Relying heavily upon Albanian and Soviet sources, and for the most part eschewing value judgements, Thomas provides a detailed view of how the present Albanian system of education rose on the ruins of Italian, French, Greek, and Turkish imports. He describes the familiar pattern of educational deprivation that still existed in Albania before World War II—a condition that spurred the Communists' subsequent commitment to extending educational opportunities, especially among women. In the space of less than 30 years, Albania has come a long way educationally—from a country that had not a single institution of higher education in 1945 to one that is now beginning to provide educational facilities on a par with those of its Greek and Yugoslav neighbors. Thomas' book is invaluable for its detailed account of this process of development.

Like the other Eastern European countries, Albania reconstructed its educational system in imitation of Soviet models, with only minor adjustments to adapt them to local conditions. Indeed, the strength of the Soviet example in Eastern Europe is nowhere evidenced more clearly than in Albania, notwithstanding the 1961 split with the Soviet Union. The transfer of Albania's allegiance to the Chinese branch of communism apparently did not mean that the usefulness and durability of Soviet models were at an end, at least in education. Although Thomas mentions these events, his book leaves the reader with a definite sense of incompleteness on this score. After all, the really interesting thing about Albania's educational development is that while Albania shifted its political allegiance from Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, and then from the Soviet Union to China, its adherence to Soviet-based forms of education has endured. Why? That question Thomas does not raise.

Part of the answer is that the Soviet model has, in fact, proven very useful for countries, like Albania, which are seeking to effect extremely rapid transformations of their backward, predominantly agricultural societies, marked by traces of feudalism, into modern, industrialized, and mass-participatory states. This implies that it was not just a matter of the Soviet Union imposing its example by sheer force of military might and

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political power, but that the countries of Eastern Europe derived genuine assistance from the Soviet framework and philosophy of education. Is there justification for this belief? The conclusion offered by Nigel Grant's book is "Probably yes"; the answer from Wasyl Shimoniak is a resounding "No!"

GRANT has written a shrewdly perceptive and on the whole sympathetic book about the countries of Eastern Europe, their turbulent history, their pre-Communist educational development, and the schooling patterns adopted under communism. While tracing the common pattern underlying the changes in education that have taken place in eight countries (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania), he also takes pains to explain how and why local variations have occurred. Writing a multinational, comparative book of this kind is a difficult task, and Grant has succeeded admirably.

The countries of Eastern Europe are in an interesting "love-hate" relationship with the Soviet Union. There is little in their histories (except perhaps for Bulgaria) to make them natural disciples of the Soviet Union; yet their military, economic, and perhaps ideological need for the Soviet Union is so great that, notwithstanding conflicts of varying gravity that arose on occasion in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the allegiance of the East European states to the Soviet bloc has not been seriously in doubt. Writing from the perspective of education, Grant is able to show that the Soviet model does have a genuine functional meaning for countries as diverse as East Germany and, say, Romania. Secularization of education; tying schools more closely to the requirements of planned economic development; widening educational opportunities, particularly for women, rural youth, and the poor; replacing a formal classics-oriented curriculum with one emphasizing mathematics and the natural sciences for all; and introducing strong elements of work-study and practical training into school programs—all these basic features of the Soviet educational model the Eastern European countries have found exceptionally useful to their own development.

WASYL SHIMONIAK addresses an even wider canvas than does Grant, extending the scope of his study to include China, Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam, although half of his long book is devoted to the development of education in Russia and the Soviet Union. For Shimoniak, the key to what has been going on in the Communist polities lies in the growth and consolidation of personal power in the hands of small groups of men, with education, too, being utilized to serve this purpose. Marxist-Leninist philosophy and sloganizing are seen as verbal cloaks for a powerful drive, both inside and outside the Soviet Union, to extend the sway of the Russian people and their culture and to extirpate (using violence, where necessary) the influence of organized religions. While Shimoniak is prepared to concede that some benefits have flowed from the establishment of Communist forms of government in and around the Soviet Union (emancipation of women, elimination of illiteracy, improvement in the material conditions of life), his judgment is that the price paid has been altogether too high. He also concedes that the Communist rulers of these nations have spent generously on education, but he views their motives as suspect. They needed schools to build economic power as a basis for military might, to facilitate the ideological indoctrination of the masses, and to estabiish the supremacy of Russian (or Chinese) culture as the only true socialist culture—and all this primarily for the sake of consolidating their personal power. Shimoniak concludes:

In brief, the language of communism cannot be trusted. Russian and Chinese communism are not the types of communism that were dreamed of for many centuries. As seen in every country where the Communists came to power, the individual lost his freedom not to the state, but to a few dictators, who were power-hungry individuals. There can be no two political parties, there can be no more than one representative in an "election," and there cannot be division of power between God and the ruler.

At the same time the Communists realized that the only way to stay in power is to educate their own intelligentsia, their own leaders and their own children. For this reason, the number of schools has increased in every country they have occupied.

This interpretation of events and motivations takes the "devil-theory" of communism much too far. While self-serving political behavior, arbitrary rule, oppression of national groups, and the suppression of national and religious aspirations have certainly occurred under communism, they

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are unfortunately no monopoly of the Communist world. Moreover, the Communist system, especially in the fields of education and social services, does have its positive aspects from the standpoint of harnessing national energies for the tasks of modernization and economic development.

A DISTINGUISHING mark of Communist states is their commitment to reforming the ideals and philosophy of their citizens along so-called Marxist-Leninist lines. In this task, the schools, the higher educational institutions, and the youth movement are expected to play major roles. It is not surprising that this is so, for such institutions are ideally adapted to centralized, bureaucratic forms of control and to the inculcation of officially prescribed ideas and norms. Thus, education in the Soviet Union and other Communist states serves a much wider purpose than merely insuring the perpetuation in power of a small clique of rulers. It is intended to be the instrument for bringing into being a new type of citizen as the basis of a new social order. To see Communist education *only* in the light of the abuses of state power that have taken place, as Shimoniak tends to do, may lead us both to misunderstand the appeal of the Communist system and to underrate its potential for survival.

It is in this respect that Seymour Rosen's book needs to be read in conjunction with Shimoniak's. Though much of what Rosen has to say is not new, it is helpful to have collected in one place details on curriculum, enrollment, and educational structure updated to the end of the 1960's. Useful statistical tables on the economy and the educational system are given in an appendix. Moreover, the author is scrupulously accurate in his citations of sources and his transliterations (unfortunately something which cannot be said of Shimoniak), as well as in his facts. Like Grant, Rosen is clear about the distortions and defects of Communist socio-cultural policies, but by looking at Soviet educational programs in the context of Russia's 250-year-old drive toward modernization, he achieves an objective analysis that serves as a counterweight to Shimoniak's one-sided interpretation.

WILL mass education prove in time to be a Trojan horse in the Communist societies? That is to say, will not a highly educated population eventually become unwilling to tolerate the political and ideological authoritarianism that has characterized the Soviet and other Communist societies? This is perhaps one of the most important questions that confront analysts of the Communist system, but unfortunately it is one to which none of the authors whose works are reviewed here gives any attention.

The evidence to date is, of course, not encouraging. As in the Western countries, the elimination of illiteracy in the USSR did not automatically produce an independently thinking, politically sophisticated electorate. Rather, mass literacy was used to insure that the ideas of the dominant ideology received the widest publicity. Universal primary and near-universal secondary education under communism has proved to be a splendid instrument for the inculcation of an intensely narrow view of the world and the Soviet Union's place in it. Higher education has been developed in a framework of rigorous specialization and is designed not to open young minds but to train them to perform certain well-defined professional tasks. So far, it must be conceded, the Soviet state has been able to reap the economic benefits flowing from its educational system without paying any appreciable price in terms of the emergence of a more intellectually curious and ideologically obdurate citizenry.

What of the future? Here, I am inclined to be more sanguine. Soviet leaders might do well to remember Marx's insistence that the laws of motion of societies can be understood best in terms of men's relationship to the means of production. Everywhere, but especially in Communist states, the amount of public educational investment in the citizenry is becoming so vast that it begins to rival investment in conventional physical capital. Those who embody that educational investment cannot be treated simply as if they were inanimate tools. Indeed, they begin to assume many of the characteristics of an independent peasantry, seeking to exploit to the best advantage their individual holding of capital—in this case, education. If so, Communist states may eventually find that they have cast out their agricultural peasantry only to create a replacement class of independently thinking, small-scale "capitalists"—the educated professionals.

The path to relaxed controls over intellectual inquiry and freedom of expression will no doubt be long and beset by many twists and turns, but the emergence of a highly educated population seems likely to present a growing challenge to the continuation of authoritarianism in politics as well as in culture.

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Messages and Miscreants

By Jeffrey W. Hahn

GAYLE DURHAM HOLLANDER: *Soviet Political Indoctrination.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
WALTER D. CONNOR: *Deviance in Soviet Society.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.

THE STUDY of political socialization has evolved with the application of comparative systems analysis to the study of political phenomena. It is concerned with the problem of how, in different societies, values, attitudes, and beliefs about the political system are transferred to those living within that society. System stability, it is felt, varies with the degree of consensus that exists among members of the society with respect to these behavioral norms. In the case of the Soviet Union, there is an officially sponsored set of norms which are ideally to be embodied in the so-called "New Soviet Man." As a model of desired behavior, the "New Soviet Man" is a paragon of Communist virtues: hardworking, sober, conscious of his social responsibility, polite, politically literate, disciplined, patriotic, honest, modest, and, above all, devoted to the cause of communism (as defined by the CPSU).[1]

The two books under review both attest to the growing interest in the process of political socialization in the USSR, though they look at the process from differing perspectives. Professor Hollander's work describes the post-Stalin evolution of the media as the "main agency of adult political socialization in the USSR." Her book devotes one chapter to each of the major Soviet media—newspapers and periodicals; books; radio and television; and films—and a chapter to the agitation and propaganda apparatus (Agitprop). In each chapter dealing with the individual media, she first examines the quantitative growth and institutional structure of that particular medium and then reviews audience surveys measuring the impact of the medium on the audience. The latter analysis is particularly valuable since it utilizes much new work done by Soviet social scientists, and it is brought all together in a single chapter at the end of the book.

While Professor Hollander's book examines how the official message is transmitted and suggests some of the consequences of media development for political socialization, Professor Connor's work adduces evidence that the official message is not equally internalized by all Soviet citizens. Outside observers of the socialization process in the Soviet Union might find it tempting to overemphasize the seemingly greater capability of the Soviet leaders to manipulate social values and attitudes, and from this might draw erroneous conclusions about the relative effectiveness of Soviet socialization practices. In fact, to take such a view is to ignore important "discontinuities," or alternative sources of values, which exist within Soviet society. Such discontinuities may influence an individual to behave in a manner inconsistent with the officially sponsored norms, that is to say, in a manner termed "deviant" from the point of view of society. It is with the phenomenon of deviance in Soviet society, and with its sources, that the Connor volume is concerned.

PROFESSOR CONNOR examines three types of what he terms "apolitical" or nonideological deviance in the USSR: alcoholism (and drunkenness), juvenile delinquency, and crime. The book accords two chapters to each of these forms of deviance, first describing the manifestations and amplitude of each (using such statistics as are available), and

[1] The model is perhaps most clearly delineated in the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism," set forth in the *1961 Party Program of the CPSU.* For text, see Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules,* San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1962, pp. 112-13.

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then examining Soviet explanations for the deviant behavior (Soviet criminological theory continues to be dominated by the social-determinist approach, attributing deviance to "bourgeois survivals," institutional malfunctioning in the family, etc.). The following chapters review Soviet responses to deviance through various forms of correction or prevention.

Notwithstanding its focus on "apolitical" forms of deviance as distinguished from "principled" or politically nonconforming behavior, Professor Connor's study does have definite relevance for students of Soviet political socialization. After all, the "New Soviet Man," whose development is the objective of the socialization process, is a behavioral model that embraces the individual's total social behavior, including his political behavior. Thus, the prevalence in the USSR of the "apolitical" forms of deviance discussed by Connor can be said to suggest, in some sense, a failure to instill the values of the "New Soviet Man" *in toto,* political as well as social.

But it is above all in his analysis of the causes of deviance that Professor Connor makes a significant contribution to the study of political socialization in the USSR. He argues forcefully that modernization itself may be an important source of deviant attitudes and behavior. In his own words (p. 261),

. . . the legacy of coercive modernization is a large element in contemporary Soviet life. If one examines the forms that crime, delinquency, and alcohol problems assume, one can see the legacy reflected there as well. It would be disingenuous to ignore the impact of low living standards, crowded housing, and the pressures of an urban environment on the drinking behavior of working-class males.

If the "legacy of coercive modernization" is at least partly responsible for such forms of deviance as alcoholism, crime, and delinquency, may it not also be a source of attitudes and behavior undesirable from the regime's social and political standpoint? For example, the presence of manufactured consumer goods priced well above the abilities of the average consumer is not likely to encourage a socialist attitude toward property. Nor is the fierce competition among secondary-level graduates for entrance into the technical-scientific training provided by the universities conducive to cooperative attitudes toward one's fellow students. Examples could be multiplied, but the point is that both attitudes are inconsistent with the officially desired set of norms associated with the "New Soviet Man," and both are partly a consequence of Soviet modernization. Connor's argument, which does not necessarily negate Soviet explanations about "bourgeois survivals," does suggest that Soviet-type "coercive modernization," especially with its resultant industrialization and urbanization, leads to forms of deviance. It is a useful insight.

ANOTHER THEME with important implications for the Soviet political socialization process receives expression in both books—that is, the existence of a "dissensus" between the views of the public on the one hand and the state on the other. In the case of the media—especially radio and television, the fastest growing forms of communication—Professor Hollander sees such a dissensus in the fact that while the ruling elite views the media primarily as a powerful tool for political indoctrination, the popular audience is more interested in being entertained or in receiving practical information. The latter desire not being satisfied, the Soviet citizen turns to alternative sources, such as foreign radio broadcasts, which have the attraction of providing more objective news reportage (Hollander, pp. 125, 194). The resultant socialization discontinuities can, however, be minimized through greater sophistication in media usage. The author notes that such a change is indeed taking place in the USSR, and she expresses the view that the Soviet media can increase their potential effectiveness as an instrument of socialization by giving the public what it wants in terms of attractive packaging and more entertainment. After all, "apolitical" entertainment can also carry a political message, as anyone who has watched spy thrillers, detective stories, historical dramas, and World War II movies on American television can attest.

Professor Hollander observes that Soviet efforts to indoctrinate via the media confront a new problem resulting from what she calls the "privatization" of media use. By that she means that the great quantitative growth of the Soviet media has made it easier for the Soviet television viewer or radio listener to "tune out" what he does not want (straight propaganda) and "tune in" what he does want (entertainment, human interest items, etc.). She suggests, however, that increased media sophistication may also provide an answer to this problem. As American advertisers have learned, it is

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not so much what you are selling as how you go about selling it.

The dissensus which Professor Connor sees between state and public with respect to deviance is not so easily resolved. He convincingly argues that public tolerance toward heavy drinking especially and, to a lesser extent, toward juvenile delinquency and nonviolent crime has frustrated efforts by the regime to eliminate these forms of deviant behavior, and that their persistence, as well as the persistence of tolerant popular attitudes regarding them after fifty years of concerted effort to replace such attitudes with new ones, raises serious questions about when, if ever, the "New Soviet Man" will emerge. Connor views this phenomenon as further emphasizing the need to examine socialization discontinuity in the context of modernization. Is deviant behavior in the USSR the result of bourgeois "survivals" and traditions as the regime maintains, or should one look rather to industrialization and urbanization for the causes of behavior at variance with the official value system? If the latter is true, as Professor Connor suggests, what other forms of deviance—such, for example, as the development of a "consumer mentality"—can be attributed to the impact of these fundamental social processes?

In any event, students of Soviet political socialization can surely profit from Connor's illuminating analysis of dissensus, for it has significant implications for political as well as nonpolitical forms of deviant behavior.

SOME FINAL remarks may be appropriate with regard to the source material used in the books under review. Outside students of Soviet behavior tend to be overly apologetic in reporting their findings, largely because of the fact that they are as yet unable to carry out cross-cultural survey research inside the USSR. Obviously, this constitutes a substantial limitation, but it is not as serious as many make it out to be.

For one thing, as both these books make amply clear, indigenous survey research is gradually coming of age in the Soviet Union itself—in quality as well as in quantity. There is good reason for this: pragmatism in decision-making and problem-solving requires it, and pragmatism rather than ideological rigidity seems to characterize the present Soviet leadership. Thus, an increasing volume of survey research and other kinds of data is now appearing in Soviet professional journals and books dealing with social problems that were previously discussed only in ideological platitudes. It should be noted in this connection that the Hollander and Connor studies contain interesting statistical data tending to show an association between socio-economic status and behavior and suggesting, among other things, that lower socio-economic status may correlate positively with both lower media consumption and deviant behavior. Although data of this sort still remain tantalizingly incomplete, the fact that such information is becoming increasingly available is encouraging. Professors Connor and Hollander are both to be commended for digging into this valuable material and incorporating it in their works. Their books help to bring the study of Soviet society more nearly within the framework of modern comparative systems analysis, a development which this reviewer welcomes.

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Urbanization in China

By Victor C. Falkenheim

JOHN W. LEWIS, Ed.: *The City in Communist China*. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1971.

THE STUDY of the urbanization process in the Third World has been accompanied in recent years by considerable theoretical confusion. This confusion stems in part from the dissatisfaction of researchers with models of urbanization drawn from the experience of the West during the industrial revolution. While scholars agree that the Third World is experiencing urban growth at a pace that outstrips that of early Western urbanization, they are uncertain about the causes and consequences of that phenomenon and have been calling increasingly for empirical models of urban change specifically related to Third World settings.

One such study by T. C. McGee, appropriately subtitled *Explorations in Search of a Theory*,[1] questions the relevance of two conventional Western views of the city to an understanding of Southeast Asian Cities. Neither the view of the city as "catalyst" of socio-economic change nor the image of the city as a parasitic enclave, he holds, is helpful to students of urban change in the Third World; and while recognizing that urbanization outruns industrialization in those areas, he sees new revolutionary consequences flowing from that fact. McGee's views are supported by Joan M. Nelson's study of urban migration and political instability, which comes to similar conclusions.[2]

For any effort to study Third World urbanization, China offers a fruitful area for comparative research. McGee excludes China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba from his focus on the ground that "their problems of development are being tackled in a different manner."[3] However, such a distinction hinges narrowly on differences in urbanization *policy* and does not lessen the desirability and value of including China in the comparative study of the *dynamics* of urbanization. In common with much of Asia, for example, the primary functions of the traditional Chinese city were administrative and political. Strong efforts were made by the Confucian state to contain trends toward urban commercialization and social diversification by restricting city growth and city autonomy. These policies led to what Etienne Balasz has described as a pattern of "arrested" urban development in which the cities of China never became "magnets" for the countryside or catalysts of social change.[4]

This pattern of urban development changed in part after the 1840's with the growth of modern industrial cities in the foreign treaty ports. These cities were relatively autonomous and did serve to generate some limited political diversification and commercial and industrial growth. But, as the centers of foreign influence as well as of bourgeois power and Kuomintang support (after 1927), the cities earned the mistrust of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders who came to power in 1949.

The primary concern of the CCP after 1949 was to establish control over the cities, and then to direct the subsequent process of urban development within the framework of clearly established political, economic, and strategic priorities. The first priority was to alter the skewed pattern of urban development inherited in 1949. In 1948, only 18 cities in China could be classed as industrial

[1] *The Urbanization Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory*, London, G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1971.

[2] *Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations*, Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1969.

[3] McGee, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[4] *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1964, p. 78.

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cities. Seventy percent of industrial capacity was to be found in the cities of six coastal provinces. For political and strategic reasons, it was decided to encourage the growth of medium-sized cities in the interior and set limits on the subsequent growth of coastal urban centers.[5]

While the Chinese have had considerable success in building medium-sized industrial cities, they have had more difficulty in limiting the growth of the larger cities. Urban growth has been difficult to contain, and the conspicuous growth of the large metropolitan centers has widened disparities rather than narrowed them. The annual industrial capacity of Shanghai is more than five times that of Tientsin, the next largest center, and six times larger than the third largest complex, Wuhan.[6] The dynamics of urban growth and the problems of hyperurbanization seem to defy simple solutions in China as elsewhere. Similarly, efforts at blending political control of the cities and participation by the urban masses have not been entirely successful. Franz Schurmann concluded a study of Chinese cities with the judgment that while the CCP had learned to govern the cities of China, it had yet to create "effective social institutions to resolve the dilemma of community."[7]

For the student of comparative urbanization, there are thus marked similarities between the Chinese experience and that of other developing countries, and these similarities could be usefully explored. That little effort has been made along these lines reflects one of the weaknesses of the area approach in research. As Jerry Hough has pointed out in a recent symposium on comparative urbanization, area scholars have often failed to frame their research in comparative terms and thus have not only neglected the theoretical importance of their own findings but impeded the "proper incorporation" of their detailed knowledge "into Western theory on the subject." [8]

THE VOLUME under review, which is edited by John W. Lewis and presents the research findings of a number of specialists working on urban China, illustrates the difficulties which impede such comparison. The volume contains 11 essays, including eight papers by participants in the St. Croix conference of December 1968 on "The City in China," plus three additional essays especially commissioned for the book. Four of the chapters deal with specific cities, including John Lewis' study of economic and political development in Tangshan, Lynn White's study of Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution, Christopher Howe's research on employment in Shanghai in the 1950's, and Victor Li's study of the public security system in a local county (Hui-yang) and county town (Hui-chou) in Kwangtung Province. Other chapters examine selected issues of urban policy at the national level and include Ezra Vogel's work on law and social control, Jerome Cohen's study of mediation practices, Phillip Emerson's study of manpower and education policies, and John Gardner's work on urban-rural disparities. Three chapters focus on selected urban groups: Janet Salaff's study of residential communities before and after the Cultural Revolution, Ying-mao Kau's work on urban cadres, and Paul Harper's discussion of the role of trade unions.

All these essays are uniformly of high quality and represent substantial contributions to our knowledge of political institutions and processes in China. As such they are to be recommended to specialists in Chinese affairs. They are, however, of less direct utility to the comparative urbanist. Several of the essays are concerned with issues that are national in scope and give only peripheral emphasis to the urban dimension. Others, though dealing with urban matters, aim primarily at detailed description of a particular institution or process without much attention to theoretical concerns.

The result is a certain lack of conceptual unity, but this is neither surprising nor to be excessively deplored. In the first place, the volume had its origins in a conference, and it is notoriously difficult—and probably undesirable—to force conference participants into a single mold. Lewis wryly describes one of the conference's achievements as "interdisciplinary" diversity. Similarly, the nature of the data makes a unified urban focus difficult. As all working researchers on China are aware, and as Lewis himself points out (pp. vi-vii), the data often blur the "distinctions between national and local, urban and rural, propaganda and reality, and policy and results."

DESPITE THIS diversity, the book holds together as a volume on the

[5] Yuan-li Wu, *The Spatial Economy of Communist China*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 11-17.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 56-57.

[7] *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, rev. ed., Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, p. 403.

[8] "Soviet Urban Politics and Comparative Urban Theory," *Journal of Comparative Administration* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), November 1972, pp. 313-14.

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Chinese city for several reasons. First, Lewis' introduction is a *tour de force,* managing to link disparate research efforts in a provocative discussion of urban development and policies in China. The introduction was designed both to fill in some of the major research gaps and to offer a framework for analyzing urban development in China, and it is an important contribution in its own right. Second, Lewis' application of his own developmental perspective to the study of politics in Tangshan city in North China generates a highly interesting and suggestive set of findings which can be usefully explored by other scholars working on the Chinese city. His approach, which analyzes Tangshan politics in terms of the tensions between state-building and revolution and between economic modernization and political development, is highly fruitful. Third, although many of the contributing authors do not apply the same conceptual approach, their findings are consistent with it and permit us to elaborate further a picture of urban processes in China that bears a striking resemblance to city politics and society in other parts of the world.

One interesting set of findings deals with the role of the city in the broader political system. The Chinese city is not a "sovereign" level of politics, as White points out in his essay on Shanghai, but an intermediate level of politics neither totally administered from above nor fully autonomous. Further, the relationship between the city and its administrative setting appears to have changed over time. Lewis, for example, traces the growing autonomy of Tangshan city in the 1960's back to the growth of a more natural set of local relationships. In the 1950's, he argues, the city was independent of its own hinterland and hence dependent on the center. In the 1960's, a "tacit alliance" developed between the city and surrounding villages, and this fostered a more independent base of power for the urban leaders.

One consequence of the changing relationship between the cities and the central government has been to make it increasingly difficult for scholars to determine whether individual urban decisions reflect local, regional, or central priorities. In discussing the impact of local priorities on policy, most of the contributors couch their analysis in terms of conflicting group interests. Lewis, White, and Salaff refer explicitly to the problems of adjusting competing urban interests. White analyzes the dynamics of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai in terms of the varying roles of workers, students, and several different groups of military personnel. The heart of the political process in Tangshan, Lewis argues, involved bargaining and coalition formation. The role of the central government and the party in this setting was to establish the rules of the game, and to act as arbiter. If we want to know "who governs" China's cities, in the view of some of the contributors, we might profitably turn to the example of Floyd Hunter's Atlanta.[9]

Most of the analysts have related the emergence of active urban groups, in part, to the impact of modernization and political development. As Harper shows, the educational programs mounted by the trade unions have generated tensions between upwardly mobile workers and older technicians. Similarly, the impact of political institutionalization has been to create bureaucratic interests with their own clientele and constituencies. Victor Li, for example, has documented the growing independence of the Hui-yang (county) public security institutions both from their local party superiors and from the next higher echelon of public security administrators.

DESPITE THE tensions brought into focus by these studies, Chinese urban leaders have on the whole been successful in managing the problems accompanying rapid urbanization. In part, the policies they have pursued may account for relative urban stability. Vigorous programs of resettlement in rural areas—in particular, the relocation of educated youth for whom urban employment opportunities are limited—have effectively siphoned off part of the natural increase in urban population. Local industries managed by neighborhood committees have given a sense of purpose to those not absorbed by modern industry. McGee, in discussing the absence of revolutionary change in Southeast Asian cities, lays emphasis on the existence of tertiary employment opportunities which give a sense of productive participation to excess urban workers. Christopher Howe's data on nonagricultural employment in Shanghai suggests that similar factors may be at work in China as well.

Not all the contributors to the Lewis volume are equally impressed by Peking's urban policies. Emerson argues that the problems of unemployed students resulted from a failure to match educational programs to available

[9] Hunter's classic work, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1953), uses Atlanta as a case study of local power distribution.

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Notice of Errata

TO OUR READERS: A portion of the print run of the May-June 1973 issue contained two footnote errors of some consequence in a chart on page 21:

1. In footnote a, the second source should have been listed as *Hsing-huo Liao-yuan,* Peking, 1958 *et seq.*

2. In footnote b, the first reference should have been listed as *Chung-ying tsai-chang ta-k'uei hui-p'ien,* Peking, 1957.

employment opportunities. He finds the remedy, involving the indiscriminate sending of valuable manpower to agricultural jobs that underutilize their skills, equally unsatisfactory. Kao is similarly critical of the alternation between boom and retrenchment in cadre policy, viewing it as inimical to rational bureaucratic growth. Further, Salaff argues that local institutions have failed to integrate many marginal groups into the local communities. Whatever the success or shortcomings of Peking's urban policies, however, the Chinese are managing at least as well as, if not better than, their Asian neighbors in a sphere in which the West has scarcely distinguished itself either.

In view of the problematic relationship between urbanization and social change in general, the view, implicit in this volume, of the relationship between modernization and urban politics in China should be taken as tentative. It seems worth pointing out that the authors were writing during the period of the Cultural Revolution, a period when group politics seemed the dominant mode of political interaction. Latent interests were allowed, and even encouraged, to surface during this period. The conflict paradigm of city politics shared by many of the contributors, though perhaps valid for the late 1960's, may however no longer be fully valid in the decade of the 1970's.

John Lewis, in characterizing the differences between the Chinese cities in the 1950's and in the 1960's, wrote that they had advanced from the role of simple administrators of central policy to become bureaucracies with some autonomy of their own. He noted, however, that Tangshan's relative autonomy was a function of central permissiveness and that continued autonomy was dependent in the long run on central policy. It may be that the pattern of city leadership in the 1970's, both in relation to the center and to its own constituency, may more closely resemble that which obtained in the 1950's than that which emerged in the period of the Cultural Revolution.

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